PlainBillCongress, translated.Legislation. Context. Public interest.Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Congressional Research Service
Version 00 · Introduced in House · Jan 3, 2025
Fourth Amendment Restoration Act
This bill repeals the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (which authorizes various types of searches and surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes) and limits surveillance of U.S. citizens.
The bill requires that an officer of the U.S. government obtain a warrant for certain search and surveillance activities against a U.S. citizen, including (1) conducting electronic surveillance, (2) conducting physical searches of property under a U.S. citizen's exclusive control, or (3) targeting a U.S. citizen to acquire foreign intelligence information.
The bill provides for criminal penalties for a person who intentionally (1) violates these requirements without statutory authorization, or (2) discloses or uses information that the person knows (or has a reason to know) was obtained under color of law by methods that violate these requirements.
Information about a U.S. citizen acquired under Executive Order 12333 (relating to intelligence gathering) or during surveillance of a non-U.S. citizen shall not be used against the U.S. citizen in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding or investigation.
People & committees
Rep. Biggs, Andy [R-AZ-5] · R–AZ
Legislative record
A procedural vote is different from passage. Passage in one chamber does not establish enactment. Explore the glossary.
Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Primary sources
Text links open the official source. We also preserved the text version used in the PlainBill explanation below.
No related bills are listed in this snapshot. This does not establish whether the proposal has appeared in earlier Congresses.
Source last updated: Mar 19, 2025. Consult Congress.gov for the current record.
AI Conversation Starters
Choose a perspective, copy a prompt, and paste it into your preferred AI. Each prompt includes the bill version and available official source links, and asks for counterarguments as well as supporting evidence.
Analyze H.R.117 as objectively as possible. Explain its main provisions, who would be affected, possible benefits and harms, implementation, exceptions, and uncertainties. Present the strongest arguments for and against it, and identify evidence needed to assess its public impact.
Examine H.R.117 through a progressive lens, focusing on fairness, access, economic inequality, and effects on vulnerable communities. Explain potential benefits, costs, and unintended consequences. Consider the strongest counterarguments and distinguish stated goals from demonstrated outcomes.
Examine H.R.117 through a conservative lens, focusing on fiscal responsibility, institutional stability, federalism, and the scope of government. Explain potential benefits, costs, and unintended consequences. Consider the strongest counterarguments and any provisions that challenge this perspective.
Examine H.R.117 through a civil-liberties and limited-government lens. Consider individual rights, privacy, voluntary choice, accountability, and government power. Explain tradeoffs, possible safeguards, and the strongest counterarguments without assuming the proposal is beneficial or harmful.
PlainBill explanation
Based on the full Introduced in House · 2025-01-03 text. This explanation has not received human editorial review. This overview describes the proposal’s major provisions; it does not establish what its real-world effects would be.
This proposal would repeal the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and require federal officers to obtain federal court warrants for specified surveillance, searches, and intelligence collection involving U.S. citizens. It would also prohibit using information about citizens against them in proceedings or investigations when obtained under a specified intelligence executive order or during surveillance of noncitizens. These are proposed changes, not evidence of enacted law.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is repealed.
An officer of the United States must obtain a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a Federal court in order to conduct or request— (1) electronic surveillance of a United States citizen; (2) a physical search of a premises, information, material, or property used exclusively by, or under the open and exclusive control of, a United States citizen; (3) approval of the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device, a sole or significant purpose of which is to obtain foreign intelligence information concerning a United States citizen; (4) the production of tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) concerning a United States citizen to obtain foreign intelligence information; or (5) the targeting of a United States citizen for the acquisition of foreign intelligence information.
Any information concerning a United States citizen acquired under Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to United States intelligence activities) shall not be used in evidence against that United States citizen in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding or as part of any criminal, civil, or administrative investigation.
Any information concerning a United States citizen acquired during surveillance of a non-United States citizen shall not be used in evidence against that United States citizen in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding or as part of any criminal, civil, or administrative investigation.
2025-01-03: Introduced in House
The bill names itself the Fourth Amendment Restoration Act and proposes repealing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 in its entirety. The supplied text does not reproduce the law being repealed.
This Act may be cited as the Fourth Amendment Restoration Act.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is repealed.
The bill defines a U.S. citizen as an individual person who holds U.S. citizenship. Its definition of foreign intelligence information covers specified foreign threats, national defense, security, and foreign affairs. When the information concerns a citizen, it must be necessary to the listed protective ability or national interest, rather than merely related to it.
The term United States citizen means an individual who is a citizen of the United States.
The term foreign intelligence information means— (1) information that relates to, and if concerning a United States citizen is necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect against— (A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; (B) sabotage, international terrorism, or the intentional proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or (C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or (2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to, and if concerning a United States citizen, is necessary to— (A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or (B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
The definition of electronic surveillance includes intentionally targeting a particular, known citizen in the United States to acquire the contents of their incoming or outgoing wire or radio communications. This applies where a citizen has a reasonable expectation of privacy and law enforcement would need a warrant. Wire communications are defined as communications being carried through specified carrier-provided wires, cables, or similar connections.
the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be received by a particular, known United States citizen who is in the United States, if the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that United States citizen, under circumstances in which a citizen has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes
The term wire communication means any communication while it is being carried by a wire, cable, or other like connection furnished or operated by any person engaged as a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications.
