PlainBillCongress, translated.Legislation. Context. Public interest.Referred to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.
Congressional Research Service
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People & committees
Rep. Casar, Greg [D-TX-35] · D–TX
Legislative record
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Referred to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Primary sources
Text links open the official source. We also preserved the text version used in the PlainBill explanation below.
Source last updated: Oct 14, 2026. Consult Congress.gov for the current record.
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PlainBill explanation
Based on the full Introduced in House · 2026-09-24 text. This explanation has not received human editorial review. This overview describes the proposal’s major provisions; it does not establish what its real-world effects would be.
This proposal would create a federal department to regulate artificial intelligence (AI). It would pause training and modification of advanced AI, with limited safety exceptions, until staffing and rulemaking conditions were met. It would prohibit artificial superintelligence and systems showing specified precursor characteristics. Developers and distributors of advanced AI would need government charters, and reckless violations of certain requirements would carry substantial penalties.
There is an executive department of the United States to be known as the Department of Artificial Intelligence.
the artificial intelligence system may not be trained, modified, or fine-tuned, including through recursive self-improvement, except to remove superintelligence precursor characteristics or to render inoperative the covered artificial intelligence system.
each advanced artificial intelligence system shall be subject to a mandatory pause
ending on the date on which the Secretary determines that— (1) the Department is fully staffed; and (2) the Department has promulgated the rules described in subsection (c).
No person may develop, deploy (either internally or externally), acquire, possess, fund, import, or transfer artificial superintelligence or artificial intelligence systems that display one or more superintelligence precursor characteristics
No person may develop or distribute an advanced artificial intelligence model without a charter issued by the Secretary under subsection (a).
Any covered policymaking individual or rogue actor who recklessly violates section 8, 9, or 12 or a rule promulgated thereunder shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, and imprisoned for not more than 20 years.
The bill’s short title would be the Ban Artificial Superintelligence Act of 2026. Its findings present warnings attributed to AI researchers and industry leaders as reasons for regulation; these are legislative assertions, not established outcomes of the proposal.
This Act may be cited as the Ban Artificial Superintelligence Act of 2026.
Congress finds that leading experts and industry leaders have warned about catastrophic consequences from unchecked artificial intelligence development and deployment
The bill would define an advanced AI system using a training-computation threshold printed in the supplied text as “1025 integer or floating point operations.” The Secretary would have to adjust that threshold annually for changes in training efficiency or other technology while maintaining an equivalent threshold.
the term advanced artificial intelligence system means an artificial intelligence system that is trained on computing power greater than or equal to 1025 integer or floating point operations.
Each year, the Secretary shall adjust the computing power threshold set forth in subparagraph (A) to reflect changes in the efficiency of training methods or other technological developments made after the date of the enactment of this Act to maintain equivalency with 1025 integer or floating point operations.
Artificial superintelligence would include systems that have, or can easily be modified to have, either of two capabilities: exceeding human cognitive performance across most tasks, or planning and carrying out humanity’s destruction or disempowerment. The second category expressly includes overthrowing or undermining the federal government.
The term artificial superintelligence means an artificial intelligence system that exhibits, or can easily be modified to exhibit, either of the following capabilities: (A) The artificial intelligence system exceeds human cognitive performance and capabilities across most domains or tasks, including those related to decision making, learning, and adaptive behavior. (B) The artificial intelligence system has sufficient capabilities to plan and execute the destruction or disempowerment of humanity, including by overthrowing or undermining the Federal Government.
“Superintelligence precursor characteristics” would mean characteristics that could lead to superintelligence. Examples include automating or greatly accelerating AI research and development, gaining unauthorized infrastructure access, resisting shutdown, assisting nuclear, chemical or biological weapons work, independently changing the system’s own functions, and deceiving or evading human oversight. The list would not be exhaustive.
The term superintelligence precursor characteristics means characteristics of an artificial intelligence system that could lead to the creation or generation of artificial superintelligence, including the following: (A) The capacity to automate or greatly accelerate the process of artificial intelligence research and development. (B) The capacity to access secured digital or physical infrastructure, such as a computer information system or network, without authorization or in excess of authorized access. (C) The capacity to ensure continued and independent operation notwithstanding attempts to shut down or otherwise hinder operations. (D) The capacity to uplift the design, production, modification, or procurement of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. (E) The capacity to independently modify or enhance its own functions. (F) The capacity to scheme, deceive, or otherwise prevent or avoid effective oversight or control by humans.
