PlainBillCongress, translated.Legislation. Context. Public interest.Referred to the Subcommittee on Aviation.
Congressional Research Service
No official summary is available in the imported record yet.
People & committees
Rep. Mills, Cory [R-FL-7] · R–FL
Legislative record
A procedural vote is different from passage. Passage in one chamber does not establish enactment. Explore the glossary.
Referred to the Subcommittee on Aviation.
Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure, the Judiciary, and Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure, the Judiciary, and Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure, the Judiciary, and Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure, the Judiciary, and Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Primary sources
Text links open the official source. We also preserved the text version used in the PlainBill explanation below.
No related bills are listed in this snapshot. This does not establish whether the proposal has appeared in earlier Congresses.
Source last updated: May 7, 2025. Consult Congress.gov for the current record.
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PlainBill explanation
Based on the full Introduced in House · 2025-02-14 text. This explanation has not received human editorial review. This overview describes the proposal’s major provisions; it does not establish what its real-world effects would be.
This bill would let the State Department counter drones posing credible threats to certain high-risk facilities or assets in the United States connected to its security and protection missions. Authorized actions would include intercepting drone-control communications, taking control of drones, and using reasonable force to damage or destroy them. The proposal would require aviation coordination and privacy safeguards. Its main threat-response authority would expire seven years after enactment.
the Secretary of State may take, and may authorize appropriate personnel, including Bureau of Diplomatic Security personnel and contractors, with assigned duties that include safety, security, or protection of personnel, facilities, or assets, to take, such actions described in subsection (b)(1) that are necessary to mitigate a credible threat
(A) is identified as high-risk and a potential target for unlawful unmanned aircraft activity by the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Federal Aviation Administration, with respect to potentially impacted airspace, through a risk-based assessment for purposes of this section; (B) is located in the United States (including the territories and possessions of the United States); (C) directly relates to the security and protective missions of the Department of State
including by means of intercept or other access of a wire communication, an oral communication, or an electronic communication used to control the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft.
(D) Seize or exercise control of the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft. (E) Seize or otherwise confiscate the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft. (F) Use reasonable force to disable, damage, or destroy the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft.
The Secretary of State shall coordinate with the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration prior to any action authorized by this section
the interception or acquisition of, access to, or maintenance or use of communications to or from an unmanned aircraft system under this section is conducted in a manner consistent with the First and Fourth Amendments to the Constitution and applicable provisions of Federal law
The authority provided by subsection (a) shall terminate on the date that is 7 years after the enactment of this Act.
The Secretary of State could authorize actions necessary to address a credible drone threat to a covered facility or asset. The Secretary would define a credible threat in consultation with the Federal Aviation Administration. This authority would operate despite the specifically listed federal laws; those laws are not reproduced in the bundle.
Notwithstanding section 46502 of title 49, United States Code, sections 32, 1030, 1367, and chapters 119 and 206 of title 18, United States Code, or section 705 of the Communications Act of 1934, the Secretary of State may take, and may authorize appropriate personnel, including Bureau of Diplomatic Security personnel and contractors, with assigned duties that include safety, security, or protection of personnel, facilities, or assets, to take, such actions described in subsection (b)(1) that are necessary to mitigate a credible threat (as defined by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Federal Aviation Administration) that an unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft poses to the safety or security of a covered facility or asset.
Covered facilities or assets would have to be identified through a risk assessment as high-risk potential targets, be located in the United States or its territories or possessions, and directly relate to State Department security and protection missions. For the specified personal-protection duties, coverage would be limited to a set period at a fixed location.
the term covered facility or asset means any facility or asset that— (A) is identified as high-risk and a potential target for unlawful unmanned aircraft activity by the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Federal Aviation Administration, with respect to potentially impacted airspace, through a risk-based assessment for purposes of this section; (B) is located in the United States (including the territories and possessions of the United States); (C) directly relates to the security and protective missions of the Department of State, including those consistent with— (i) the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 (22 U.S.C. 4801, et seq.); and (ii) section 37 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2709); and (D) when fulfilling personal protection responsibilities consistent with 22 U.S.C. 4802(a)(1)(D), 4802(a)(2)(B)(vii), 4802 (a)(2)(B)(viii), and 2709(a)(3), is limited to a specified timeframe at a static location
While a drone system is operating, authorized personnel could detect, identify, monitor, and track it without prior consent, including by intercepting its control communications. They could also warn its operator through physical or electronic means.
(A) During the operation of the unmanned aircraft system, detect, identify, monitor, and track the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft, without prior consent, including by means of intercept or other access of a wire communication, an oral communication, or an electronic communication used to control the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft. (B) Warn the operator of the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft, including by passive or active, and direct or indirect physical, electronic, radio, and electromagnetic means.
