PlainBillCongress, translated.Legislation. Context. Public interest.Referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Congressional Research Service
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People & committees
Rep. Schakowsky, Janice D. [D-IL-9] · D–IL
Legislative record
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Referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Primary sources
Text links open the official source. We also preserved the text version used in the PlainBill explanation below.
No related bills are listed in this snapshot. This does not establish whether the proposal has appeared in earlier Congresses.
Source last updated: Oct 5, 2026. Consult Congress.gov for the current record.
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PlainBill explanation
Based on the full Introduced in House · 2026-09-16 text. This explanation has not received human editorial review. This overview describes the proposal’s major provisions; it does not establish what its real-world effects would be.
The proposed Patriotic Corporations of America Act of 2026 would attach new worker-protection conditions to federal contracts and favor bidders meeting additional standards. For example, bidders would have to provide minimum amounts of paid leave, and stronger preferences would go to bidders meeting more qualifying standards. The bill also sets separate requirements and preferences for Defense Department contracts.
This Act may be cited as the Patriotic Corporations of America Act of 2026.
The head of an executive agency may not award a contract unless the following requirements are met:
The offeror provides each employee at least 7 days of paid sick leave, 7 days of paid family and medical leave, and 7 days of paid vacation per year.
The head of an executive agency shall apply subsection (a) by providing greater preference to an offeror that meets a greater number of the qualifications under paragraphs (1) through (18) of such subsection.
The Secretary of Defense may not award a contract unless the following requirements are met:
The Secretary of Defense shall establish a preference for contracting with an offeror that meets any of the following qualifications:
Both sets of contract requirements would make bidders agree to pay each employee, throughout the contract, at least the higher of two amounts: a $15 wage floor adjusted annually for increases in the national median hourly wage, or 110% of the wage rate specified in the cited Fair Labor Standards Act provision.
The offeror agrees for the duration of the contract to pay each employee of the offeror a wage of not less than the greater of— (A) $15, increased on an annual basis from such amount by the annual percentage increase, if any, in the median hourly wage of all employees as determined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics; or (B) the amount equal to the sum of— (i) the wage rate in effect under section 6(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 206(a)(1)); and (ii) the amount that is 10 percent of such wage rate.
The offeror agrees for the duration of the contract to pay each employee of the offeror a wage of not less than the greater of— (A) $15, increased annually by the amount of any annual percentage increase of the median hourly wage of all employees, as determined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics; or (B) the amount equal to the sum of— (i) the wage rate in effect under section 6(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 206(a)(1)); and (ii) the amount that is 10 percent of such wage rate.
Independent contractors would count as employees under both the mandatory contract requirements and the preference rules, including the defense provisions.
(f) Employee defined In this section, the term employee includes an independent contractor.
(2) the term employee includes an independent contractor;
(f) Employee defined In this section, the term employee includes an independent contractor.
(2) The term employee includes an independent contractor.
Bidders would have to agree to remain neutral toward efforts to form a union during the contract. The general provision also requires an agreement against hiring replacements for striking or picketing workers and against closing a business in response. The defense provision connects its replacement-worker and closure commitments with “or,” creating a textual difference whose practical meaning is unresolved in the supplied evidence.
The offeror agrees to sign— (A) a neutrality agreement, effective during the period of the contract, with respect to efforts to form a labor organization (as defined in section 2 of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 152)); and (B) an agreement, effective during the period of the contract, not to hire employees to replace any employee engaged in any strike, picketing, or other concerted refusal to work or to close a business in response to such a strike, picketing, or other refusal to work.
The offeror agrees to sign— (A) a neutrality agreement, effective for the duration of the contract, with respect to efforts to form a labor organization (as defined in section 2 of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 152)); and (B) an agreement, effective for the duration of the contract— (i) not to hire employees to replace any employee engaged in any strike, picketing, or other concerted refusal to work; or (ii) not to close an entity of such offeror in response to such a strike, picketing, or other refusal to work.