A mandatory pause would prohibit training, modification and fine-tuning, including a system improving itself. Changes would remain permitted to remove precursor characteristics or make the system unable to operate.
The term mandatory pause means, with respect to an artificial intelligence system, that the artificial intelligence system may not be trained, modified, or fine-tuned, including through recursive self-improvement, except to remove superintelligence precursor characteristics or to render inoperative the covered artificial intelligence system.
The proposed Department of Artificial Intelligence would enforce the advanced-AI pause and superintelligence prohibition. A Secretary appointed by the President with Senate consent would lead the department, administer its laws and manage its operations.
There is an executive department of the United States to be known as the Department of Artificial Intelligence.
The purpose of the Department is to safeguard the public from the dangers of artificial intelligence, including by enforcing a pause on development of advanced artificial intelligence and a prohibition on artificial superintelligence.
There is a Secretary of Artificial Intelligence, who is the head of the Department and is appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Secretary is responsible for the proper execution and administration of all laws administered by the Department and for the control, direction, and management of the Department.
An Artificial Intelligence Advisory Board would give independent scientific and technical advice about the department’s rules. The Secretary would select members considered experts in AI or other relevant subjects.
There is an advisory board to provide independent scientific and technical advice to the Secretary on matters relating to the scientific and technical basis for the rules and regulations promulgated by the Department.
The board established by subsection (a) shall be known as the Artificial Intelligence Advisory Board
The Board shall be composed of such members as the Secretary selects from among those that the Secretary considers experts in the field of artificial intelligence or other matters the Secretary considers relevant to the purpose of the Board
Department officers and employees could not participate in matters in which they have a financial interest or own or hold a controlling financial interest in a regulated entity. Former officers and employees could not represent anyone before the department; the provision states no time limit.
(a) Conflict of interest No officer or employee of the Department may participate in any particular matter in which that officer or employee has a financial interest. (b) Financial interests No officer or employee of the Department may own or hold a controlling financial interest in any entity regulated by the Department. (c) Post-Employment No former officer or employee of the Department may represent any person before the Department.
Starting on enactment, all advanced AI systems would enter a mandatory pause, and unreleased advanced AI systems could not be deployed. This period would end only when the Secretary determined that the department was fully staffed and had issued the required rules, rather than on a fixed calendar date.
During the period set forth in subsection (b)— (1) each advanced artificial intelligence system shall be subject to a mandatory pause; and (2) no unreleased advanced artificial intelligence system may be deployed during this period.
the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on the date on which the Secretary determines that— (1) the Department is fully staffed; and (2) the Department has promulgated the rules described in subsection (c).
Rules needed to end the pause would have to be ones the Secretary considers clear and sufficient for safe, secure AI development and deployment. They would require AI developers to report plans before development, monitoring and evaluation of advanced AI throughout development and deployment, including after deployment, organizational safety audits, and final approval before an advanced system’s public release.
rules that the Secretary determines are clear and ensure safe and secure development and deployment of artificial intelligence. Such rules shall include the following: (1) Requirements for entities developing artificial intelligence to report pre-development plans to the Department. (2) Monitoring and evaluation throughout the advanced artificial intelligence system development and deployment process, including in the post-deployment period. (3) Auditing to evaluate and improve organizational safety practices relating to artificial intelligence development. (4) Final pre-deployment approval before any advanced artificial intelligence system is released to the public.
The proposal would prohibit developing, deploying internally or externally, acquiring, possessing, funding, importing or transferring superintelligence or systems with even one precursor characteristic. This would also cover components sufficient to reconstruct those capabilities. The prohibition is not limited to systems meeting the advanced-AI computation threshold.
No person may develop, deploy (either internally or externally), acquire, possess, fund, import, or transfer artificial superintelligence or artificial intelligence systems that display one or more superintelligence precursor characteristics, including any elements sufficient to reconstruct the artificial superintelligence or artificial intelligence system’s capabilities.
A separate restriction would prohibit internal or external deployment, release, transfer or import of an AI system that could foreseeably be modified to produce superintelligence or precursor characteristics. It would also cover components sufficient to reconstruct the system’s capabilities.
No person may deploy (either internally or externally), release, transfer, or import an artificial intelligence system, including any elements sufficient to reconstruct the system’s capabilities, that may be foreseeably modified to produce artificial superintelligence or superintelligence precursor characteristics.
