PlainBillCongress, translated.Legislation. Context. Public interest.Referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Congressional Research Service
No official summary is available in the imported record yet.
People & committees
Rep. Franklin, Scott [R-FL-18] · R–FL
Legislative record
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Referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Primary sources
Text links open the official source. We also preserved the text version used in the PlainBill explanation below.
No related bills are listed in this snapshot. This does not establish whether the proposal has appeared in earlier Congresses.
Source last updated: Nov 18, 2025. Consult Congress.gov for the current record.
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PlainBill explanation
Based on the full Introduced in House · 2025-02-21 text. This explanation has not received human editorial review. This overview describes the proposal’s major provisions; it does not establish what its real-world effects would be.
The proposed Cardiac Arrest Survival Act of 2025 would replace a federal provision governing civil liability for emergency use of automated external defibrillators (AEDs), devices that can automatically assess whether to deliver an electrical shock to a person. It would protect emergency users, device owners, and certain premises owners, tenants, and managers from liability for resulting harm, subject to exceptions. Those exceptions include serious misconduct, certain health care uses, and owners’ maintenance failures that proximately cause harm.
This Act may be cited as the Cardiac Arrest Survival Act of 2025.
Section 248 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 238q) is amended to read as follows:
Except as provided in subsection (e), a person described in paragraph (2) is immune from civil liability for any harm resulting from the use or attempted use of an automated external defibrillator device (in this section referred to as an AED).
owns, occupies under a lease or similar arrangement, or manages
Except as provided in subsection (e), an owner-acquirer of an AED is immune from civil liability for any harm resulting from the use or attempted use of such AED, unless the harm was proximately caused by the failure of the owner-acquirer to properly maintain the AED according to the guidelines of the manufacturer of the AED.
such person’s willful or criminal misconduct, gross negligence, reckless misconduct, or a conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of the victim proximately caused the harm involved
such person is a licensed or certified health professional who used the AED while acting within the scope of the license or certification of the professional and within the scope of the employment or agency of the professional
is capable of determining without intervention by the user of the device whether defibrillation should be performed; (iii) upon determining that defibrillation should be performed, is able to deliver an electrical shock to an individual
Section 2 states Congress’s rationale: inconsistent state liability protections discourage AED deployment, particularly for organizations operating in multiple states. It predicts that a national baseline would encourage more AEDs and save lives. These are the bill’s findings and predictions, not demonstrated effects in the supplied evidence.
The current patchwork of State Good Samaritan laws provides incomplete, inconsistent, and, in some instances, inadequate protection for entities considering the acquisition or deployment of AEDs.
Such concerns are especially acute for entities with operations or facilities in multiple States
will encourage the deployment of additional AEDs, which will ultimately save lives that would otherwise have been lost to cardiac arrest.
Subject to the bill’s exceptions, someone who uses or attempts to use an AED on a person in a perceived medical emergency would receive protection from civil liability for resulting harm. This particular protection excludes the device’s owner-acquirer, whose protection is addressed separately.
(a) Good samaritan protections (1) In general Except as provided in subsection (e), a person described in paragraph (2) is immune from civil liability for any harm resulting from the use or attempted use of an automated external defibrillator device (in this section referred to as an AED). (2) Good Samaritan described A person described in this paragraph is a person who— (A) uses or attempts to use an AED on a victim of a perceived medical emergency, and (B) is not the owner-acquirer (as defined in subsection (c)(2)) of the AED.
Subject to the exceptions, the proposal would also protect owners, tenants or similar occupants, and managers of premises where an AED is used or attempted to be used, or from which it is taken for that use. This premises-based protection excludes the AED’s owner-acquirer.
(b) Premises owner/Lessee/Manager protections (1) In general Except as provided in subsection (e), a person described in paragraph (2) is immune from civil liability for any harm resulting from such use or attempted use of an AED. (2) Premises owner/lessee/manager described A person described in this paragraph is a person who— (A) owns, occupies under a lease or similar arrangement, or manages— (i) the premises at which an AED is used or attempted to be used on a victim of a perceived medical emergency, or (ii) the premises from which an AED used or attempted to be used on a victim of a perceived medical emergency is taken for such use, and (B) is not the owner-acquirer of such AED.