Before awarding a contract, the responsible agency would have to determine, with the National Labor Relations Board, that the bidder had neither been found to violate nor settled a claim about employees’ organizing rights under covered federal rules or relevant state regulations. State relevance would be determined in consultation with the Labor Secretary. These clauses specify no lookback period.
The head of the executive agency, in consultation with the National Labor Relations Board, determines that the offeror has not been found in violation or settled a claim for a violation of the right of an employee to organize under a law, including regulations thereof, administered by the National Labor Relations Board, or of a State regulation determined relevant by the head of the executive agency, in consultation with the Secretary of Labor.
The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the National Labor Relations Board, determines that the offeror has not been found in violation, or settled a claim for a violation, of the right of an employee to organize— (A) under a law or regulation administered by the National Labor Relations Board; or (B) under a State regulation determined relevant by the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Labor.
Bidders would have to provide each employee at least seven days of paid sick leave and seven days of paid family and medical leave annually. The general provision also requires seven days of paid vacation; the defense provision instead calls this seven days of paid personal leave.
The offeror provides each employee at least 7 days of paid sick leave, 7 days of paid family and medical leave, and 7 days of paid vacation per year.
The offeror provides each employee at least seven days of paid sick leave, seven days of paid family and medical leave, and seven days of paid personal leave per year.
Under both sets of requirements, a bidder could not have had a payment assessment imposed under Internal Revenue Code section 4980H for any of the 12 months before the contract award. The referenced tax provision is not reproduced in the bundle.
No assessable payment has been imposed, with respect to the offeror, under section 4980H of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, with respect to any of the 12 months ending before the date on which the contract is awarded.
No assessable payment has been imposed, with respect to the offeror, under section 4980H of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, with respect to any of the 12 months ending before the date on which the contract is awarded.
Bidders would have to confirm compliance with the cited workplace-safety standards and submit actionable disaster and health-crisis plans. Plans must address essential workers, increased essential-worker and quarantine pay, family and medical leave, temporary layoffs, whistleblower protections, evacuation, protective equipment, and medical services and first aid. The defense version expressly requires planning for family and medical leave beyond the basic leave requirement.
The offeror submits to the head of the executive agency confirmation of their compliance with standards promulgated pursuant to section 6 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 655), and an actionable plan to address natural disasters and health crises, including policies and plans for the following: (A) The determination of essential employees. (B) Increased essential employee pay and quarantine pay. (C) Paid family and medical leave. (D) Temporary layoffs. (E) Whistleblower protections. (F) Emergencies in the case of rapidly changing circumstances, including the following: (i) An evacuation plan. (ii) Assessment and provision of personal protective equipment. (iii) Provision of medical services and first aid.
The offeror submits to the Secretary of Defense confirmation of compliance with standards issued pursuant to section 6 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 655) and an actionable plan to address natural disasters and health crises, including policies and plans for— (A) the determination of essential employees; (B) increased essential employee pay and quarantine pay; (C) paid family and medical leave in addition to such leave provided under paragraph (4); (D) temporary layoffs; (E) whistleblower protections during such a natural disaster or health crisis; and (F) emergencies in the case of rapidly changing circumstances, including— (i) an evacuation plan; (ii) an assessment of, and the provision of, personal protective equipment; and (iii) the provision of medical services and first aid.
Bidders would have to submit actionable plans to recruit and promote people of color, women, LGBTQ+ people, people with disabilities, and veterans. A workforce child-care plan would also be mandatory for general contracts above $100 million and defense contracts with proposed values above $100 million.
(7) The offerer submits to the head of the executive agency an actionable plan to recruit and promote people of color, women, LGBTQ+ people, people with disabilities, and veterans. (8) In the case of a contract that is more than $100,000,000, the offeror submits a plan to meet the child care needs of their workforce.