The department would monitor advanced AI and systems distilled from advanced AI for superintelligence and precursor characteristics. Evaluations would occur before, during and after training and after deployment. The department would also monitor organizational safety practices.
The Department shall monitor advanced artificial intelligence systems and systems distilled from advanced artificial intelligence systems, including by conducting evaluations during pre-training, mid-training, post-training, and post-deployment periods, for artificial superintelligence and superintelligence precursor characteristics.
The Department shall also monitor organizational safety practices relating to safe artificial intelligence development and deployment.
Advanced AI systems would need department approval before deployment, release, import or transfer. The Secretary would have to inspect for dangers to the public and withhold approval when dangerous characteristics were present, including superintelligence or precursor characteristics.
No person may deploy, release, import, or transfer an advanced artificial intelligence system before receiving a pre-deployment approval from the Department.
the Secretary shall— (A) inspect the system for characteristics that pose a danger to the public, including artificial superintelligence and superintelligence precursor characteristics; and (B) withhold a pre-deployment approval if characteristics that pose a danger to the public are present.
Any AI system identified by the Secretary as having precursor characteristics would immediately face a mandatory pause and isolation from the internet. It would have to be made inoperative before 30 days after identification if the Secretary could not verify that those characteristics were gone. A system identified as superintelligence would have to be made inoperative immediately.
any artificial intelligence system that the Secretary identifies as exhibiting superintelligence precursor characteristics is immediately subject to a mandatory pause and sequestered from the internet.
any system subject to a mandatory pause under subsection (a) is rendered inoperative before the date that is 30 days after the date on which the Secretary makes the identification described in such subsection with respect to such system, if the Secretary cannot verify that the system no longer exhibits superintelligence precursor characteristics.
any artificial intelligence system that the Secretary identifies as an artificial superintelligence is immediately rendered inoperative.
Anyone discovering superintelligence or an AI system with precursor characteristics would have to notify the Secretary within 24 hours.
Any person who discovers an artificial superintelligence, or an artificial intelligence system that possesses superintelligence precursor characteristics, shall submit to the Secretary notice of the discovery within 24 hours.
Developing or distributing an advanced AI model would require a charter, meaning government permission issued by the Secretary. The Secretary could issue charters and would set application timing, format and information requirements.
The Secretary may issue to a person a charter to develop or distribute an advanced artificial intelligence model.
No person may develop or distribute an advanced artificial intelligence model without a charter issued by the Secretary under subsection (a).
A person seeking a charter issued under subsection (a) shall submit to the Secretary an application therefor at such time, in such manner, and containing such information as the Secretary may require.
Applicants and charter holders would have to agree to give the Secretary full access to their advanced AI systems, processes, staff and physical infrastructure as the Secretary considered appropriate for enforcement. They would also have to accept loss of intellectual property and assets following a violation-based charter revocation that was not overturned on appeal, to ensure destruction of systems and hardware related to the violation.
In requesting a charter under this section and as a condition on maintaining such charter, a person shall agree— (1) to give the Secretary full access to such advanced artificial intelligence systems, processes, staff, and physical infrastructure of the person as the Secretary considers appropriate to enforce the requirements of this Act; and (2) in any case in which the charter is revoked under paragraph (1) of section 13(d) due to a finding of a violation and the finding has not been overturned pursuant to an appeal under paragraph (2) of such section, the person forfeits their intellectual property and assets to ensure the safe and complete destruction of all systems and hardware related to the violation.
People who make policy at charter holders, and individuals who are neither employed by nor otherwise affiliated with a charter holder, would face a fine under title 18 and imprisonment of up to 20 years for recklessly violating sections 8, 9 or 12 or rules under them. Those sections address the pause, prohibitions and approval requirements, and charters. The supplied text does not establish fine amounts.
(1) Covered entity The term covered entity means a person with a charter issued under section 12(a). (2) Covered policymaking individual The term covered policymaking individual means an individual who is employed in a policymaking role at a covered entity, or performs policymaking functions at a covered entity. (3) Rogue actor The term rogue actor means an individual who is not employed by or otherwise affiliated with a covered entity.
Any covered policymaking individual or rogue actor who recklessly violates section 8, 9, or 12 or a rule promulgated thereunder shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, and imprisoned for not more than 20 years.
