PlainBillCongress, translated.Legislation. Context. Public interest.Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Congressional Research Service
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People & committees
Rep. Stanton, Greg [D-AZ-4] · D–AZ
Legislative record
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Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Primary sources
Text links open the official source. We also preserved the text version used in the PlainBill explanation below.
No related bills are listed in this snapshot. This does not establish whether the proposal has appeared in earlier Congresses.
Source last updated: May 7, 2025. Consult Congress.gov for the current record.
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PlainBill explanation
Based on the full Introduced in House · 2025-02-11 text. This explanation has not received human editorial review. This overview describes the proposal’s major provisions; it does not establish what its real-world effects would be.
This proposal would direct U.S. agencies to support Western Hemisphere governments in diversifying semiconductor supply chains—the minerals, production, and testing and packaging behind computer chips. It would encourage public and private investment in Latin American semiconductor infrastructure. It would also allow the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation to support qualifying projects in wealthier Western Hemisphere countries, waive a specified statutory restriction, and require presidential certification and development or strategic justifications for that support.
shall, as appropriate, focus the efforts of the Department of State and those agencies in supporting the efforts of the governments of Western Hemisphere countries to increase the diversity of their upstream supply chains and downstream supply chains
to encourage United States public and private sector investment in Latin American semiconductor infrastructure projects
(1) The United States International Development Finance Corporation may provide support for upstream supply chain and downstream supply chain projects in countries in the Western Hemisphere with upper-middle-income economies or high-income economies (as those terms are defined by the World Bank). (2) The restrictions under section 1412(c)(2) of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9612(c)(2)) shall not apply.
The Corporation shall restrict the provision of such support in a country described in paragraph (1) unless— (A) the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such support furthers the national economic or foreign policy interests of the United States; and (B) such support is— (i) designed to produce significant developmental outcomes or provide developmental benefits to the poorest population of that country; or (ii) necessary to preempt or counter efforts by a strategic competitor of the United States to secure significant political or economic leverage or acquire national security-sensitive technologies or infrastructure in a country that is an ally or partner of the United States.
Section 1 would name the bill the Semiconductor Supply Chain Security and Diversification Act of 2025.
This Act may be cited as the Semiconductor Supply Chain Security and Diversification Act of 2025.
The bill defines the earlier, or upstream, parts of the supply chain to include mining, producing, or processing critical minerals used in semiconductor manufacturing, including zinc, gallium, germanium, silicon, lithium, and cobalt. The later, or downstream, parts include semiconductor testing and packaging facilities, including advanced facilities.
(1) the term upstream supply chain includes mining, production, or processing of critical minerals used in semiconductor manufacturing, including— (A) zinc; (B) gallium; (C) germanium; (D) silicon; (E) lithium; and (F) cobalt; and (2) the term downstream supply chain includes— (A) testing and packaging facilities for semiconductors; and (B) advanced testing and packaging facilities for semiconductors.
The bill would express Congress's view that diversifying semiconductor supply chains through regional development in the Western Hemisphere serves U.S. economic and national security interests and complements domestic CHIPS and Science Act investments. This is a statement of Congress's proposed position, not evidence that those results would occur.
It is the sense of Congress that the United States has an economic and national security interest in diversifying the semiconductor supply chain, specifically by encouraging the development of a regionally-based semiconductor ecosystems in the Western Hemisphere to compliment the investments in the United States under the CHIPS and Science Act.
The proposed policy would encourage accessible, transparent, competitive semiconductor markets with diverse sources and components to promote allies' and partners' security. It would also encourage U.S. public and private investment in Latin American semiconductor infrastructure, taking account of the region's ability to absorb that investment.
(1) to promote the security of allies and partners of the United States by encouraging the development of accessible, transparent, competitive, and robust semiconductor markets that provide diversified sources, types, and parts of the semiconductor chip; and (2) to encourage United States public and private sector investment in Latin American semiconductor infrastructure projects to bridge the gap between national security needs and commercial demand in a way that is consistent with the region’s absorptive capacity.
The Secretary of State would consult the Secretary of Commerce and other relevant agency heads and, as appropriate, focus agency efforts on helping Western Hemisphere governments diversify their supply chains. Diplomatic and political support for those governments and the Organization of American States would address cross-border infrastructure negotiations, semiconductor regulation, and competitive supply-chain markets supplied by diverse energy sources, types, and routes.
the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the heads of other relevant United States agencies, shall, as appropriate, focus the efforts of the Department of State and those agencies in supporting the efforts of the governments of Western Hemisphere countries to increase the diversity of their upstream supply chains and downstream supply chains
(1) providing diplomatic and political support to the Organization of American States and Western Hemisphere governments, as necessary— (A) to facilitate international negotiations concerning cross-border infrastructure; (B) to enhance the Western Hemisphere’s regulatory environment with respect to semiconductors; and (C) to develop accessible, transparent, and competitive supply chain markets and downstream supply chain markets that are supplied by diverse sources, types, and routes of energy
Agency support would also include helping Western Hemisphere countries diversify supply sources and routes and connect semiconductor markets across regions.