Authorized personnel could disrupt drone control without prior consent, including by interfering with control communications. They could take control of or confiscate a drone and use reasonable force to disable, damage, or destroy it.
(C) Disrupt control of the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft, without prior consent, including by disabling the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft by intercepting, interfering, or causing interference with wire, oral, electronic, or radio communications used to control the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft. (D) Seize or exercise control of the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft. (E) Seize or otherwise confiscate the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft. (F) Use reasonable force to disable, damage, or destroy the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft.
Operational personnel would need assigned safety, security, or protection duties and training and certification, including training on drone threats and airspace risks. Contractors conducting operations would have to contract directly with the State Department, operate at government-owned or government-leased facilities, avoid functions reserved to government, and meet department training and certification requirements.
the term personnel— (A) means officers, employees, and contractors of the Department of State with assigned duties that include safety, security, or protection of personnel, facilities, or assets and who are trained and certified to perform such duties, including training specific to countering unmanned aircraft threats and mitigating risks in the national airspace; and (B) includes contractors conducting operations under subsections (a) and (b) if the contractors are— (i) directly contracted by the Department of State; (ii) operating at a government owned or government leased facility; (iii) not conducting inherently governmental functions; and (iv) trained and certified by the Department of State as meeting established Department guidance and regulations
Before using equipment for the authorized drone-response actions, the Secretary would have to research, test, train on, and evaluate its capability and usefulness. This requirement would operate despite the listed federal laws. Personnel and contractors without protective duties could participate in these preparatory activities.
Notwithstanding section 46502 of title 49, United States Code, sections 32, 1030, 1367, and chapters 119 and 206 of title 18, United States Code, or section 705 of the Communications Act of 1934, the Secretary of State shall conduct research, testing, training on, and evaluation of any equipment, including any electronic equipment, to determine its capability and utility prior to the use of any such technology for any action described in paragraph (1). Personnel, including contractors, who do not have duties that include the safety, security, or protection of people, facilities, or assets may engage in research, testing, training, and evaluation activities pursuant to this section.
Before research, testing, training, or evaluation begins, the Secretary would have to coordinate the governing procedures with the Federal Aviation Administration to protect airport operations, navigation, air traffic services, and safe and efficient airspace use.
The Secretary shall coordinate procedures governing research, testing, training, and evaluation for carrying out any provision in this section with the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration before initiating such activities so the Administrator may ensure the activities do not adversely impact or interfere with safe airport operations, navigation, air traffic services, or the safe and efficient operation of the national airspace system.
A drone seized under the threat-response authority would be subject to forfeiture—legal loss of the property to the federal government—under the procedures in chapter 46 of title 18. The bill does not reproduce those procedures.
Any unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft described in subsection (a) that is seized by the Secretary of State is subject to forfeiture to the United States pursuant to the provisions of chapter 46 of title 18, United States Code.
The Secretaries of State and Transportation could issue regulations and would have to issue guidance within their respective responsibilities, consulting the specified Commerce Department official. The State Department would also have to coordinate development of its actions, regulations, and guidance with the aviation and communications agencies named in the bill.
The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, may prescribe regulations and shall issue guidance in the respective areas of each Secretary to carry out this section.
The Secretary of State shall develop the actions described in subsection (b)(1) in coordination with the Secretary of Transportation (through the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration), and the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration.
The Secretary of State shall coordinate the development of guidance and regulations under subsection (d) with the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Communications Commission, and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration.
The Secretary would have to coordinate with the Federal Aviation Administration before any authorized action. Coordination would also be required before issuing guidance or otherwise implementing the section, with the aim of preserving safe airport operations and safe and efficient airspace use.
The Secretary of State shall coordinate with the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration prior to any action authorized by this section so the Administrator may ensure the action does not adversely impact or interfere with safe airport operations, navigation, air traffic services, or the safe and efficient operation of the national airspace system.
Before issuing any guidance under subsection (d), or otherwise implementing this section, the Secretary of State shall coordinate with the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration to ensure such guidance or implementation is designed to preserve safe airport operations, navigation, air traffic services, and the safe and efficient operation of the national airspace system.
