PlainBillCongress, translated.Legislation. Context. Public interest.Referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and in addition to the Committee on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Congressional Research Service
Version 00 · Introduced in House · Feb 24, 2025
PIIA Reform Act
This bill establishes a federal Overpayment Czar position, requires federal agencies to identify certain programs and activities as susceptible to improper payments (i.e., payments that should not have been made or were made in an incorrect amount), and imposes financial penalties on agencies for noncompliance with requirements related to reducing improper payments.
The bill establishes the position of Director of Improper Payment Mitigation, to be known as the Overpayment Czar, within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The duties of the Overpayment Czar include assisting federal agencies in preventing improper payments and fraud. Under the bill, federal agencies must additionally identify as susceptible to significant improper payments any program or activity that is in the first four years of operation and has or is expected to have outlays exceeding $100 million in any of the first three fiscal years of operation unless, based upon a review of the program or activity, the agency makes a determination to the contrary. The bill requires a reduction in certain appropriations accounts for agencies that do not comply with various requirements related to reducing improper payments (such as publishing improper payments estimates and programmatic corrective action plans). States receiving funding for certain programs, such as Medicaid and unemployment compensation, must use payment integrity tools approved by OMB to reduce overpayments.
Showing the opening paragraphs of the official summary.
Each annual governmentwide five-year financial management plan produced by OMB must include a plan to decrease improper payments throughout executive agencies.
People & committees
Rep. Meuser, Daniel [R-PA-9] · R–PA
Legislative record
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Referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and in addition to the Committee on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and in addition to the Committee on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Primary sources
Text links open the official source. We also preserved the text version used in the PlainBill explanation below.
No related bills are listed in this snapshot. This does not establish whether the proposal has appeared in earlier Congresses.
Source last updated: Apr 9, 2026. Consult Congress.gov for the current record.
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PlainBill explanation
Based on the full Introduced in House · 2025-02-24 text. This explanation has not received human editorial review. This overview describes the proposal’s major provisions; it does not establish what its real-world effects would be.
The proposed PIIA Reform Act would create a federal official to help agencies address improper payments and fraud. It would expand payment oversight, require states administering specified assistance programs to use federal payment-checking tools, and require further fraud-risk reporting. Agencies that fail compliance requirements would face administrative funding cuts, while states that fail to use required tools would have to repay covered overpayments. These are proposed changes, not established law in the supplied evidence.
This Act may be cited as the PIIA Reform Act.
shall assist executive agencies in the identification, prevention, and mitigation of improper payments and fraud within Federal programs
any executive agency which is in a state of noncompliance according to subsection (b)(1) shall have its highest-level administrative appropriation account reduced
Any State that receives funding in a program described under paragraph (2) shall use each applicable payment integrity tool published pursuant to paragraph (3) and submit a report on the effectiveness of each such tool in accordance with subsection (b).
If a State does not use payment integrity tools as required by this section, that State shall remit payment to the Treasury for the total amount of overpayment in any program covered by this section.
Information on the status of implementing each of the 11 leading practices identified in the report published by the Government Accountability Office on July 28, 2015, entitled Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs.
Section 2 would establish a Director of Improper Payment Mitigation, called the Overpayment Czar, within the Office of Federal Financial Management. That official would work under the office's Controller. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget would appoint the official, could remove them, and would set their pay.
There is established within the Office of Federal Financial Management a Director of Improper Payment Mitigation, to be referred to as the Overpayment Czar— (1) under the direction and control of the Controller; (2) who shall be appointed and may be removed by the Director; and (3) who shall receive a rate of pay fixed by the Director.
(1) Controller The term Controller means the Controller of the Office of Federal Financial Management. (2) Director The term Director means the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.
The new official would have to help executive agencies identify, prevent, and reduce improper payments and fraud, develop recommended strategies, and send the Controller an annual report proposing corrective actions.
(1) shall assist executive agencies in the identification, prevention, and mitigation of improper payments and fraud within Federal programs; and (2) shall develop and recommend strategies that address improper payment in executive agency payments; and (3) shall annually submit to the Controller a report that proposes corrective actions to improve payment integrity and combat fraud effectively across the Federal Government.
The official could recommend policy changes to an executive agency's Chief Financial Officer to help develop reliable estimates of improper payments. This provision grants authority to recommend changes; it does not direct agencies to adopt those recommendations.
The Overpayment Czar may recommend policy changes to the Chief Financial Officer of any executive agency to develop reliable estimates of improper payments.
Section 3 would add the Overpayment Czar to an existing financial-management-plan provision and require the plan to include a strategy for decreasing improper payments throughout executive agencies. The surrounding statutory text is not supplied, so the official's precise role in preparing that plan cannot be determined here.