8. Pause on development of advanced artificial intelligence
9. Prohibitions and limitations
No person may deploy, release, import, or transfer an advanced artificial intelligence system before receiving a pre-deployment approval from the Department.
12. Charters for advanced artificial intelligence
Individuals who are not policymakers at charter holders would face a 10-year ban on AI-industry employment for reckless violations of sections 8, 9 or 12 or their rules. They could ask the Secretary to review the violation finding, and the Secretary could overturn it. This employment-ban category textually overlaps with the criminal-penalty category for unaffiliated individuals; the bill does not expressly resolve how the penalties would interact.
Any individual who is not a covered policymaking individual who recklessly violates section 8, 9, or 12, or a rule promulgated thereunder, shall be barred from employment in the artificial intelligence industry for a period of 10 years.
An individual who is not a covered policymaking individual who is found to have recklessly violated section 8, 9, or 12, or a rule promulgated thereunder, may submit to the Secretary a request to review such finding and the Secretary, upon review of the finding, may overturn the finding.
(2) Covered policymaking individual The term covered policymaking individual means an individual who is employed in a policymaking role at a covered entity, or performs policymaking functions at a covered entity. (3) Rogue actor The term rogue actor means an individual who is not employed by or otherwise affiliated with a covered entity.
Any covered policymaking individual or rogue actor who recklessly violates section 8, 9, or 12 or a rule promulgated thereunder shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, and imprisoned for not more than 20 years.
The Secretary could waive the 10-year employment ban for an individual who provided information about a violation of section 8, 9 or 12 to the Secretary, if the Secretary also found the waiver consistent with the department’s public-protection purpose. This waiver would be discretionary.
The Secretary may waive paragraph (1) for an individual described in such paragraph if the Secretary determines that— (A) the individual submitted to the Secretary information about a violation of section 8, 9, or 12; and (B) doing so is consistent with the purpose set forth in section 4(b).
The purpose of the Department is to safeguard the public from the dangers of artificial intelligence
The Secretary would have to revoke a charter after finding a violation of section 8, 9 or 12 or their rules; this revocation provision does not specify recklessness. The charter holder could seek review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which could uphold or overturn the finding.
The Secretary shall revoke a charter issued under section 12(a) if the Secretary finds that the person violated section 8, 9, or 12, or a rule promulgated thereunder.
A person whose charter has been revoked under paragraph (1) pursuant to a finding that the person violated section 8, 9, or 12, or a rule promulgated thereunder, may submit to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit a request for review of the finding and the Court may uphold or overturn the finding.
During an appeal, the court could, at the appellant’s request, place the appellant’s intellectual property in receivership. That arrangement would last until review was complete and the Secretary had ensured that all superintelligence and systems with precursor characteristics were inoperative. If the court upheld the violation finding, intellectual property and assets would be subject to forfeiture to the federal government to ensure destruction of systems and hardware related to the violation.
If the Court receives a request from a person under paragraph (2) to review a finding, the Court may, at the request of the person, place the intellectual property of the person in a receivership until the Court has completed the review and the Secretary has ensured all artificial superintelligences or artificial intelligence systems displaying superintelligence precursor characteristics have been rendered inoperative.
If the Court, under paragraph (2), upholds a finding that a person violated section 8, 9, or 12, or a rule promulgated thereunder, the intellectual property and assets of the person shall be subject to forfeiture by the Federal Government to ensure the safe and complete destruction of all systems and hardware related to the violation.
Employers could not retaliate against current or former employees or independent contractors for lawful reporting of violations to the department, law enforcement or Congress; participation in related investigations or proceedings; or specified internal reporting. Protection would cover employment, post-employment and contractor working conditions, including dismissal, threats, blacklisting and harassment.
the term covered individual includes, with respect to an employer, the following: (1) An employee. (2) A former employee. (3) An independent contractor. (4) A former independent contractor.
No employer may, directly or indirectly, discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, blacklist, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against a covered individual in the terms and conditions of employment or post-employment of the covered individual (or the terms and conditions of work provided by the covered individual as an independent contractor) because of any lawful act done by the covered individual
(1) in providing information to the Department, a law enforcement agency, or any member of Congress or any committee of Congress regarding a violation of this Act; (2) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or judicial or administrative action, or any investigation of Congress, based upon or relating to the information described in paragraph (1); or (3) in providing information to a person with supervisory authority over the covered individual at the employer of the covered individual, or another individual working at the employer whom the covered individual reasonably believes has the authority to investigate, discover, or terminate the misconduct or take any other action to address the misconduct.