(7) The offerer submits to the Secretary of Defense an actionable plan to recruit and promote people of color, women, LGBTQ+ individuals, individuals with disabilities, and veterans. (8) In the case of a contract with a proposed value greater than $100,000,000, the offeror submits a plan to meet the child care needs of their workforce.
For general contracts exceeding $100,000 and defense contracts with proposed values exceeding $100,000, bidders would have to disclose political contributions on their main websites and submit them to the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council. The requirement expressly includes contributions to Super PACs and section 501(c)(4) organizations.
In the case of a contract that exceeds $100,000, the offeror discloses publicly on the primary website of the offeror and submits to the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council any political contribution, including to any Super PAC and 501(c)(4) organization.
In the case of a contract a proposed value greater than $100,000, the offeror discloses publicly on the primary website of the offeror and submits to the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council any political contribution, including to any super PAC (as defined by the Federal Election Commission) or any organization that is described in section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and that is exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of such Code.
Agencies, including the Defense Department, would have to consult the Environmental Protection Agency and determine that a bidder had not paid a penalty or settled a claim for more than $100,000 over a violation of EPA-administered law within the preceding five years.
The head of an executive agency may not award a contract unless the head of the executive agency, in consultation with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, determines that the offeror has not, within the previous 5 years— (1) paid a penalty that is greater than $100,000 for a violation of a law, including regulations thereof, administered by Environmental Protection Agency; or (2) settled a claim in connection with such a violation for an amount that is greater than $100,000.
The Secretary of Defense may not award a contract unless the Secretary, in consultation with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, determines that the offeror has not, within the five-year period preceding the proposed date of such award— (1) paid a penalty that is greater than $100,000 for a violation of a law, including regulations thereof, administered by Environmental Protection Agency; or (2) settled a claim in connection with such a violation for an amount that is greater than $100,000.
Both sets of requirements would require bidders to maintain U.S. headquarters, have federal income-tax liability exceeding their federal income-tax credits except credits constituting cash tax payments, and disclose financial performance and tax information country by country. Bidders also could not be an “expatriated entity” or “surrogate foreign corporation” as defined in the cited tax law; those definitions are not supplied.
The head of an executive agency may not award a contract unless the offeror— (1) maintains headquarters in the United States; (2) has Federal income tax liability which exceeds the offeror’s Federal income tax credits (other than such credits which constitute cash payments of tax by the offeror); (3) is neither an expatriated entity (as defined in subparagraph (A) of section 7874(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) nor a surrogate foreign corporation (as defined in subparagraph (B) of such section); and (4) discloses financial performance and tax information on a country-by-country basis.
The Secretary of Defense may not award a contract unless the offeror— (1) maintains headquarters in the United States; (2) has Federal income tax liability which exceeds the offeror’s Federal income tax credits (other than such credits which constitute cash payments of tax by the offeror); (3) is neither an expatriated entity (as defined in subparagraph (A) of section 7874(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) nor a surrogate foreign corporation (as defined in subparagraph (B) of such section); and (4) discloses financial performance and tax information on a country-by-country basis.
A bidder controlled by a private equity firm would have to disclose its parent companies and controlling investors. The controlling firm would have to agree not to charge the bidder management or monitoring fees during the contract.
In the case that a private equity firm holds a controlling interest in an offeror, the following requirements apply:
(A) the offeror discloses each parent company and controlling investor;
The controlling private equity firm of the offeror agrees to abstain from charging management and monitoring fees to the offeror for the duration of the Federal contract.
With respect to an offeror for which a private equity firm has a controlling interest, the Secretary of Defense may not award a contract to such offeror unless— (A) the offeror discloses any parent companies and controlling investors;
The controlling private equity firm of the offeror agrees to abstain from charging management and monitoring fees to the offeror for the duration of the contract.
During a contract, private-equity-controlled bidders would have to forgo dividend recapitalizations and dividends above the specified 10%-of-debt threshold. The general provision also prohibits dividends while pensions are underfunded; the defense provision makes that condition depend on the bidder’s determination that its pensions are underfunded. The general debt threshold refers to the “firm,” while the defense threshold expressly refers to the bidder’s debt.