Section 3512(a)(3) of title 31, United States Code, is amended— (1) in subparagraph (A), by inserting the Overpayment Czar, after the Controller of the Office of Federal Financial Management,
(x) include a plan to decrease improper payments (as defined in section 3351) throughout executive agencies.
Section 4(a) would add criteria to an existing improper-payment provision: new federal programs paying more than $100 million in their first year; programs with an outstanding agency Inspector General recommendation in the specified report; and new programs within their first four operating years whose spending exceeds, or is expected to exceed, $100 million in any of their first three fiscal years. The existing provision's opening language is not reproduced, limiting interpretation of these additions.
(iii) any new Federal program that makes more than $100,000,000 in payments in the first year of operation; (iv) for which the Inspector general of the executive agency has an outstanding recommendation in the report required by subsection (b)(2)(E); or (v) any new Federal program that has or is expected to have outlays exceeding $100,000,000 in any one of the first 3 fiscal years of operation and is in the first 4 years of operation.
Agency heads would have to identify additional programs or activities as susceptible to significant improper payments when they are within their first four operating years and have actual or expected spending above $100 million in any of their first three fiscal years. An agency head could exclude a program or activity if a review under the existing statute determines that it is not susceptible to significant improper payments.
the head of an executive agency shall identify as susceptible to significant improper payments any program or activity that— (i) has or is expected to have outlays exceeding $100,000,000 in any one of the first 3 fiscal years of operation; and (ii) is in the first 4 years of operation.
This paragraph shall not apply with respect to any program or activity that the head of the relevant executive agency determines, based on the results of a review conducted under paragraph (1), is not susceptible to significant improper payments.
Section 4(a) would also update existing cross-references to include the new program-review paragraph. The obligations governed by those cross-references are not reproduced in the bundle.
in subparagraph (C), by striking paragraph (1) each place it appears and inserting paragraphs (1) and (4)
in subsection (c)(1), in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking “subsection (a)(1)” and inserting “paragraphs (1) and (4) of subsection (a)”.
Section 4(b), concerning Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, would add language to Social Security Act section 417 allowing what the Secretary determines necessary to carry out specified federal improper-payment provisions for programs or activities authorized by that part of the Act. The subsection describes this as authority to require data reporting, but the existing section 417 is not supplied, so the precise reach of the change remains uncertain.
(b) Authority To require data reporting for improper payment estimation under the TANF program Section 417 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 617) is amended by striking the period at the end and inserting or as the Secretary may determine is necessary to carry out subsections (a) through (e) of section 3352 of title 31, United States Code, with respect to any program or activity authorized by this part.
Starting in the first fiscal year after enactment, an executive agency found noncompliant under the referenced existing standard would face a 5% reduction in its highest-level administrative funding account. The reduction would use the account's funding authority in the most recently enacted applicable appropriations law and would be made through the specified final sequestration report—the federal budget-cutting mechanism named in the bill.
Beginning with the first fiscal year after the date of the enactment of this subsection, any executive agency which is in a state of noncompliance according to subsection (b)(1) shall have its highest-level administrative appropriation account reduced in the final sequestration report issued under the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 for that fiscal year by an amount equal to 5 percent of the total budget authority provided for that account in the most recently enacted applicable appropriation Act.
For an agency noncompliant for two or more fiscal years after enactment, the specified administrative-account reduction would be 10%. The text does not say those years must be consecutive.
If the executive agency is noncompliant for two or more fiscal years after the date of the enactment of this subsection, then the highest-level administrative appropriation account shall be reduced in the final sequestration report issued under the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 for that fiscal year by an amount equal to 10 percent of the total budget authority provided for that account in the most recently enacted applicable appropriation Act.
Section 4(d) would require each agency head to report to Congress annually for ten fiscal years, beginning with the first fiscal year after enactment. The report would be included in the report containing the agency's annual financial statement.
For each fiscal year beginning in the first fiscal year after the date of the enactment of this subsection, and in each of the following 9 fiscal years, the head of each agency shall submit to Congress, in the report containing the annual financial statement of the agency, a report on the following:
Those reports would describe progress implementing required financial and administrative controls, Government Accountability Office fraud-risk principles, and Office of Management and Budget guidance on leading fraud-risk practices.
(A) The progress of the agency in the following: (i) The implementation of the following: (I) The financial and administrative controls required to be established under subsection (c)(1). (II) The fraud risk principles in the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government of the Government Accountability Office. (III) Circular A–123 of the Office of Management and Budget with respect to the leading practices for managing fraud risk.