Risk assessments would have to consider site-specific threats, aviation safety and infrastructure, ways to reduce airspace impacts, consequences of leaving those impacts unaddressed, and the ability to give aircraft operators reasonable advance notice. Mitigation options would include minimizing signal-disrupting technology when possible.
the term risk-based assessment includes an evaluation of threat information specific to a covered facility or asset and, with respect to potential impacts on the safety and efficiency of the national airspace system and the needs of law enforcement and national security at each covered facility or asset identified by the Secretary
(A) Potential impacts to safety, efficiency, and use of the national airspace system, including potential effects on manned aircraft and unmanned aircraft 30 systems, aviation safety, airport operations, infrastructure, and air navigation services related to the use of any system or technology for carrying out the actions described in subsection (b)(1). (B) Options for mitigating any identified impacts to the national airspace system related to the use of any system or technology, including minimizing when possible the use of any technology which disrupts the transmission of radio or electronic signals, for carrying out the actions described in subsection (b)(1). (C) Potential consequences of the impacts of any actions taken under subsection (b)(l) to the national airspace system and infrastructure if not mitigated. (D) The ability to provide reasonable advance notice to aircraft operators consistent with the safety of the national airspace system and the needs of law enforcement and national security.
Risk assessments would also have to consider nearby people and structures, public access, nongovernmental uses of the site, possible wireless interference, and risks of injury or property damage. They would also examine consequences for national security, public safety, or law enforcement if drone threats were not addressed.
(E) The setting and character of any covered facility or asset, including whether it is located in a populated area or near other structures, whether the facility is open to the public, whether the facility is also used for nongovernmental functions, and any potential for interference with wireless communications or for injury or damage to persons or property. (F) Potential consequences to national security, public safety, or law enforcement if threats posed by unmanned aircraft systems are not mitigated or resolved
Regulations or guidance would have to require handling drone communications consistently with the First and Fourth Amendments and applicable federal law. Interception, acquisition, or access would be limited to what is necessary to support the authorized actions.
The regulations prescribed or guidance issued under subsection (d) shall ensure that— (1) the interception or acquisition of, access to, or maintenance or use of communications to or from an unmanned aircraft system under this section is conducted in a manner consistent with the First and Fourth Amendments to the Constitution and applicable provisions of Federal law; (2) communications to or from an unmanned aircraft system are intercepted, acquired, or accessed only to the extent necessary to support the actions described in subsection (b)
Communication records could be kept only as long as necessary, generally no more than 180 days. Longer retention would require the Secretary to determine that it is necessary for an investigation or prosecution, directly supports ongoing security, law-enforcement, or national-defense operations, or is required by federal statute, regulation, or litigation.
records of such communications are maintained only for as long as necessary, and in no event more than 180 days, unless the Secretary of State determines that maintenance of such records— (A) is necessary to investigate or assist in the prosecution of a violation of law; (B) is necessary to directly support an ongoing security, law enforcement, or national defense operations; or (C) is required under Federal statue, regulation, or for the purpose of litigation
Disclosure of drone communications outside the State Department would generally be prohibited, with exceptions for investigating or prosecuting legal violations; supporting specified defense, intelligence, security, or law-enforcement agencies; related federal regulatory enforcement; exchanges with law enforcement during security or protection operations; or disclosures otherwise required by law.
such communications are not disclosed outside the Department of State unless the disclosure— (A) is necessary to investigate or assist in the prosecution of a violation of law; (B) would support the Department of Defense, a Federal law enforcement, intelligence, or security agency, or a State, local, tribal, or territorial law enforcement agency; (C) would support the enforcement activities of a regulatory agency of the Federal Government in connection with a criminal or civil investigation of, or any regulatory, statutory, or other enforcement action relating to, an action described in subsection (b); (D) is between the Department of State and a Federal, State, local, tribal, or territorial law enforcement agency in the course of a security or protection operation of either agency or a joint operations of such agencies; or (E) is otherwise required by law.
For each fiscal year following enactment, the Secretary would have to identify the State Department funding source for drone-response actions in its budget presentation to Congress. This funding display would be unclassified but could include a classified annex.
The Secretary of State shall submit to Congress, as a part of the budget presentation documents for each fiscal year following the enactment of this provision, a consolidated funding display that identifies the funding source for the actions described in subsection (b)(1) within the Department of State. The funding display shall be in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.
The Secretary could use, request, or accept supplies, services, or funds from federal agencies and other public or private entities, with or without reimbursement, despite laws that would prevent their use or acceptance. The Secretary could also make agreements to carry out the covered security and protection responsibilities.
The Secretary is authorized to use, solicit, or accept from any other Federal agency, or any other public or private entity, supplies, services, or funds to facilitate or take the actions provided for in subsection (b). The Secretary may use, solicit, or accept such supplies, services, or funds with or without reimbursement and notwithstanding any provision of law that would prevent such use or acceptance. The Secretary in implementing subsection (l)(3)(C) may enter into agreements with other executive agencies and with appropriate officials of other non-Federal public or private agencies or entities, as may be necessary and proper to carry out their responsibilities under this section.
