PlainBillCongress, translated.Legislation. Context. Public interest.Referred to the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence.
Congressional Research Service
No official summary is available in the imported record yet.
People & committees
Rep. Pfluger, August [R-TX-11] · R–TX
Legislative record
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Referred to the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence.
Referred to the House Committee on Homeland Security.
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Primary sources
Text links open the official source. We also preserved the text version used in the PlainBill explanation below.
No related bills are listed in this snapshot. This does not establish whether the proposal has appeared in earlier Congresses.
Source last updated: Jul 9, 2026. Consult Congress.gov for the current record.
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PlainBill explanation
Based on the full Introduced in House · 2025-02-11 text. This explanation has not received human editorial review. This overview describes the proposal’s major provisions; it does not establish what its real-world effects would be.
This proposal would require the Department of Homeland Security to assess terrorism threats involving certain foreign messaging apps and recommend responses. It would require public versions of those assessments and information sharing with state and local intelligence-sharing centers. The main requirements would fall on federal officials, with assessments examining terrorist organizations’ use of apps for recruitment and financial support.
the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an assessment of terrorism threats to the United States posed by terrorist organizations utilizing foreign cloud-based mobile or desktop messaging applications.
(A) In the first such assessment, an analysis of incidents in which terrorist organizations have utilized foreign cloud-based mobile and desktop messaging applications to facilitate the ability to radicalize and recruit individuals. (B) Information related to online payment features of foreign cloud-based mobile and desktop messaging applications, and how such features provide monetary support to terrorist organizations. (C) Recommendations on appropriate measures to address terrorism threats to the United States posed by terrorist organizations utilizing foreign cloud-based mobile or desktop messaging applications.
The Secretary of Homeland Security shall post on a publicly available website of the Department of Homeland Security the unclassified portion of each such assessment.
The Secretary shall ensure the dissemination to State and local fusion centers and the National Network of Fusion Centers of such information.
Section 1 would name the legislation the Countering Online Radicalization and Terrorism Act.
This Act may be cited as the Countering Online Radicalization and Terrorism Act.
Section 2 would express Congress’s view that terrorist organizations’ increasing use of foreign messaging apps presents a poorly understood national security threat. It would urge the Department of Homeland Security, working with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to assess and address that threat. These are proposed congressional statements, not evidence that the bill would reduce risks.
It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the heightened terrorism threat landscape and the increasing utilization of foreign cloud-based mobile and desktop messaging applications by terrorist organizations represent a national security threat, and the challenges posed by such threat are not well understood; and (2) the Department of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, must take steps to recognize, assess, and address such threat, thereby reducing risks to the people of the United States.
The Homeland Security Secretary would have to submit the first threat assessment within 180 days after enactment, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence. The text then requires assessments annually thereafter for five years; the deadline depends on enactment, not introduction.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for five years, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an assessment of terrorism threats to the United States posed by terrorist organizations utilizing foreign cloud-based mobile or desktop messaging applications.
The first assessment would have to analyze incidents involving use of the covered apps to radicalize and recruit people. Assessments would also have to discuss how app payment features financially support terrorist organizations and recommend measures to address the threats.
(A) In the first such assessment, an analysis of incidents in which terrorist organizations have utilized foreign cloud-based mobile and desktop messaging applications to facilitate the ability to radicalize and recruit individuals. (B) Information related to online payment features of foreign cloud-based mobile and desktop messaging applications, and how such features provide monetary support to terrorist organizations. (C) Recommendations on appropriate measures to address terrorism threats to the United States posed by terrorist organizations utilizing foreign cloud-based mobile or desktop messaging applications.
Before an assessment leaves the department, it would have to be coordinated with its legal, privacy, and civil rights offices to ensure compliance with applicable law and protection of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. Existing analytical products could inform the assessments where appropriate.
(A) shall be coordinated with the Office of the General Counsel, the Privacy Office, and the Office of for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the Department of Homeland Security prior to release outside the Department to ensure each such assessment complies with applicable law and protects individuals’ privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties, and (B) may be informed by existing products, as appropriate.
Assessments would have to be unclassified and posted publicly on the department’s website. A classified attachment would be allowed only to protect intelligence sources and methods related to the assessment.
Each terrorism threat assessment under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex only for the protection of intelligence sources and methods relating to the matters contained in such assessment. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall post on a publicly available website of the Department of Homeland Security the unclassified portion of each such assessment.
The Secretary would have to brief the designated congressional committees within 30 days after each assessment is submitted. Another relevant federal department or agency head would have to join if a committee, consulting with the Secretary, determines that participation is appropriate.
