PlainBillCongress, translated.Legislation. Context. Public interest.Referred to the House Committee on Homeland Security.
Congressional Research Service
No official summary is available in the imported record yet.
People & committees
Rep. Khanna, Ro [D-CA-17] · D–CA
Legislative record
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Referred to the House Committee on Homeland Security.
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Primary sources
Text links open the official source. We also preserved the text version used in the PlainBill explanation below.
Source last updated: Oct 5, 2026. Consult Congress.gov for the current record.
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PlainBill explanation
Based on the full Introduced in House · 2026-09-24 text. This explanation has not received human editorial review. This overview describes the proposal’s major provisions; it does not establish what its real-world effects would be.
The proposed Protecting Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing as Critical Infrastructure Act would expand federal responsibilities for protecting biotechnology and biomanufacturing infrastructure. It would require protection measures where no agency is designated to lead security for that sector, along with industry coordination and federal planning. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency would have to prepare a protection work plan and report to Congress on implementation and remaining gaps.
This Act may be cited as the Protecting Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing as Critical Infrastructure Act.
(14) take such actions as may be necessary to ensure the protection of biotechnology and biomanufacturing infrastructure with no designated Sector-Specific Agency;
the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency of the Department of Homeland Security shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a work plan to protect biotechnology and biomanufacturing infrastructure.
a report on the implementation of such work plan.
a report addressing whether there are any critical biotechnology areas that remain unprotected.
The bill would expressly add biotechnology and biomanufacturing infrastructure owners and operators to section 2202(c)(2) of the Homeland Security Act. The supplied text does not reproduce the existing provision, so the insertion alone does not explain its full effect.
Section 2202 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 652) is amended— (1) in subsection (c)— (A) in paragraph (2), by inserting and biotechnology and biomanufacturing infrastructure owners and operators after international entities;
For critical infrastructure without a designated sector-specific agency—an agency assigned responsibility for that sector—the bill would require agency staff to provide analyses, expertise, and technical assistance. Those staff would also carry out outreach and engagement, including bringing relevant sector-specific agencies together when appropriate. These requirements expressly include biotechnology and biomanufacturing infrastructure.
with respect to critical infrastructure, including biotechnology and biomanufacturing infrastructure, with no designated Sector-Specific Agency, designate staff of the Agency to provide those analyses, expertise, and other technical assistance
for critical infrastructure, including biotechnology and biomanufacturing infrastructure, with no designated Sector-Specific Agency, direct staff designated in accordance with paragraph (5) to carry out that outreach and engagement, including, as appropriate, convening relevant Sector-Specific Agencies
The bill would add a duty to take actions necessary to protect biotechnology and biomanufacturing infrastructure that has no designated sector-specific agency.
(14) take such actions as may be necessary to ensure the protection of biotechnology and biomanufacturing infrastructure with no designated Sector-Specific Agency;
Assessments of critical infrastructure without a designated sector-specific agency would have to be coordinated with relevant existing information-sharing and analysis organizations and industry associations. The bill gives BIO-ISAC and H-ISAC as examples of those organizations.
With respect to critical infrastructure, including biotechnology and biomanufacturing infrastructure, with no designated Sector-Specific Agency, such assessments shall be carried out in coordination with existing relevant Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations, such as BIO-ISAC and H-ISAC, and industry member associations.
The bill would add biotechnology and biomanufacturing infrastructure to the existing national-planning provision. It would also require the comprehensive national plan to be informed by the assessments required under section 2202(e)(1)(B).
(B) in subparagraph (E)— (i) by inserting biotechnology and biomanufacturing infrastructure, after emergency communications systems,; and (ii) by adding at the end the following new sentence: Such comprehensive national plan shall be informed by the assessments required under subparagraph (B).
Within 45 days after enactment, the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency would have to submit a biotechnology and biomanufacturing protection work plan to the House Homeland Security Committee and the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee.
Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency of the Department of Homeland Security shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a work plan to protect biotechnology and biomanufacturing infrastructure.
The work plan would have to identify stakeholders, including information-sharing and analysis organizations. It would also need plans to tell stakeholders about protection under existing critical-infrastructure sectors where applicable, and to ensure their representation in appropriate industry groups and sector coordinating councils.
Such work plan shall include the following: (A) An identification of biotechnology and biomanufacturing infrastructure stakeholders, including Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations. (B) An outreach plan to ensure such stakeholders are aware, if applicable, of their protection under existing critical infrastructure sectors. (C) An action plan to ensure such stakeholders are represented at appropriate consortia and sector coordinating councils.
The work plan would have to include an action plan to update the specified federal strategic plans by September 30, 2027, using input from biotechnology and biomanufacturing stakeholders.
(D) An action plan to update, by September 30, 2027, strategic plans under section 2202(e)(1)(E) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 652(e)(1)(E)) with input from such stakeholders.
Within one year after submitting the work plan, the agency's Director would have to report on its implementation to the same two congressional committees.
Not later than one year after the submission of the work plan under paragraph (1), the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency of the Department of Homeland Security shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report on the implementation of such work plan.
The Director would also have to report to those committees on whether any critical biotechnology areas remain unprotected. The deadline would be whichever comes first: two years after submitting the work plan, or the first post-enactment evaluation and recommendation under the cited provision of the fiscal year 2021 defense authorization law.
Not later than the earlier of two years after the submission of the work plan under paragraph (1), or the first evaluation and recommendation carried out pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of section 9002 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (6 U.S.C. 652a) that occurs after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency of the Department of Homeland security shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report addressing whether there are any critical biotechnology areas that remain unprotected.
The official-actions snapshot updated October 5, 2026, records introduction in the House and referral to the House Committee on Homeland Security on September 24, 2026. It does not establish what happened after that snapshot.
Source snapshot updated 2026-10-05T11:43:36Z. 2026-09-24: Referred to the House Committee on Homeland Security. 2026-09-24: Introduced in House
A closer look
Reviewed version: Introduced in House · 2026-09-24. These findings describe provisions and who may benefit; they are not judgments of waste, corruption, or motive.
This review covers the supplied bill text. “None identified” does not rule out provisions in later versions or accompanying reports and disclosures.
Provisions outside the bill’s main subject, or policy changes attached to appropriations.
None identified in the reviewed text
No unrelated provision or policy change attached to appropriations was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion does not extend to other versions or accompanying materials.
Spending directed to particular recipients or places outside ordinary competitive or formula-based allocation.
None identified in the reviewed text
No congressionally directed spending for particular recipients or places was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion does not establish absence in other versions or accompanying materials.
Narrow exceptions, exemptions, or preferential treatment that warrant a closer look.
None identified in the reviewed text
No materially narrow carve-out, special exemption, or preferential treatment was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. Coverage of the policy's intended beneficiaries and routine coordination do not alone qualify. This conclusion is limited to this version.
Full text preserved for this analysis. Legislative record snapshot: Oct 5, 2026. How PlainBill uses AI