PlainBillCongress, translated.Legislation. Context. Public interest.Congressional Research Service
No official summary is available in the imported record yet.
People & committees
Rep. Frost, Maxwell [D-FL-10] · D–FL
Legislative record
A procedural vote is different from passage. Passage in one chamber does not establish enactment. Explore the glossary.
Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Primary sources
Text links open the official source. We also preserved the text version used in the PlainBill explanation below.
No related bills are listed in this snapshot. This does not establish whether the proposal has appeared in earlier Congresses.
Source last updated: Oct 29, 2025. Consult Congress.gov for the current record.
AI Conversation Starters
Choose a perspective, copy a prompt, and paste it into your preferred AI. Each prompt includes the bill version and available official source links, and asks for counterarguments as well as supporting evidence.
Analyze H.R.1788 as objectively as possible. Explain its main provisions, who would be affected, possible benefits and harms, implementation, exceptions, and uncertainties. Present the strongest arguments for and against it, and identify evidence needed to assess its public impact.
Examine H.R.1788 through a progressive lens, focusing on fairness, access, economic inequality, and effects on vulnerable communities. Explain potential benefits, costs, and unintended consequences. Consider the strongest counterarguments and distinguish stated goals from demonstrated outcomes.
Examine H.R.1788 through a conservative lens, focusing on fiscal responsibility, institutional stability, federalism, and the scope of government. Explain potential benefits, costs, and unintended consequences. Consider the strongest counterarguments and any provisions that challenge this perspective.
Examine H.R.1788 through a civil-liberties and limited-government lens. Consider individual rights, privacy, voluntary choice, accountability, and government power. Explain tradeoffs, possible safeguards, and the strongest counterarguments without assuming the proposal is beneficial or harmful.
PlainBill explanation
Based on the full Introduced in House · 2025-03-03 text. This explanation has not received human editorial review. This overview describes the proposal’s major provisions; it does not establish what its real-world effects would be.
The proposed Fair Grocery Pricing Act would prohibit food manufacturers, processors, and producers from paying for or otherwise exchanging value for covered services that combine producers’ price or supply information and recommend commercial terms. It would also prohibit service providers from helping producers agree not to compete. Federal and state authorities would enforce the proposal, and people or entities harmed by violations could sue for three times their damages.
This Act may be cited as the Fair Grocery Pricing Act.
The term food producer means any individual, corporation, or entity engaged in the manufacturing, processing, or production of food products for commercial distribution.
The term coordinating function means— (A) collecting historical or contemporaneous food product prices or supply levels from 2 or more food producers; (B) analyzing or processing of the information described in subparagraph (A) using a system, software, or process that uses computation, including by using that information to train an algorithm; and (C) recommending food prices, supply or output, or other commercial term to a food producer.
It is unlawful for a food producer, in or affecting commerce, or any agent or subcontractor thereof, to subscribe to, contract with, or otherwise exchange anything of value or use in return for the services of a coordinator
It is unlawful for a coordinator, in or affecting commerce, to facilitate an agreement among food producers to not compete with respect to food prices, supply or output, or other commercial term, including by performing a coordinating function.
The Commission shall enforce this Act
The Attorney General shall enforce this Act
Any attorney general of a State shall enforce this Act
Any person who is aggrieved by a violation of this Act may bring a civil action in an appropriate district court of the United States
The court shall award to the plaintiff threefold the damages sustained by the plaintiff
The proposal defines a covered coordinating function as three combined activities: collecting past or current prices or supply levels from at least two food producers, processing that information computationally, and recommending prices, production levels, or other commercial terms. Processing includes using the information to train an algorithm.
The term coordinating function means— (A) collecting historical or contemporaneous food product prices or supply levels from 2 or more food producers; (B) analyzing or processing of the information described in subparagraph (A) using a system, software, or process that uses computation, including by using that information to train an algorithm; and (C) recommending food prices, supply or output, or other commercial term to a food producer.
Covered food producers would include individuals and businesses that manufacture, process, or produce food for commercial distribution. A coordinator would be someone operating a software or data analysis service that performs the covered function, including a producer doing so for its own benefit.
The term food producer means any individual, corporation, or entity engaged in the manufacturing, processing, or production of food products for commercial distribution.
The term coordinator means any person that operates a software or data analytics service that performs a coordinating function for any food producer, including a food producer performing a coordinating function for their own benefit.
For conduct in or affecting commerce, the proposal would prohibit a food producer, its agent, or its subcontractor from subscribing to, contracting with, or exchanging something of value or use for a coordinator’s services. It would classify that conduct as a Sherman Act violation in itself, using the term “per se.”
It is unlawful for a food producer, in or affecting commerce, or any agent or subcontractor thereof, to subscribe to, contract with, or otherwise exchange anything of value or use in return for the services of a coordinator, and such action shall be deemed to be a per se violation of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1 et seq.).
The proposal would separately prohibit a coordinator, in or affecting commerce, from helping food producers agree not to compete on prices, supply, output, or other commercial terms. This includes doing so through a covered coordinating function.
It is unlawful for a coordinator, in or affecting commerce, to facilitate an agreement among food producers to not compete with respect to food prices, supply or output, or other commercial term, including by performing a coordinating function.
The Federal Trade Commission would enforce the proposal using its applicable existing statutory powers. The U.S. Attorney General and state attorneys general would also enforce it using the powers of the antitrust laws specified for each. Here, “State” includes the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and U.S. territories and possessions.
The term Commission means the Federal Trade Commission.