Agencies would also report progress identifying fraud risks involving payroll, beneficiary payments, grants, large contracts, and purchase and travel cards; steps to curb fraud; and the implementation status of all 11 leading practices in the Government Accountability Office's July 28, 2015 fraud-risk framework.
(ii) The identification of fraud risks and vulnerabilities, including with respect to payroll, beneficiary payments, grants, large contracts, and purchase and travel cards. (iii) The establishment of strategies, procedures, and other steps to curb fraud. (B) Information on the status of implementing each of the 11 leading practices identified in the report published by the Government Accountability Office on July 28, 2015, entitled Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs.
Agencies could avoid a separate, duplicative report if their annual financial statement, or an alternative report included in it, already provides the required information. The agency head could instead include a brief statement explaining that the requirement has been fulfilled.
If the annual financial statement of an agency, or an alternative report of the agency included in the annual financial statement, includes information that fulfills the requirements of this subsection, the head of the agency may include a brief statement to that effect in the financial statement or alternative report without duplicating the information required under this subsection in a separate or standalone report.
Section 4(e) would require states receiving funding under the listed programs to use every applicable payment-integrity tool—tools intended to reduce overpayments—on a list published by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. States would also have to report on each tool's effectiveness.
Any State that receives funding in a program described under paragraph (2) shall use each applicable payment integrity tool published pursuant to paragraph (3) and submit a report on the effectiveness of each such tool in accordance with subsection (b).
The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall publish a list of payment integrity tools that each State shall use to reduce overpayments.
The listed programs are Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, federal-state unemployment compensation, and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children.
(A) The program of block grants to States for temporary assistance for needy families under part A of title IV of the Social Security Act. (B) The Medicaid program under title XIX of the Social Security Act. (C) The supplemental nutrition assistance program under the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 (7 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.). (D) The Federal-State unemployment compensation program under titles III, IX, and XII of the Social Security Act. (E) The special supplemental nutrition program for women, infants, and children established by section 17 of the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1786).
Each state would have to report to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget by September 30 each year on its use of payment-integrity tools and an analysis of their effects.
Not later than September 30 of each year, each State shall submit to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget a report that includes— (1) the usage by that State of payment integrity tools; and (2) an analysis on the effect of using payment integrity tools.
A state that failed to use the required tools would have to pay the Treasury the total overpayment amount in any covered program. The repayment language does not limit liability to overpayments shown to have resulted from failing to use a tool.
If a State does not use payment integrity tools as required by this section, that State shall remit payment to the Treasury for the total amount of overpayment in any program covered by this section.
The new state-tool requirements, reporting duties, and repayment provision would take effect one year after enactment.
Section 3359 of title 31, United States Code, as added by paragraph (1), shall take effect on the date that is one year after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Section 4(f) would remove a three-year time limit from the existing Social Security Act data-sharing provision. It would also replace language about preventing payments to deceased people with language covering the authorized uses of the Do Not Pay working system. The underlying provision and the system's authorized uses are not reproduced, so the full scope of data sharing cannot be determined from this bundle.
Section 205(r)(11) of the Social Security Act is amended— (1) by striking During the 3-year period that begins on the effective date of this paragraph, the and inserting The; and (2) by striking to prevent improper payments to deceased individuals and inserting for the authorized uses of the Do Not Pay working system.
The supplied official-actions snapshot, updated April 9, 2026, records introduction in the House on February 24, 2025, and referral that day to the Committees on Oversight and Government Reform and Ways and Means, each for provisions within its jurisdiction. This snapshot does not establish subsequent action or enactment.
Source snapshot updated 2026-04-09T15:32:42Z.
2025-02-24: Introduced in House
2025-02-24: Referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and in addition to the Committee on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
A closer look
Reviewed version: Introduced in House · 2025-02-24. These findings describe provisions and who may benefit; they are not judgments of waste, corruption, or motive.
This review covers the supplied bill text. “None identified” does not rule out provisions in later versions or accompanying reports and disclosures.
Provisions outside the bill’s main subject, or policy changes attached to appropriations.
None identified in the reviewed text
No unrelated provision or policy rider attached to appropriations was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion applies only to that version and does not establish attachment history or the contents of other versions or accompanying materials.
Spending directed to particular recipients or places outside ordinary competitive or formula-based allocation.
None identified in the reviewed text
No congressionally directed spending for particular recipients or places was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to that version; formal earmark status in accompanying materials is not established.
Narrow exceptions, exemptions, or preferential treatment that warrant a closer look.
None identified in the reviewed text
No materially narrow preferential benefit, special exemption, or carve-out was identified in the complete supplied introduced text under the stated criteria. This conclusion applies only to that version, not other versions or accompanying materials.
Full text preserved for this analysis. Legislative record snapshot: Apr 9, 2026. How PlainBill uses AI