The Secretary could assist another department or agency with missions under three specified laws when that agency requests help and urgent circumstances exist. Assistance would be limited to a specified time and place, use available resources, and require aviation coordination; reimbursement could be required or waived.
The Secretary is authorized to provide support or assistance, upon the request of an agency or department conducting a mission specified in section 210G of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124n), section 130i of title 10, United States Code, or section 4510 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2661), in fulfilling the requesting agency’s or department’s roles and responsibilities for that mission, when exigent circumstances exist, limited to a specified timeframe and location, within available resources, on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis, in coordination with the Federal Aviation Administration.
Starting six months after enactment, the Secretaries of State and Transportation would have to jointly brief the designated congressional committees every six months during the seven-year period beginning at enactment. Briefings would be unclassified, with an additional classified briefing allowed.
On a semiannual basis beginning six months following the enactment of this provision during the seven-year period beginning upon enactment of this provision, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Transportation shall jointly provide a briefing to the appropriate congressional committees on the activities carried out pursuant to this section.
Each briefing under paragraph (1) shall be in unclassified form but may be accompanied by an additional classified briefing.
the term appropriate congressional committees means— (A) the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee; (B) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate; and (C) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives
Briefings would have to cover measures to reduce airspace impacts, uses of the drone-response powers, privacy and civil-liberties safeguards and significant changes to them, public notice about possible use of the powers, engagement with law enforcement, and effects on lawful drone operators’ airspace access and drone integration.
Such briefings shall include a description of— (A) policies, programs, and procedures to mitigate or eliminate impacts of such activities to the National Airspace System; (B) instances where actions described in subsection (b)(1) have been taken; (C) the guidance, policies, or procedures established to address privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties issues implicated by the actions authorized under this section and any changes or subsequent efforts that would significantly affect privacy, civil rights, or civil liberties; (D) how the Secretaries have informed the public as to the possible use of authorities under this section; (E) how the Secretaries have engaged with Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies to implement and use such authorities; and (F) a description of the impact of the authorities granted under this section on lawful operator access to national airspace and UAS integration into the national airspace system.
The section would not transfer the Transportation Secretary’s or Federal Aviation Administration administrator’s title 49 powers to the Secretary of State, or transfer the Secretary of State’s powers to those officials.
Nothing in this section may be construed to— (1) vest in the Secretary of State any authority of the Secretary of Transportation or the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration under title 49, United States Code; and (2) vest in the Secretary of Transportation or the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration any authority of the Secretary of State.
The threat-response authority in subsection (a) would expire seven years after enactment. The termination clause specifically names that authority.
The authority provided by subsection (a) shall terminate on the date that is 7 years after the enactment of this Act.
The bill would use existing statutory definitions for drones and drone systems, and for specified communications and interception terms. Those definitions are incorporated by reference rather than reproduced.
the terms electronic communication, intercept, oral communication, and wire communication have the meanings given those terms in section 2510 of title 18, United States Code
the terms unmanned aircraft and unmanned aircraft system have the meanings given those terms in section 44801 of title 49, United States Code.
The supplied actions snapshot, updated May 7, 2025, records introduction in the House on February 14, 2025, referrals to four House committees, and referral to the Aviation Subcommittee on that date. This snapshot does not establish subsequent legislative developments.
Source snapshot updated 2025-05-07T16:23:28Z. 2025-02-14: Referred to the Subcommittee on Aviation. 2025-02-14: Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure, the Judiciary, and Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
2025-02-14: Introduced in House
A closer look
Reviewed version: Introduced in House · 2025-02-14. These findings describe provisions and who may benefit; they are not judgments of waste, corruption, or motive.
This review covers the supplied bill text. “None identified” does not rule out provisions in later versions or accompanying reports and disclosures.
Provisions outside the bill’s main subject, or policy changes attached to appropriations.
None identified in the reviewed text
No unrelated provision or policy rider attached to appropriations was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to that version and does not establish absence in other versions or accompanying materials.
Spending directed to particular recipients or places outside ordinary competitive or formula-based allocation.
None identified in the reviewed text
No congressionally directed spending for a particular recipient or place was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to that version; formal earmark disclosures and accompanying materials are not supplied.
Narrow exceptions, exemptions, or preferential treatment that warrant a closer look.
None identified in the reviewed text
No materially narrow preferential benefit separate from the bill’s mission-specific authority and administration was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to that version and does not establish absence in other versions or accompanying materials.
Full text preserved for this analysis. Legislative record snapshot: May 7, 2025. How PlainBill uses AI