In the case that a private equity firm holds a controlling interest in an offeror, the following requirements apply:
the offeror agrees for the duration of the contract to abstain from the following: (i) Dividend recapitalization. (ii) Payment of dividends that are in aggregate more than 10 percent of the amount of the debt load of the firm. (iii) Dividend payment while pensions are underfunded.
With respect to an offeror for which a private equity firm has a controlling interest, the Secretary of Defense may not award a contract to such offeror unless— (A) the offeror discloses any parent companies and controlling investors; (B) the offeror agrees for the duration of the contract to— (i) abstain from dividend recapitalizations; (ii) abstain from payment of dividends that are in aggregate more than ten percent of the amount of the offeror’s debt load; (iii) abstain from payment of dividends if the offeror determines pensions of the offeror are underfunded;
Private-equity-controlled bidders would have to agree not to sell real estate and lease it back during the contract. Certain transfers to related companies would require agency consent: the general provision covers transfers to another company owned by a firm shareholder, while the defense provision covers transfers to the bidder’s parent or another entity with that parent.
In the case that a private equity firm holds a controlling interest in an offeror, the following requirements apply:
the offeror agrees for the duration of the contract to abstain from the following:
(iv) Selling real estate assets and leasing them back. (v) The transfer of assets from the offering company to another company owned by a firm shareholder without the consent of the head of the agency.
With respect to an offeror for which a private equity firm has a controlling interest, the Secretary of Defense may not award a contract to such offeror unless—
the offeror agrees for the duration of the contract to—
(iv) abstain from selling real estate assets and leasing such assets back; and (v) abstain from transferring assets of the offeror to a parent company of the offeror, or any other entity with such parent company, without consent from the Secretary of Defense.
Under the general private-equity rule, an agency finding that one controlled company violated the organizing-rights or environmental provisions would trigger a five-year federal-contract bar for every company the same private equity firm controlled when the violation occurred. The agency would make the determination with the Labor Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, and EPA Administrator.
If the head of an executive agency determines, in consultation with the Secretary of Labor, the National Labor Relations Board, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, that one company in which the private equity firm has a controlling interest violated subsection (a)(3) or (b), such head shall bar any company in which the private equity firm had a controlling interest at the time of violation from participation in a Federal contract for a period of 5 years.
The defense private-equity rule uses a different trigger: a violation by the controlling private equity firm itself of the organizing-rights or environmental provisions. Following the specified interagency determination, the Defense Secretary could not award a contract to the controlled bidder for five years beginning on the violation date.
With respect to an offeror for which a private equity firm has a controlling interest, if such private equity firm has violated subsection (a)(3) or (b) (as determined by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of Labor, the National Labor Relations Board, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency), the Secretary of Defense may not award a contract to such offeror for the five-year period beginning on the date of such violation.
Agencies would have to ensure contract funds do not help consolidate markets. Bidders would have to agree not to acquire competitors when the acquisition might substantially reduce competition or tend to create a monopoly. The restriction would run for one year after the contract closes, or two years for private-equity-controlled bidders; the defense version measures these periods from the last day of contract performance.
The head of an executive agency shall ensure that Federal contract funds do not facilitate market consolidation.
The head of an executive agency may not award a contract unless— (A) the offeror signs an agreement that the offeror will not acquire a competitor or rival where the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly, for one year following the close of a Federal contract; and (B) in the case of a private equity firm that holds a controlling interest in an offeror, the offeror signs an agreement that the offeror will not acquire a competitor or rival where the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly, for two years following the close of a Federal contract.
The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that funds from a contract awarded under this section do not facilitate market consolidation.
