PlainBillCongress, translated.Legislation. Context. Public interest.Referred to the Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security.
Congressional Research Service
Version 00 · Introduced in House · Feb 10, 2025
Port Crane Security and Inspection Act of 2025
This bill limits the operation of foreign cranes at U.S. ports. In general, foreign cranes are those that have information technology and operational technology components that (1) were manufactured by companies that are subject to the ownership, control, or influence of a country designated as a foreign adversary; and (2) connect to ports' cyber infrastructure.
Foreign cranes that are contracted for on or after the date of the bill's enactment may not operate at a U.S. port. Also, beginning five years after this bill is enacted, foreign cranes operating at U.S. ports may not use software or other technology manufactured by a company owned by a country designated as a foreign adversary.
Showing the opening paragraphs of the official summary.
Additionally, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) must (1) inspect foreign cranes for potential security risks or threats before they are placed into operation, (2) assess the threat posed by security risks or threats of existing or newly constructed foreign cranes, and (3) take any crane that poses a security risk or threat offline until the crane can be certified as no longer being a risk or threat.
CISA must also report to Congress about security risks or threats posed by foreign cranes at U.S. ports.
People & committees
Rep. Gimenez, Carlos A. [R-FL-28] · R–FL
Legislative record
A procedural vote is different from passage. Passage in one chamber does not establish enactment. Explore the glossary.
Referred to the Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security.
Referred to the House Committee on Homeland Security.
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Primary sources
Text links open the official source. We also preserved the text version used in the PlainBill explanation below.
No related bills are listed in this snapshot. This does not establish whether the proposal has appeared in earlier Congresses.
Source last updated: Apr 8, 2025. Consult Congress.gov for the current record.
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PlainBill explanation
Based on the full Introduced in House · 2025-02-10 text. This explanation has not received human editorial review. This overview describes the proposal’s major provisions; it does not establish what its real-world effects would be.
This bill would require security inspections and threat assessments for certain cranes used at U.S. ports, and require unsafe cranes to remain offline until certified safe. It would also prohibit operating certain cranes contracted for on or after enactment and, after five years, prohibit specified foreign software on covered cranes. Port operators would be affected, with different definitions determining which cranes face inspections and operating restrictions.
the Secretary of Homeland Security shall, acting through the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, before such crane is placed into service at such port, inspect such crane for potential security risks or threats.
take any crane that poses a security risk or threat offline until such crane can be certified as no longer being a risk or threat.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a foreign crane— (1) for which a contract was entered into on or after the date of enactment of this Act may not be operated at a port located in the United States; and (2) operated at a port located in the United States may not operate foreign software on any date after the date which is 5 years after the date of enactment of this Act.
manufactured by an entity that is operating under ownership, control, or influence of a covered foreign country.
manufactured by an entity that is owned or controlled by, is a subsidiary of, or is otherwise related legally or financially to a corporation based in a covered foreign country.
The proposed short title is the Port Crane Security and Inspection Act of 2025.
This Act may be cited as the Port Crane Security and Inspection Act of 2025.
The Homeland Security Secretary, acting through the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, would have to inspect covered newly built, internet-connected foreign cranes before they enter service. The requirement applies to cranes procured for use at a U.S. port determined by the Secretary to be high risk for port or maritime transportation security.
With respect to newly constructed foreign cranes procured for use at a United States port determined by the Secretary to be of high risk to port security or maritime transportation security and that connect to the internet, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall, acting through the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, before such crane is placed into service at such port, inspect such crane for potential security risks or threats.
Within 180 days after enactment, the Secretary would have to assess security threats from existing or newly built foreign cranes in use at U.S. ports. The same deadline applies to taking cranes posing a security risk or threat offline. They would remain offline until certified as no longer posing a risk or threat.
Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall— (1) assess the threat posed by security risks or threats of any existing or newly constructed foreign cranes in use at a United States port; and (2) take any crane that poses a security risk or threat offline until such crane can be certified as no longer being a risk or threat.