(A) Federal trade commission The Commission shall enforce this Act in the same manner, by the same means, and with the same jurisdiction, powers, and duties as though all applicable terms of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.) were incorporated into and made a part of this Act. (B) Attorney general The Attorney General shall enforce this Act in the same manner, by the same means, and with the same jurisdiction, powers, and duties as though all applicable terms of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1 et seq.), Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.), and Antitrust Civil Process Act (15 U.S.C. 1311 et seq.) were incorporated into and made a part of this Act. (C) State attorneys general Any attorney general of a State shall enforce this Act in the same manner, by the same means, and with the same jurisdiction, powers, and duties as though all applicable terms of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1 et seq.) and the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) were incorporated into and made a part of this Act.
The term State means any of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any territory or possession of the United States.
A violation would also count as an unfair method of competition under the Federal Trade Commission Act. If the Commission had reason to believe someone violated the proposal, it could sue in its own name in federal district court for a civil monetary penalty and other appropriate relief.
A violation of this Act shall also constitute an unfair method of competition under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45).
If the Commission has reason to believe that a person violated this Act, the Commission may commence a civil action, in its own name by any of its attorneys designated by it for such purpose, to recover a civil penalty and seek other appropriate relief in any district court of the United States.
For civil actions under section 4(a), the proposal sets a rule for what a complaint must allege: facts making an agreement restraining trade one plausible possibility would suffice for the specified Sherman Act claims. The complaint would not have to allege facts tending to rule out independent action. The text includes allegations of tacit pricing agreements—understandings that are not expressly stated—between at least two producers of reasonably interchangeable food products.
In a civil action under this subsection, a complaint— (A) plausibly pleads a violation of section 1 or 3(a) of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1, 3(a)) if the complaint contains factual allegations, including allegations of consciously parallel pricing coordination, demonstrating that the existence of a contract, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is among the realm of plausible possibilities; and (B) need not allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
The term consciously parallel pricing coordination means a tacit agreement between 2 or more food producers to raise, lower, change, maintain, or manipulate pricing for the purchase or sale of reasonably interchangeable food products.
A person harmed by a violation could sue in an appropriate federal district court regardless of the amount at stake. The proposal would require an award of three times the damages sustained, plus reasonable litigation costs, including a reasonable attorney fee.
Any person who is aggrieved by a violation of this Act may bring a civil action in an appropriate district court of the United States, without respect to the amount in controversy, to recover an amount described in paragraph (2).
The court shall award to the plaintiff threefold the damages sustained by the plaintiff and the reasonable cost of litigation, including a reasonable attorney fee.
On a plaintiff’s prompt request, a court could award simple interest—interest without compounding—on actual damages. The permitted period would run from service of the pleading stating the claim to judgment, or a shorter period within those dates.
Pursuant to a motion by the plaintiff promptly made, the court may award simple interest on actual damages sustained by the plaintiff for the period beginning on the date of service of the pleading of the plaintiff setting forth a claim under this Act and ending on the date of judgment, or for any shorter period therein.
A plaintiff bringing an authorized private lawsuit could choose to invalidate or prevent enforcement of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement or joint-action waiver relating to a violation. These are agreements made before a dispute arises to use arbitration or give up participation in joint, class, or collective proceedings.
At the election of the plaintiff in an action authorized under paragraph (1), a pre-dispute arbitration agreement or pre-dispute joint action waiver relating to a violation of this Act shall be invalid or unenforceable.
The term pre-dispute arbitration agreement means an agreement between 2 or more parties to arbitrate a dispute between the parties that is made before any dispute has arisen.
The term pre-dispute joint action waiver means an agreement between 2 or more parties, which may be part of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement, that— (A) would prohibit or waive the right of a party to participate in a joint, class, or collective action in a judicial, arbitral, administrative, or other forum relating to a dispute between parties; and (B) is made before any dispute has arisen.
The proposal says it must not be interpreted to modify, impair, or replace the operation of existing antitrust laws.
Nothing in this Act, or any amendment made by this Act, shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the operation of any of the antitrust laws
The proposal would preserve supplemental state, Tribal, city, and local laws, regulations, and ordinances rather than displace them.
Nothing in this Act may be construed to preempt any State, Tribal, city, or local law, regulation, or ordinance that supplements this Act.
If a provision or its application were held unconstitutional, the proposal directs that the remaining provisions and their application would remain unaffected. This is a severability rule intended to keep the rest of the legislation operative.
If any provision of this Act, or the application of such a provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the remaining provisions of this Act, and the application of such provisions to any person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.
The supplied official-actions snapshot, updated October 29, 2025, records introduction in the House and referral to the House Committee on the Judiciary on March 3, 2025.
Source snapshot updated 2025-10-29T08:05:57Z. 2025-03-03: Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary. 2025-03-03: Introduced in House
A closer look
Reviewed version: Introduced in House · 2025-03-03. These findings describe provisions and who may benefit; they are not judgments of waste, corruption, or motive.
This review covers the supplied bill text. “None identified” does not rule out provisions in later versions or accompanying reports and disclosures.
Provisions outside the bill’s main subject, or policy changes attached to appropriations.
None identified in the reviewed text
No unrelated provision or policy change attached to appropriations was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to that version and does not establish absence in other versions or accompanying materials.
Spending directed to particular recipients or places outside ordinary competitive or formula-based allocation.
None identified in the reviewed text
No congressionally directed spending for particular recipients or places was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to that version; accompanying earmark materials were not supplied.
Narrow exceptions, exemptions, or preferential treatment that warrant a closer look.
None identified in the reviewed text
No materially narrow carve-out, special exemption, or preferential treatment was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. Generally available remedies for people harmed by covered violations do not alone constitute targeted benefits. This conclusion is limited to that version.
Full text preserved for this analysis. Legislative record snapshot: Oct 29, 2025. How PlainBill uses AI