The Secretary of Defense may not award a contract unless— (A) the offeror signs an agreement that they will not acquire a competitor or rival where the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly, during the one-year period beginning on the last day of performance of the contract; and (B) with respect to an offeror for which a private equity firm holds a controlling interest, the offeror signs an agreement that they will not acquire a competitor or rival where the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly, during the two-year period beginning on the last day of performance of the contract.
Market-consolidation violations would be determined by the responsible agency with the Federal Trade Commission and Attorney General. The general rule would bar the bidder from federal-contract participation for five years. The defense rule would prohibit the violator from submitting an offer under that section for five years beginning on the violation date.
A violation of this subsection— (A) shall be determined by the head of the relevant executive agency, in consultation with the Federal Trade Commission and the Attorney General; and (B) shall bar the offeror from participation in a Federal contract for a period of 5 years.
The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Federal Trade Commission and the Attorney General, shall determine a violation of this subsection. A person that violates this subsection may not submit an offer for a contract under this section for a period of five years beginning on the date of such violation.
The bill would establish bidding preferences separate from the mandatory eligibility conditions. Meeting any listed qualification would earn a preference, and meeting more qualifications would earn greater preference. The general list contains 18 qualifications; the defense list contains 16.
There shall be a contract preference for an offeror that meets any of the following qualifications:
The head of an executive agency shall apply subsection (a) by providing greater preference to an offeror that meets a greater number of the qualifications under paragraphs (1) through (18) of such subsection.
The Secretary of Defense shall establish a preference for contracting with an offeror that meets any of the following qualifications:
The Secretary of Defense shall apply subsection (a) by providing greater preference to an offeror that meets a greater number of the qualifications under paragraphs (1) through (16) of such subsection.
Preference qualifications would include a pay ratio no higher than 100 to 1 and not outsourcing jobs outside the United States. The pay-ratio calculation comes from an external regulation, with a modification to use the highest-paid employee when that person is not the principal executive officer. The supplied text does not reproduce the rest of that calculation.
(1) The offeror does not have a pay ratio of more than 100 to 1. (2) The offeror does not outsource jobs outside of the United States.
the term pay ratio means the ratio described in section 229.402(u)(1)(iii) of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations (or any successor regulation), except that if the highest compensated employee of the corporation is not the principal executive officer, the ratio shall be determined based on the compensation of such highest compensated employee.
(1) The offeror does not have a pay ratio of more than 100 to 1. (2) The offeror does not outsource jobs outside of the United States.
The term pay ratio means the ratio described in section 229.402(u)(1)(iii) of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations (or any successor regulation), except that if the highest compensated employee of the corporation is not the principal executive officer, the ratio shall be determined based on the compensation of such highest compensated employee.
Other preference qualifications would include an employee-elected board representative, if the bidder has a board; contributions of at least 5% of payroll to a portable pension fund; and annual transfers of at least 2% of company stock to employees until they own at least 20%. The defense stock qualification requires assurances of future transfers, while the general provision describes providing the stock.
(3) If the offeror has a Board of Directors, the offeror has at least one seat on such Board of Directors for a representative elected by the employees. (4) The offeror contributes at least 5 percent of the payroll to a portable pension fund for the employees. (5) The offeror provides at least 2 percent of stock to their employees every year until the company is at least 20 percent owned by employees.
(3) If the offeror has a board of directors, the offeror has at least one seat on such board for a representative elected by the employees of the offeror. (4) The offeror contributes at least five percent of the payroll to a portable pension fund for employees of the offeror. (5) The offeror provides assurances that the offeror will provide at least two percent of stock to employees of the offeror every year until the company is at least 20 percent owned by such employees.
Bidders could also qualify for preferences through a collective bargaining agreement with employees or by meeting the stated 40% threshold for women and people of color among top executives and board members, if there is a board. Another qualification concerns public workforce disclosures: the general version specifies gender and racial composition and pay gaps; the defense version specifies pay gaps identifying employees’ gender and race.