Within one year after enactment, the Secretary would have to brief the House Homeland Security Committee and the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee about security risks or threats from existing or newly built foreign cranes at U.S. ports.
Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall brief the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate regarding foreign crane security risks or threats posed by existing or newly constructed foreign cranes within United States ports.
Both substantive sections would define a covered foreign country as a country identified as a foreign adversary in the intelligence community's latest Annual Threat Assessment, or separately identified by the Homeland Security Secretary in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence.
The term covered foreign country means a country that— (A) the intelligence community has identified as a foreign adversary in its most recent Annual Threat Assessment; or (B) the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, has identified as a foreign adversary that is not included in such Annual Threat Assessment.
The term covered foreign country means a country that— (A) the intelligence community has identified as a foreign adversary in its most recent Annual Threat Assessment; or (B) the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, has identified as a foreign adversary that is not included in such Annual Threat Assessment.
For the inspection and assessment section, the foreign-crane definition concerns information technology and operational technology—computer systems and equipment-control technology—connected to a U.S. port's digital infrastructure. It covers components made wholly or partly by an entity under a covered foreign country's ownership, control or influence.
The term foreign crane means a crane for which any information technology and operational technology components in such crane that is connected into cyber infrastructure at a port located in the United States was, in whole or in part, manufactured by an entity that is operating under ownership, control, or influence of a covered foreign country.
Regardless of other laws, a crane meeting section 3's foreign-crane definition could not operate at a U.S. port if its contract was entered into on or after enactment. This particular prohibition uses the contract date to determine coverage.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a foreign crane— (1) for which a contract was entered into on or after the date of enactment of this Act may not be operated at a port located in the United States;
After five years from enactment, foreign cranes covered by section 3 and operated at U.S. ports could not run foreign software. This software restriction has no contract-date qualification. The bill defines foreign software as software or other technology made wholly or partly by a company wholly owned by a covered foreign country.
(2) operated at a port located in the United States may not operate foreign software on any date after the date which is 5 years after the date of enactment of this Act.
The term foreign software means software or other technology, in whole or in part, manufactured by a company wholly owned by a covered foreign country.
For the operating prohibitions, section 3 would use a separate foreign-crane definition. It covers cranes with software or other technology connected to a U.S. port's digital infrastructure and made wholly or partly by an entity owned or controlled by, a subsidiary of, or otherwise legally or financially related to a corporation based in a covered foreign country.
The term foreign crane means a crane for which any software or other technology in such crane that is connected into cyber infrastructure at a port located in the United States was, in whole or in part, manufactured by an entity that is owned or controlled by, is a subsidiary of, or is otherwise related legally or financially to a corporation based in a covered foreign country.
The supplied official-actions snapshot, updated April 8, 2025, records introduction in the House and referrals to the House Homeland Security Committee and its Transportation and Maritime Security Subcommittee on February 10, 2025.
Source snapshot updated 2025-04-08T13:48:14Z. 2025-02-10: Referred to the Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security. 2025-02-10: Referred to the House Committee on Homeland Security. 2025-02-10: Introduced in House
A closer look
Reviewed version: Introduced in House · 2025-02-10. These findings describe provisions and who may benefit; they are not judgments of waste, corruption, or motive.
This review covers the supplied bill text. “None identified” does not rule out provisions in later versions or accompanying reports and disclosures.
Provisions outside the bill’s main subject, or policy changes attached to appropriations.
None identified in the reviewed text
No unrelated provision or policy attachment to appropriations was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion does not cover other versions or accompanying materials.
Spending directed to particular recipients or places outside ordinary competitive or formula-based allocation.
None identified in the reviewed text
No congressionally directed spending for particular recipients or places was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion does not establish the absence of earmarks in other versions or accompanying materials.
Narrow exceptions, exemptions, or preferential treatment that warrant a closer look.
None identified in the reviewed text
No materially narrow preferential benefit, special exemption or carve-out was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to that version.
Full text preserved for this analysis. Legislative record snapshot: Apr 8, 2025. How PlainBill uses AI