Not later than 30 days after the submission of each terrorism threat assessment under paragraph (1), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall brief the appropriate congressional committees regarding each such assessment. The head of any other relevant Federal department or agency shall join the Secretary for any such briefing if any such committee, in consultation with the Secretary, determines such is appropriate.
The assessments and briefings would go to four committees: House Homeland Security, House Intelligence, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Senate Intelligence.
the term appropriate congressional committees means the Committee on Homeland Security and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
The Secretary would have to review relevant threat information gathered by state and local fusion centers and their national network, incorporate it into the department’s information where appropriate, and ensure information is shared with those centers and the network.
The Secretary of Homeland Security shall review information relating to terrorism threats to the United States posed by terrorist organizations utilizing foreign cloud-based mobile or desktop messaging applications that is gathered by State and local fusion centers and the National Network of Fusion Centers, and incorporate such information, as appropriate, into the Department of Homeland Security’s own information relating to such. The Secretary shall ensure the dissemination to State and local fusion centers and the National Network of Fusion Centers of such information.
The covered-app definition includes specified apps with a connection, relationship, or other association with a foreign adversary, a person owned or controlled by or subject to that adversary’s jurisdiction or direction, or a terrorist organization. The bill refers to an existing federal regulation for the meaning of foreign adversary.
The term foreign cloud-based mobile or desktop messaging applications includes any application specified in subparagraph (B) that has a connection, relationship, or other association with or to any of the following: (i) A foreign adversary (as such term is defined in section 7.2 of subpart A of part 7 of subtitle A of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations). (ii) A person owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary. (iii) A terrorist organization.
The specified apps include any app owned or operated wholly or partly by ByteDance, plus Tamtam, Telegram, Vkontakte, WeChat, Weibo, and RedNote. The Homeland Security Secretary, consulting with the Director of National Intelligence, could identify other appropriate apps for the definition.
An application specified in this subparagraph includes the following: (i) An application owned or operated, in whole or in part, by ByteDance. (ii) Tamtam. (iii) Telegram. (iv) Vkontakte. (v) WeChat. (vi) Weibo. (vii) RedNote. (viii) Any other application the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, determines appropriate.
The bill would use an existing statutory definition of fusion center. It describes their national network as a decentralized arrangement for pooling state and local centers’ expertise and capabilities to improve analysis and homeland security information sharing.
(2) Fusion center The term fusion center has the meaning given such term in subsection (k) of section 210A of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124h). (3) National Network of Fusion Centers The term National Network of Fusion Centers means a decentralized arrangement of fusion centers intended to enhance the ability of individual State and local fusion centers to leverage the capabilities and expertise of all such fusion centers for the purpose of enhancing analysis and homeland security information sharing nationally.
The definition of terrorist organization would cover both entities formally designated as foreign terrorist organizations under immigration law and other entities engaged in terrorism as defined in the Homeland Security Act.
The term terrorist organization means— (A) any entity designated as a foreign terrorist organization pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189); or (B) any entity engaged in terrorism, as such term is defined in section 2(18) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101(18)).
The supplied official-actions snapshot, updated July 9, 2026, records introduction in the House and referrals to the House Committee on Homeland Security and its Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence on February 11, 2025.
Source snapshot updated 2026-07-09T13:27:22Z. 2025-02-11: Referred to the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence. 2025-02-11: Referred to the House Committee on Homeland Security. 2025-02-11: Introduced in House
A closer look
Reviewed version: Introduced in House · 2025-02-11. These findings describe provisions and who may benefit; they are not judgments of waste, corruption, or motive.
This review covers the supplied bill text. “None identified” does not rule out provisions in later versions or accompanying reports and disclosures.
Provisions outside the bill’s main subject, or policy changes attached to appropriations.
None identified in the reviewed text
No unrelated provision or policy change attached to appropriations was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to that version and does not establish absence in other versions or accompanying materials.
Spending directed to particular recipients or places outside ordinary competitive or formula-based allocation.
None identified in the reviewed text
No congressionally directed spending for particular recipients or places was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to that version; accompanying materials needed to assess formal earmark status are absent.
Narrow exceptions, exemptions, or preferential treatment that warrant a closer look.
None identified in the reviewed text
No materially narrow benefit, special exemption, or preferential treatment was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion does not establish absence in other versions or accompanying materials.
Full text preserved for this analysis. Legislative record snapshot: Jul 9, 2026. How PlainBill uses AI