PlainBillCongress, translated.Legislation. Context. Public interest.Sponsor introductory remarks on measure. (CR H625-626)
Congressional Research Service
Version 00 · Introduced in House · Feb 6, 2025
Taxpayer Data Protection Act
This bill restricts access to any public money receipt or payment system belonging to the Department of the Treasury.
Specifically, access is limited to authorized Treasury officers, employees, or contractors meeting certain performance standards who have held a qualified position for at least a year, or who hold other qualifications as provided by the bill. The bill specifically prohibits special government employees (i.e., temporary appointees hired to perform specific tasks) from having access to such systems. The bill also provides that an individual accessing such systems shall be treated as an executive branch employee for purposes of federal criminal conflict of interest laws.
Treasury's Office of Inspector General must investigate and report on each instance of unauthorized use or other access of such payment systems.
People & committees
Rep. Stevens, Haley M. [D-MI-11] · D–MI
Legislative record
A procedural vote is different from passage. Passage in one chamber does not establish enactment. Explore the glossary.
Sponsor introductory remarks on measure. (CR H625-626)
Referred to the Committee on Financial Services, and in addition to the Committee on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Referred to the Committee on Financial Services, and in addition to the Committee on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Introduced in House
Sponsor introductory remarks on measure. (CR H536)
Introduced in House
Primary sources
Text links open the official source. We also preserved the text version used in the PlainBill explanation below.
No related bills are listed in this snapshot. This does not establish whether the proposal has appeared in earlier Congresses.
Source last updated: Jun 11, 2026. Consult Congress.gov for the current record.
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Analyze H.R.1101 as objectively as possible. Explain its main provisions, who would be affected, possible benefits and harms, implementation, exceptions, and uncertainties. Present the strongest arguments for and against it, and identify evidence needed to assess its public impact.
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PlainBill explanation
Based on the full Introduced in House · 2025-02-06 text. This explanation has not received human editorial review. This overview describes the proposal’s major provisions; it does not establish what its real-world effects would be.
The proposed Taxpayer Data Protection Act would limit who can access Treasury systems that receive or pay public money, and their data. Individuals would have to meet one of two sets of eligibility requirements. Treasury’s inspector general would also have to investigate unauthorized payment-system access and report to Congress within 30 days of each instance.
This Act may be cited as the Taxpayer Data Protection Act.
The Secretary may not allow any individual to use, exercise administrative control over, or otherwise access any Department of the Treasury public money receipt or payment system (including any payment system of the Bureau of the Fiscal Service (or any successor thereof)), or any data from any such system, unless—
The Inspector General of the Department of the Treasury shall investigate, and submit a report to Congress on such investigation, each instance of unauthorized use or other access of any payment system described in paragraph (1). Any such report shall be submitted not later than 30 days after any such instance
The restriction would cover using the systems, controlling their administration, and accessing their data. It expressly includes Bureau of the Fiscal Service payment systems and those of any successor organization.
The Secretary may not allow any individual to use, exercise administrative control over, or otherwise access any Department of the Treasury public money receipt or payment system (including any payment system of the Bureau of the Fiscal Service (or any successor thereof)), or any data from any such system, unless—
One eligibility route would apply to Treasury officers, employees, and contractors. They must already be eligible for access and have a most recent performance rating of fully successful or equivalent, or higher. Officers and employees must have held a civil-service position for at least one year by the access date; contractors must have performed under a Treasury contract for at least one year.
(A) such individual is an officer, employee, or contractor of the Department of the Treasury— (i) who is otherwise eligible to access such system or data; (ii) whose most recent performance rating was at the fully successful level or higher (or the equivalent thereof); and (iii) who, as of the date of such access, with respect to such an officer or employee has occupied a position in the civil service (as that term is defined in section 2101 of title 5), or with respect to such a contractor has been performing under a contract with the Department, for a period of at least one year;
People who do not meet that first route would need an appropriate security clearance granted under the cited statutory procedures. They could not be special Government employees, a category defined in another statute, and must have at least one year of current, continuous civil-service employment by the access date.
