PlainBillCongress, translated.Legislation. Context. Public interest.Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
Congressional Research Service
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People & committees
Rep. Fitzpatrick, Brian K. [R-PA-1] · R–PA
Legislative record
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Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Primary sources
Text links open the official source. We also preserved the text version used in the PlainBill explanation below.
No related bills are listed in this snapshot. This does not establish whether the proposal has appeared in earlier Congresses.
Source last updated: Sep 29, 2026. Consult Congress.gov for the current record.
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PlainBill explanation
Based on the full Introduced in House · 2026-09-15 text. This explanation has not received human editorial review. This overview describes the proposal’s major provisions; it does not establish what its real-world effects would be.
The proposed Problem Solvers Independent Commissions Act would require states to use independent commissions to redraw U.S. House district boundaries after the 2030 census. Commissions would have equal representation from the two parties holding the most state legislative seats and people affiliated with neither party. They would seek public input and follow rules against favoring parties or candidates. If a commission failed to enact a map, the proposal provides a court-based fallback that excludes the state legislature.
This Act may be cited as the Problem Solvers Independent Commissions Act.
Each State shall establish an independent redistricting commission composed of an equal number of members (but not fewer than one) from each of the following categories: (1) Members affiliated with the political party with the greatest number of seats in the State legislature. (2) Members affiliated with the political party with the second greatest number of seats in the State legislature. (3) Members not affiliated with any political party described in subparagraph (A) or (B).
Ensuring that no congressional district in the State is drawn to discourage competition, or for the purpose of favoring or disfavoring an incumbent, a particular candidate, or a particular political party.
The commission shall solicit and take into consideration comments from the public in developing the redistricting plan
the highest court of the State may appoint two special masters to develop and publish a final redistricting plan for the State consistent with the criteria described in subsection (a), but in no case may the State legislature of the State have a role in determining a final redistricting plan under this subsection.
This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall apply with respect to any Congressional redistricting which occurs after the regular decennial census conducted during 2030.
Section 2 would require congressional redistricting to follow a commission plan or, if that plan is not enacted, a plan selected by the state's highest court. It would also replace an existing statute's reference to redistricting under state law with a reference to this Act. Its court-process cross-reference is inconsistent with section 4.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any Congressional redistricting conducted by a State shall be conducted in accordance with— (1) the redistricting plan developed by the independent redistricting commission established in the State, in accordance with section 4(d); or (2) if the plan developed by such commission is not enacted into law, the redistricting plan selected by the highest court in the State in accordance with section 4(e).
(2 U.S.C. 2a(c)), is amended by striking in the manner provided by the law thereof and inserting: in the manner provided by the Problem Solvers Independent Commissions Act.
(e) Restriction on outside communication
(f) Special process if no final plan selected
Each state would establish a commission with equal numbers from three affiliation groups: the party with the most state legislative seats, the party with the second most, and people affiliated with neither. Each group would have at least one member. Where practicable, membership would reflect the state's geographic, demographic, and socioeconomic diversity.
Each State shall establish an independent redistricting commission composed of an equal number of members (but not fewer than one) from each of the following categories: (1) Members affiliated with the political party with the greatest number of seats in the State legislature. (2) Members affiliated with the political party with the second greatest number of seats in the State legislature. (3) Members not affiliated with any political party described in subparagraph (A) or (B).
To the extent practicable, the membership of the independent redistricting commission of a State under this section shall reasonably reflect the geographic, demographic, and socioeconomic diversity of the State.
Commission members would have to be U.S. citizens. They would also need either at least three years of voter registration in the state without changing their registered political affiliation, including registration at appointment, or votes for candidates of the same party in at least three consecutive federal primary elections in the state.
(1) the individual is a United States citizen; (2) as of the date of appointment, the individual— (A) is registered to vote in elections for Federal office held in the State, and was registered to vote in elections for Federal office held in the State for at least 3 years prior to such appointment without changing the political affiliation of such registration; or (B) voted in at least 3 consecutive primary elections for Federal office held in the State for a candidate affiliated with the same political party;
Applicants would be ineligible if they, their spouse, or a family member had held or run for public office, or worked as an employee or paid consultant for a party or candidate, during the previous three years. Members would have to certify that they would not run for public office in the state for at least three years after leaving the commission.
(3) neither the individual nor the spouse or family member of the individual held public office or ran as a candidate for election for public office, or served as an employee of or paid consultant for a political party or candidate for election for public office, at any time during the 3-year period preceding the date of appointment; and (4) the individual certifies that the individual will not run as a candidate for the public office in the State for not less than 3 years after the date the individual no longer serves on the commission.