An owner-acquirer means someone who owns or has otherwise acquired a possessory property interest in an AED used or attempted to be used on a victim of a perceived medical emergency. Subject to the other exceptions, that person would be protected from civil liability for resulting harm unless a failure to maintain the device according to its manufacturer’s guidelines proximately caused the harm.
(c) Device owner-Acquirer protections (1) In general Except as provided in subsection (e), an owner-acquirer of an AED is immune from civil liability for any harm resulting from the use or attempted use of such AED, unless the harm was proximately caused by the failure of the owner-acquirer to properly maintain the AED according to the guidelines of the manufacturer of the AED. (2) Owner-acquirer defined For purposes of this section, the term owner-acquirer means any person who owns or has otherwise acquired a possessory property interest in an AED that is used or attempted to be used on a victim of a perceived medical emergency.
Protection would not depend on government registration, warnings restricting AED use, the user’s compliance with those warnings, AED training, or assistance or supervision by another person, including a physician. The misconduct and health care exceptions would still apply.
The immunity provided by subsections (a), (b), and (c) of this section shall apply regardless of whether— (1) the AED that is used or attempted to be used is marked with, or accompanied by, cautionary signage; (2) the AED that is used or attempted to be used is registered with any government; (3) the person who used or attempted to use the AED saw, read, understood, complied with, or attempted to comply with any cautionary signage present; (4) the person who used or attempted to use the AED had received any training relating to the use of— (A) AEDs in general; or (B) the particular AED used or attempted to be used; or (5) the person who used or attempted to use the AED was assisted or supervised by any other person, including a licensed physician.
The term cautionary signage means, with respect to an AED, any verbal or non-verbal markings or language purporting to limit use of the AED by members of the general public or to permit use of the AED only by persons with specific skills, qualifications, or training.
Notwithstanding subsection (d), immunity under subsection (a), (b), or (c)(1) does not apply to a person if—
Protection would be unavailable when the person’s willful or criminal misconduct, gross negligence, reckless misconduct, or conscious and flagrant disregard for the victim’s rights or safety proximately caused the harm.
immunity under subsection (a), (b), or (c)(1) does not apply to a person if— (1) such person’s willful or criminal misconduct, gross negligence, reckless misconduct, or a conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of the victim proximately caused the harm involved
A licensed or certified health professional would not receive this protection when using the AED both within the scope of that professional credential and within the scope of employment or an agency role.
such person is a licensed or certified health professional who used the AED while acting within the scope of the license or certification of the professional and within the scope of the employment or agency of the professional
Hospitals, clinics, and other entities whose purpose is directly providing patient care would not receive this protection when harm was caused by an employee or agent using an AED within the scope of that role.
such person is a hospital, clinic, or other entity whose purpose is providing health care directly to patients, and the harm was caused by an employee or agent of the entity who used the AED while acting within the scope of the employment or agency of the employee or agent
An owner-acquirer who leases an AED to a health care entity, or otherwise provides it for compensation without selling it, would be ineligible for this protection if harm was caused by that entity’s employee or agent using the device within the scope of the role.
such person is an owner-acquirer of the AED who leased the AED to a health care entity (or who otherwise provided the AED to such entity for compensation without selling the AED to the entity), and the harm was caused by an employee or agent of the entity who used the AED while acting within the scope of the employment or agency of the employee or agent.
The proposal would neither create a new legal right to sue nor require AED installation at any location. It would override state law to the extent that state law would allow civil liability where this provision grants protection.
(A) This section does not establish any cause of action, or require that an AED be placed at any building or other location. (B) With respect to the class of persons for which this section provides immunity from civil liability, this section preempts the law of any State to the extent that the otherwise-applicable State law would allow for civil liability in any circumstance where this section would provide immunity from civil liability.
The proposal would preserve federal officers’ and employees’ liability protections under the listed federal statutes and qualifying alternative federal benefits arrangements.
This section does not waive any protection from liability for Federal officers or employees under— (i) section 233 of this title; or (ii) sections 1346(b), 2672, and 2679 of title 28, United States Code, or under alternative benefits provided by the United States where the availability of such benefits precludes a remedy under section 1346(b) of such title 28.
The protections and exceptions would also apply to covered civil liability cases arising under federal law.
The applicability of subsections (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) includes applicability to any action for civil liability described in subsection (a), (b), or (c) that arises under Federal law.