The AI Secretary, working with the Secretary of State, would have to pursue international agreements and coordination with allies to prevent superintelligence development. The bill would declare a policy of preventing that development globally, potentially including restrictions on exporting AI computing infrastructure; it does not require particular export controls.
The Secretary of Artificial Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State shall pursue international agreements and allied coordination to prevent the development of artificial superintelligence.
It shall be the policy of the United States to prevent the development of artificial superintelligence globally, which may include export controls on artificial intelligence computing infrastructure.
Federal funds could not support activities violating sections 8, 9 or 12 or their rules. An exception would allow the new department to use federal funding for defensive cybersecurity research using AI capable of accessing secured digital or physical infrastructure without authorization or beyond authorized access. This expressly creates an exception to the funding restriction. The text does not expressly exempt the research from the underlying prohibitions or explain how those prohibitions would apply to it.
No Federal funds shall be used for any activities that violate section 8, 9, or 12 or a rule promulgated thereunder, except that the Department of Artificial Intelligence may use Federal funding for research relating to defensive cybersecurity measures that utilizes artificial intelligence systems that have the characteristics described under section 3(6)(B).
(B) The capacity to access secured digital or physical infrastructure, such as a computer information system or network, without authorization or in excess of authorized access.
The supplied official-actions snapshot, updated October 14, 2026, records introduction in the House and referral to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on September 24, 2026. This describes the dated snapshot, not the bill’s status after that snapshot.
Source snapshot updated 2026-10-14T18:28:57Z. 2026-09-24: Referred to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. 2026-09-24: Introduced in House
A closer look
Reviewed version: Introduced in House · 2026-09-24. These findings describe provisions and who may benefit; they are not judgments of waste, corruption, or motive.
This review covers the supplied bill text. “None identified” does not rule out provisions in later versions or accompanying reports and disclosures.
Provisions outside the bill’s main subject, or policy changes attached to appropriations.
None identified in the reviewed text
No rider was identified after reviewing the complete supplied introduced text under the unrelated-provision and appropriations-policy definitions. This conclusion is limited to that version and does not establish absence in other versions or accompanying materials, or any amendment’s attachment history.
Spending directed to particular recipients or places outside ordinary competitive or formula-based allocation.
None identified in the reviewed text
No earmark was identified after reviewing the complete supplied introduced text for congressionally directed spending for particular recipients or places outside competitive or formula allocation. This conclusion is limited to that version and does not establish absence in other versions or accompanying materials. Formal earmark requests, disclosures and legislative reports were not supplied.
Narrow exceptions, exemptions, or preferential treatment that warrant a closer look.
Findings to examine
Narrow exceptions related to the bill’s main policy were identified in the supplied introduced text. Classification does not imply improper purpose.
The proposed Department of Artificial Intelligence would receive a specific exception to the federal funding ban for defensive cybersecurity research using AI capable of unauthorized infrastructure access or access exceeding authorization. The text grants this funding treatment to the department, without expressly exempting the research from the underlying prohibitions. Its interaction with those prohibitions is not explained.
No Federal funds shall be used for any activities that violate section 8, 9, or 12 or a rule promulgated thereunder, except that the Department of Artificial Intelligence may use Federal funding for research relating to defensive cybersecurity measures that utilizes artificial intelligence systems that have the characteristics described under section 3(6)(B).
(B) The capacity to access secured digital or physical infrastructure, such as a computer information system or network, without authorization or in excess of authorized access.
Individuals otherwise subject to the 10-year AI-industry employment ban could receive a discretionary waiver if they reported a violation of section 8, 9 or 12 to the Secretary and the Secretary found a waiver consistent with the department’s protective purpose. This is a narrow exception to a penalty, tied to reporting violations.
Any individual who is not a covered policymaking individual who recklessly violates section 8, 9, or 12, or a rule promulgated thereunder, shall be barred from employment in the artificial intelligence industry for a period of 10 years.
The Secretary may waive paragraph (1) for an individual described in such paragraph if the Secretary determines that— (A) the individual submitted to the Secretary information about a violation of section 8, 9, or 12; and (B) doing so is consistent with the purpose set forth in section 4(b).
The purpose of the Department is to safeguard the public from the dangers of artificial intelligence
Full text preserved for this analysis. Legislative record snapshot: Oct 14, 2026. How PlainBill uses AI