(6) The offeror has a collective bargaining agreement with employees. (7) Women and people of color make up at least 40 percent of top executives and, if the offeror has a Board of Directors, of the members of such Board. (8) The offeror publicly discloses workforce gender and racial composition and pay gaps.
(6) The offeror has a collective bargaining agreement with employees of the offeror. (7) Women and people of color make up at least 40 percent of top executives of the offeror and, if the offeror has a board of directors, of the members of such board. (8) The offeror publicly discloses any pay gaps that exist between employees of the offeror that identifies the gender and race of such employees.
Both lists would favor bidders with the specified equal-opportunity apprenticeship program. They would also favor bidders documenting help for each covered employee with a disability working under a section 14(c) certificate to move into competitive integrated employment, with those employees working in such jobs an average of at least 20 hours weekly. The referenced legal definitions and certificate rules are not reproduced.
(9) The offeror provides an affirmative action program (as defined in section 30.4 of title 29, Code of Federal Regulations, or a successor regulation) to ensure equal opportunity in apprenticeships. (10) The offeror documents that they have assisted each individual with an intellectual or developmental disability and other individual with a significant disability employed by the employer under a certificate under section 14(c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. 214(c)) to transition to opportunities for competitive integrated employment and that such individuals are employed in such opportunities for not less than 20 hours per week, on average.
(9) The offeror provides an affirmative action program (as defined in section 30.4 of title 29, Code of Federal Regulations, or a successor regulation) to ensure equal opportunity in apprenticeships. (10) The offeror documents assistance provided to each individual with an intellectual or developmental disability and any other individual with a significant disability employed by the offeror under a certificate under section 14(c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. 214(c)) to transition to competitive integrated employment (as defined in section 7(5) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 705(5))) and that such individuals are employed in such opportunities for not less than 20 hours per week, on average.
Additional qualifications in both lists would include agreeing not to repurchase the company’s stock for five years from the contract’s start, submitting a workforce child-care plan, and both submitting a climate-impact assessment and implementing methods to reduce negative climate impacts.
(11) The offeror agrees to forgo all stock buybacks for a period of 5 years beginning on the date on which the contract begins. (12) The offeror submits a plan to meet the childcare needs of their workforce. (13) The offeror submits a climate impact assessment of the operations of the offeror and has implemented methods for reducing negative climate impacts.
(11) The offeror agrees to forgo all stock buybacks for a period of five years beginning on the date on which the contract begins. (12) The offeror submits a plan to meet the childcare needs of their workforce. (13) The offeror submits a climate impact assessment of the operations of the offerors and has implemented methods for reducing negative climate impacts.
Under the general preference rules, clearly labeling any content generated with artificial intelligence would be one qualification. Three separate qualifications concern internal controls preventing the bidder’s AI products from generating election misinformation, generating sexual material about someone without that person’s express affirmative consent, or being used for workplace surveillance. A further qualification concerns compliance of AI developed or used by the bidder with the named federal AI Risk Management Framework.
(14) The offeror, in a clear and conspicuous manner, labels any content generated with artificial intelligence. (15) The offeror has internal controls to ensure that any artificial intelligence tool or product the offeror develops is not used, either by employees or external users, to generate content that spreads misinformation about a Federal, State, or local election, or a candidate in such election. (16) The offeror has internal controls to ensure that any artificial intelligence tool or product the offeror develops is not used, either by employees or external users, to generate sexual material about an individual without their express affirmative consent. (17) The offeror has internal controls to ensure that any artificial intelligence tool or product the offeror develops is not used, either by the offeror or another company using the tool or product of the offeror, for workplace surveillance of employees. (18) The offeror has ensured that any artificial intelligence tool or product developed or used by the offeror is in compliance with the National Institute for Standards and Technology Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework.
The defense AI-disclosure preference would cover AI-generated content used to perform the contract. Disclosures would have to identify the content as AI-generated, name the tool and version, and state the creation date and time. To the extent technically feasible, the disclosures would have to be permanent and unable to be removed or tampered with.