(2) providing support to improve Western Hemisphere upstream supply chains and downstream supply chains for semiconductors, including— (A) to diversify the sources and supply routes of Western Hemisphere countries; and (B) to enhance semiconductor market integration across the regions.
For projects supported under section 4, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation would be permitted, but not required, to support upstream and downstream projects in Western Hemisphere countries classified by the World Bank as upper-middle-income or high-income. The bill would make the restrictions in section 1412(c)(2) of the BUILD Act of 2018 inapplicable for this support.
For the purposes of providing support for projects under this section, the following terms and conditions shall apply: (1) The United States International Development Finance Corporation may provide support for upstream supply chain and downstream supply chain projects in countries in the Western Hemisphere with upper-middle-income economies or high-income economies (as those terms are defined by the World Bank). (2) The restrictions under section 1412(c)(2) of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9612(c)(2)) shall not apply.
The Corporation would have to restrict that support unless the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that it advances U.S. national economic or foreign policy interests. Support must also either be designed to produce significant development results or benefit the country's poorest population, or be necessary to prevent or counter a strategic competitor's specified efforts to gain influence or sensitive technology or infrastructure in a U.S. ally or partner country. The development and strategic grounds are alternatives; the presidential certification is required in either case.
(3) The Corporation shall restrict the provision of such support in a country described in paragraph (1) unless— (A) the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such support furthers the national economic or foreign policy interests of the United States; and (B) such support is— (i) designed to produce significant developmental outcomes or provide developmental benefits to the poorest population of that country; or (ii) necessary to preempt or counter efforts by a strategic competitor of the United States to secure significant political or economic leverage or acquire national security-sensitive technologies or infrastructure in a country that is an ally or partner of the United States.
The bill would use the BUILD Act's existing definition of the congressional committees that receive the presidential certification. It does not reproduce that definition.
(c) Appropriate congressional committees defined In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees has the meaning given that term in section 1402 of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9601).
The supplied official-actions snapshot, updated May 7, 2025, records introduction in the House and referral to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on February 11, 2025.
Source snapshot updated 2025-05-07T14:11:38Z. 2025-02-11: Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 2025-02-11: Introduced in House
A closer look
Reviewed version: Introduced in House · 2025-02-11. These findings describe provisions and who may benefit; they are not judgments of waste, corruption, or motive.
This review covers the supplied bill text. “None identified” does not rule out provisions in later versions or accompanying reports and disclosures.
Provisions outside the bill’s main subject, or policy changes attached to appropriations.
None identified in the reviewed text
No unrelated provision or policy change attached to appropriations was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to that version and does not establish absence in other versions or accompanying materials.
Spending directed to particular recipients or places outside ordinary competitive or formula-based allocation.
None identified in the reviewed text
No congressionally directed spending for a particular recipient or place was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to that version; formal earmark status in other versions or accompanying materials remains unestablished.
Narrow exceptions, exemptions, or preferential treatment that warrant a closer look.
Findings to examine
The supplied text contains a geographically and sectorally limited exception to existing financing restrictions. Its classification as a targeted benefit does not establish improper purpose.
Semiconductor supply-chain projects in upper-middle-income and high-income Western Hemisphere countries would receive special eligibility for Corporation support and an exemption from specified BUILD Act restrictions. This exception directly supports the bill's main regional supply-chain policy. It remains conditional on presidential certification and either development-related or strategic grounds; it does not guarantee funding.
For the purposes of providing support for projects under this section, the following terms and conditions shall apply: (1) The United States International Development Finance Corporation may provide support for upstream supply chain and downstream supply chain projects in countries in the Western Hemisphere with upper-middle-income economies or high-income economies (as those terms are defined by the World Bank). (2) The restrictions under section 1412(c)(2) of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9612(c)(2)) shall not apply.
(3) The Corporation shall restrict the provision of such support in a country described in paragraph (1) unless— (A) the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such support furthers the national economic or foreign policy interests of the United States; and (B) such support is— (i) designed to produce significant developmental outcomes or provide developmental benefits to the poorest population of that country; or (ii) necessary to preempt or counter efforts by a strategic competitor of the United States to secure significant political or economic leverage or acquire national security-sensitive technologies or infrastructure in a country that is an ally or partner of the United States.
Full text preserved for this analysis. Legislative record snapshot: May 7, 2025. How PlainBill uses AI