For federal areas located within a state but outside its jurisdiction, the proposal addresses circumstances in which federal law makes state law applicable to matters lacking applicable federal law. In covered civil liability cases arising under that state law, the proposal’s subsections (a) through (f) would apply in place of related state rules.
If a geographic area is under Federal jurisdiction and is located within a State but out of the jurisdiction of the State, and if, pursuant to Federal law, the law of the State applies in such area regarding matters for which there is no applicable Federal law, then an action for civil liability described in subsection (a), (b), or (c) that in such area arises under the law of the State is subject to subsections (a) through (f) in lieu of any related State law that would apply in such area in the absence of this subparagraph.
State courts would have authority to apply these provisions in state-law civil cases. Applying, invoking, or potentially invoking the provisions would not itself establish federal courts’ original jurisdiction over the action or claim under 28 U.S.C. 1331.
(g) Federal jurisdiction (1) In any civil action arising under State law, the courts of the State involved have jurisdiction to apply the provisions of this section. (2) The actual, asserted, or potential application of any provision of this section in any civil action or as to any civil claim shall not establish the original jurisdiction of the Federal courts over such action or claim under section 1331 of title 28, United States Code.
A perceived medical emergency would mean behavior that leads a reasonable person to believe someone has a life-threatening condition requiring an immediate response involving the heart or other cardiopulmonary functioning.
the term perceived medical emergency means circumstances in which the behavior of an individual leads a reasonable person to believe that the individual is experiencing a life-threatening medical condition that requires an immediate medical response regarding the heart or other cardiopulmonary functioning of the individual.
A covered AED would have to be commercially distributed in accordance with the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, detect whether ventricular fibrillation is present, determine without user intervention whether defibrillation should be performed, and be able to deliver an electrical shock. A device offering both manual and automatic operation would have to be set to automatic mode.
The term automated external defibrillator device or AED means a defibrillator device that— (i) is commercially distributed in accordance with the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; (ii) is capable of recognizing the presence or absence of ventricular fibrillation, and is capable of determining without intervention by the user of the device whether defibrillation should be performed; (iii) upon determining that defibrillation should be performed, is able to deliver an electrical shock to an individual; and (iv) in the case of a defibrillator device that may be operated in either an automated or a manual mode, is set to operate in the automated mode.
The covered harm would include physical and nonphysical losses, financial losses, and losses such as pain and emotional suffering. The definition of financial loss includes lost earnings, medical expenses, burial costs, and lost opportunities, to the extent applicable state law allows recovery.
(i) The term harm includes physical, nonphysical, economic, and noneconomic losses. (ii) The term economic loss means any pecuniary loss resulting from harm (including the loss of earnings or other benefits related to employment, medical expense loss, replacement services loss, loss due to death, burial costs, and loss of business or employment opportunities) to the extent recovery for such loss is allowed under applicable State law.
The term noneconomic losses means losses for physical and emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium (other than loss of domestic service), hedonic damages, injury to reputation and all other nonpecuniary losses of any kind or nature.
The supplied actions snapshot, updated November 18, 2025, records introduction in the House and referral to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce on February 21, 2025.
Source snapshot updated 2025-11-18T09:05:37Z. 2025-02-21: Referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. 2025-02-21: Introduced in House
A closer look
Reviewed version: Introduced in House · 2025-02-21. These findings describe provisions and who may benefit; they are not judgments of waste, corruption, or motive.
This review covers the supplied bill text. “None identified” does not rule out provisions in later versions or accompanying reports and disclosures.
Provisions outside the bill’s main subject, or policy changes attached to appropriations.
None identified in the reviewed text
No unrelated provision or policy change attached to appropriations was identified after reviewing the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to that version and does not establish absence in other versions or accompanying materials.
Spending directed to particular recipients or places outside ordinary competitive or formula-based allocation.
None identified in the reviewed text
No congressionally directed spending for particular recipients or places was identified after reviewing the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to that version and does not establish absence in other versions or accompanying materials; formal earmark disclosures were not supplied.
Narrow exceptions, exemptions, or preferential treatment that warrant a closer look.
None identified in the reviewed text
No materially narrow carve-out, special exemption, or preferential treatment warranting a finding was identified after reviewing the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to that version and does not establish absence in other versions or accompanying materials.
Full text preserved for this analysis. Legislative record snapshot: Nov 18, 2025. How PlainBill uses AI