The offeror discloses, in a clear and conspicuous manner, all content generated by artificial intelligence for the performance of the contract, including by identifying content as being generated by artificial intelligence, identifying the tool and version used to create the content, stating the date and time the content was created, and, to the extent technically feasible, ensure that the disclosures are permanent and unable to be removed or tampered with.
The defense preference list combines three AI safeguards into one qualification: internal controls against election misinformation, sexual material about someone without express affirmative consent, and surveillance of the bidder’s employees using AI developed by the bidder. A separate qualification requires AI developed or used by the bidder to comply with the named federal AI Risk Management Framework.
(15) The offeror has internal controls to ensure that any artificial intelligence tool or product developed by the offeror is not used, either by employees or external users— (A) to generate content that spreads misinformation about a Federal, State, or local election, or a candidate in such election; (B) to generate sexual material about an individual without express affirmative consent of such individual; or (C) for workplace surveillance of employees of the offeror. (16) The offeror has ensured that any artificial intelligence tool or product developed or used by the offeror is in compliance with the National Institute for Standards and Technology Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework.
Section 2 would add the general eligibility and preference rules to title 41 of the U.S. Code and update its section list. Those amendments would apply to federal contracts entered into on or after enactment.
Chapter 47 of division C of subtitle I of title 41, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new sections:
The table of sections for chapter 47 of division C of subtitle I of title 41, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new items: 4715. Requirements for offerors. 4716. Contract preferences.
The amendments made by this section shall apply to any Federal contract entered into on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Section 3 would add the defense rules to title 10 of the U.S. Code. It specifies January 1, 2025, as the effective date for the new statutory sections and applies section 3 and its amendments to Defense Secretary contracts entered into on or after the section’s effective date. That written date precedes the September 16, 2026 introduction recorded in the supplied actions snapshot; the bundle does not explain the discrepancy.
Chapter 241 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new sections:
(b) Effective date Sections 3310 and 3311 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a), shall take effect on January 1, 2025. (c) Applicability This section and the amendments made by this section shall apply to any contract entered into by the Secretary of Defense on or after the effective date of this section.
Source snapshot updated 2026-10-05T19:22:10Z.
2026-09-16: Introduced in House
The supplied actions snapshot, updated October 5, 2026, records House introduction on September 16, 2026, and referral that day to the Oversight and Government Reform and Armed Services committees for provisions within their respective jurisdictions. It supplies no later legislative action and does not establish whether the bill subsequently advanced or became law.
Source snapshot updated 2026-10-05T19:22:10Z.
2026-09-16: Introduced in House
2026-09-16: Referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
A closer look
Reviewed version: Introduced in House · 2026-09-16. These findings describe provisions and who may benefit; they are not judgments of waste, corruption, or motive.
This review covers the supplied bill text. “None identified” does not rule out provisions in later versions or accompanying reports and disclosures.
Provisions outside the bill’s main subject, or policy changes attached to appropriations.
None identified in the reviewed text
No provision unrelated to the bill’s main contracting subject or policy change attached to appropriations was identified after reviewing the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to that version and does not establish attachment history or absence in other versions or accompanying materials.
Spending directed to particular recipients or places outside ordinary competitive or formula-based allocation.
None identified in the reviewed text
No congressionally directed spending for particular recipients or places was identified after reviewing the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to that version; it does not establish absence or formal earmark status in other versions or accompanying materials.
Narrow exceptions, exemptions, or preferential treatment that warrant a closer look.
None identified in the reviewed text
No materially narrow carve-out, special exemption, or preferential exception warranting a targeted-benefit finding was identified after reviewing the complete supplied introduced text. General policy qualifications and intended beneficiaries alone do not establish such a finding. This conclusion is limited to the supplied version and does not establish absence in other versions or accompanying materials.
Full text preserved for this analysis. Legislative record snapshot: Oct 5, 2026. How PlainBill uses AI