(B) in the case of an individual not described in subparagraph (A)— (i) such individual holds a security clearance at the appropriate level with respect to such system or data and such clearance was granted pursuant to the procedures established under section 801 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3161));
(iii) such individual is not a special Government employee (as defined in section 202 of title 18); (iv) such individual’s current continuous service in the civil service (as that term is defined in section 2101 of title 5) as of the date of such access is for a period of at least 1 year;
Under the second route, access or use also must not violate section 208 of title 18, applying the bill’s additional rules. The individual must complete any required privacy, cybersecurity, and national-security training or compliance procedures and sign a written ethics agreement with Treasury or the Office of Government Ethics.
(ii) such individual’s access to such system or data, or use thereof, does not constitute a violation of section 208 of title 18 (determined after the application of paragraph (2));
(v) such individual has completed any required training or compliance procedures with respect to privacy laws and cybersecurity and national security regulations and best practices; and (vi) has signed a written ethics agreement with either the Department of the Treasury or the Office of Government Ethics.
Anyone accessing a covered system or its data who is not already an executive-branch officer or employee would be treated as an executive-branch employee specifically for purposes of section 208 of title 18.
(2) (A) Any individual who accesses any system or data described in paragraph (1) who is not otherwise an officer or employee of the executive branch of the United States Government shall be treated as an employee of the executive branch of the United States Government for purposes of section 208 of title 18.
For that same statute, controlling a covered system or affecting payments or data would count as personal and substantial participation in a particular matter—the legal classification specified by the bill. Covered actions expressly include stopping, canceling, adjusting, holding, rejecting, or changing payments or data.
(B) For purposes of such section 208, exercise of administrative control or stopping, canceling, adjusting, holding, rejecting, changing, or otherwise impacting any payment or data in any Department of the Treasury public money receipt or payment system (including any payment system of the Bureau of the Fiscal Service (or any successor thereof)), shall be considered personal and substantial participation as a Government officer or employee in a particular matter.
Treasury’s inspector general would have to investigate every instance of unauthorized use or access of a covered payment system and report to Congress within 30 days after the instance.
(3) The Inspector General of the Department of the Treasury shall investigate, and submit a report to Congress on such investigation, each instance of unauthorized use or other access of any payment system described in paragraph (1). Any such report shall be submitted not later than 30 days after any such instance
Each investigation report would have to describe the unauthorized activity and the individual’s actions, assess resulting threats to privacy, national security, cybersecurity, or system integrity, and describe any payments stopped during the unauthorized activity.
shall include— (A) a detailed description of the unauthorized use or access, including any actions the individual carried out; (B) a risk assessment of any threat to privacy, national security, cybersecurity, or the integrity of the applicable system as a result of such unauthorized use or access; and (C) a detailed description of any stopped payments during the unauthorized use or access.
The supplied actions snapshot, updated June 11, 2026, records introduction in the House and referral to the Financial Services and Ways and Means committees on February 6, 2025. It also records sponsor introductory remarks on February 6 and February 11, 2025.
Source snapshot updated 2026-06-11T05:06:22Z. 2025-02-11: Sponsor introductory remarks on measure. (CR H625-626)
2025-02-06: Referred to the Committee on Financial Services, and in addition to the Committee on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
2025-02-06: Introduced in House 2025-02-06: Sponsor introductory remarks on measure. (CR H536)
A closer look
Reviewed version: Introduced in House · 2025-02-06. These findings describe provisions and who may benefit; they are not judgments of waste, corruption, or motive.
This review covers the supplied bill text. “None identified” does not rule out provisions in later versions or accompanying reports and disclosures.
Provisions outside the bill’s main subject, or policy changes attached to appropriations.
None identified in the reviewed text
No unrelated provision or policy change attached to appropriations was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to that version and does not establish absence in other versions or accompanying materials.
Spending directed to particular recipients or places outside ordinary competitive or formula-based allocation.
None identified in the reviewed text
No congressionally directed spending for particular recipients or places was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to that version and does not establish absence in other versions or accompanying materials.
Narrow exceptions, exemptions, or preferential treatment that warrant a closer look.
None identified in the reviewed text
No materially narrow preferential benefit or special exemption was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. The access eligibility rules serve the bill’s main policy. This conclusion is limited to that version and does not establish absence in other versions or accompanying materials.
Full text preserved for this analysis. Legislative record snapshot: Jun 11, 2026. How PlainBill uses AI