Electronic surveillance also includes installing or using a surveillance device in the United States to collect information other than wire or radio communications, where a citizen has a reasonable expectation of privacy and law enforcement would need a warrant.
the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire information, other than from a wire or radio communication, under circumstances in which a citizen has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes.
Federal officers would need a warrant from a federal court, obtained under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to conduct or request electronic surveillance of a citizen. The same requirement would apply to physical searches of premises, information, materials, or property used exclusively by a citizen or under that citizen's open and exclusive control.
An officer of the United States must obtain a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a Federal court in order to conduct or request— (1) electronic surveillance of a United States citizen; (2) a physical search of a premises, information, material, or property used exclusively by, or under the open and exclusive control of, a United States citizen
The warrant requirement would also cover approval to install and use a pen register or trap and trace device when obtaining foreign intelligence information about a citizen is a sole or significant purpose. The bill takes those devices' legal definitions from another statute rather than explaining them in the supplied text.
An officer of the United States must obtain a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a Federal court in order to conduct or request—
(3) approval of the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device, a sole or significant purpose of which is to obtain foreign intelligence information concerning a United States citizen
The terms pen register and trap and trace device have the meanings given such terms in section 3127 of title 18, United States Code.
Federal officers would also need the specified federal court warrant to conduct or request production of tangible items, such as books and records, concerning a citizen for foreign intelligence purposes, or to target a citizen to acquire foreign intelligence information.
An officer of the United States must obtain a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a Federal court in order to conduct or request—
(4) the production of tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) concerning a United States citizen to obtain foreign intelligence information; or (5) the targeting of a United States citizen for the acquisition of foreign intelligence information.
Information about a citizen acquired under Executive Order 12333, concerning U.S. intelligence activities, could not be used as evidence against that citizen in criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings, or as part of criminal, civil, or administrative investigations.
Any information concerning a United States citizen acquired under Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to United States intelligence activities) shall not be used in evidence against that United States citizen in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding or as part of any criminal, civil, or administrative investigation.
The same prohibition on use in proceedings and investigations would apply to information about a citizen acquired during surveillance of a noncitizen.
Any information concerning a United States citizen acquired during surveillance of a non-United States citizen shall not be used in evidence against that United States citizen in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding or as part of any criminal, civil, or administrative investigation.
Section 6 would make intentionally engaging in the offenses it references in section 4 a crime, except when authorized by this bill, title 18 of the U.S. Code, or the specified additional statutory surveillance authority. The full scope of these exceptions cannot be determined from the supplied text.
A person is guilty of an offense if he intentionally— (1) engages in any of the offenses described in section 4, except as authorized by this Act, title 18, or any express statutory authorization that is an additional exclusive means for conducting electronic surveillance under section 1812 of title 50
Section 6 would also criminalize intentionally disclosing or using information obtained through claimed government authority by the methods its cross-reference identifies, when the person knows or has reason to know that the collection lacked the listed legal authorization. The reference to “section 4, paragraph (1)” leaves uncertainty about precisely which methods this covers.
A person is guilty of an offense if he intentionally—
(2) discloses or uses information obtained under color of law by any of the methods described in section 4, paragraph (1), knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained without authorization by this chapter, title 18, or any express statutory authorization that is an additional exclusive means for conducting electronic surveillance under section 1812 of title 50.
A law enforcement or investigative officer could defend against prosecution under section 6(a) by showing that the conduct occurred during official duties and was authorized and carried out under a search warrant or court order from a court with authority to issue it.
It is a defense to prosecution under subsection (a) that the defendant was a law enforcement officer or investigative officer engaging in the course of his official duties and the conduct was authorized and conducted pursuant to a search warrant or court order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
An offense under section 6 would be punishable by a fine of up to $10,000, imprisonment of at least five years, or both. The wording permits a fine alone; five years is the stated minimum when imprisonment is imposed, not a maximum.
An offense described in this section is punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not less than five years, or both.
Section 6 expressly provides federal jurisdiction—authority for federal courts to hear an offense—when the person committing it was a federal officer or employee at the time.
There is a Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section if the person committing the offense was an officer or employee of the United States at the time the offense was committed.
The supplied official-actions snapshot, updated March 19, 2025, records introduction in the House on January 3, 2025, and referral that day to the Judiciary Committee and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for provisions within their respective jurisdictions.
Source snapshot updated 2025-03-19T13:26:22Z.
2025-01-03: Introduced in House
2025-01-03: Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
A closer look
Reviewed version: Introduced in House · 2025-01-03. These findings describe provisions and who may benefit; they are not judgments of waste, corruption, or motive.
This review covers the supplied bill text. “None identified” does not rule out provisions in later versions or accompanying reports and disclosures.
Provisions outside the bill’s main subject, or policy changes attached to appropriations.
None identified in the reviewed text
No unrelated provision or appropriations policy rider was identified after reviewing the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to this version and does not establish absence in other versions or accompanying materials.
Spending directed to particular recipients or places outside ordinary competitive or formula-based allocation.
None identified in the reviewed text
No congressionally directed spending for particular recipients or places was identified after reviewing the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to this version and does not establish absence in other versions or accompanying materials, which could bear on formal earmark status.
Narrow exceptions, exemptions, or preferential treatment that warrant a closer look.
None identified in the reviewed text
No materially narrow carve-out, special exemption, preferential treatment, or exception meeting the requested definition was identified after reviewing the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to this version and does not establish absence in other versions or accompanying materials.
Full text preserved for this analysis. Legislative record snapshot: Mar 19, 2025. How PlainBill uses AI