A state would have to establish its commission within 60 days after its chief executive receives the state apportionment notice. Section 5 defines that notice as the House Clerk's notice of how many U.S. Representatives the state is entitled to have.
Each State shall establish an independent redistricting commission under this section not later than 60 days after the date on which the chief executive of a State receives the State apportionment notice.
the State apportionment notice means, with respect to a State, the notice sent to the State from the Clerk of the House of Representatives under section 22(b) of the Act entitled An Act to provide for the fifteenth and subsequent decennial censuses and to provide for an apportionment of Representatives in Congress, approved June 18, 1929 (2 U.S.C. 2a), of the number of Representatives to which the State is entitled.
States would use an open application process that includes randomly mailing applications to a meaningful number of registered voters. They would randomly form an initial applicant pool with equal numbers from the three affiliation groups.
the members shall be selected from individuals who apply through an open application process, which shall include a random mailing of applications distributed to a meaningful number of registered voters in the State.
each State shall select applicants on a random basis to be included in an initial selection pool, which shall consist of an equal number of individuals from each of the categories described in subsection (a).
State legislative leaders could remove up to 20 percent of applicants from their respective partisan pools. Commission members would then be randomly selected from the remaining eligible applicants.
Legislative leaders in the legislature of a State may, from each of the categories described in subsection (a), strike not more than 20 percent of the applicants from their respective partisan pool described in paragraph (2).
After any removals made under paragraph (3), members of the independent redistricting commission of a State shall be randomly selected from the remaining eligible applicants selected under paragraph (2).
Before drawing maps, members would have to complete state-developed training on redistricting law, mapping criteria, ethics, and public engagement.
Each member selected for the independent redistricting commission of a State under subsection (e) shall complete training developed and provided by the State on redistricting law, mapping criteria, ethics, and public engagement before beginning the map-drawing process.
Removing a commissioner would require at least a two-thirds commission vote and one of the listed grounds: a specified felony conviction during service, an ethics violation, repeated unexcused absences, incapacity, neglect of duties, or a conflict of interest.
Members of the independent redistricting commission of a State may be removed only by an affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of the members of the commission
only on the basis of— (A) a felony conviction involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or a breach of the public trust that occurred while the individual was serving on the commission; (B) an ethics violation; (C) repeated unexcused absences, incapacity, or dereliction of duty; or (D) a conflict of interest.
If a member resigned or was removed, a replacement would be randomly selected from the state's initial applicant pool and the same affiliation group.
In the event that a member of an independent redistricting commission of a State resigns or is removed under this subsection, an individual from the applicant pool of the State described in subsection (e)(2) and from the same category described in subsection (a) as the member who resigned or was removed shall be randomly selected to fill such vacancy.
Commission-appointed experts, lawyers, consultants, and other staff would answer to the commission and could not be directed by the state legislature.
Any technical experts, legal counsel, consultants, or such other staff as the independent redistricting commission of a State may appoint shall be under the supervision and oversight of the commission and may not be directed by the legislature of the State.
The bill would express Congress's view that states should provide needed commission resources and funding and adequately compensate commissioners. This language is a recommendation, rather than an appropriation or a requirement to spend a specified amount.
It is the sense of Congress that each State should— (1) provide the independent redistricting commission of the State with such resources and funding as the commission may require to carry out its duties under the Constitution and this Act; and (2) ensure that members of the independent redistricting commission receive adequate compensation during their term of service on the commission.
Maps would have to pursue nearly equal population per Representative and avoid drawing districts to discourage competition or favor or disfavor incumbents, candidates, or parties. They would also pursue connected districts, preservation of existing counties and municipalities, and compact districts, subject to the text's practicality qualifications.
(1) Ensuring that districts each have equal population per Representative as nearly as practicable, in accordance with the Constitution of the United States. (2) Ensuring that no congressional district in the State is drawn to discourage competition, or for the purpose of favoring or disfavoring an incumbent, a particular candidate, or a particular political party. (3) Ensuring that districts are contiguous to the greatest extent possible. (4) To the greatest extent practicable, ensuring the preservation of pre-existing political subdivisions, including counties and municipalities. (5) To the greatest extent practicable, maintaining compact districts.
Commissions would have to seek and consider public comments, including through meetings at the state capitol streamed live on a publicly accessible state government website. They would also solicit input through other methods they consider appropriate.
The commission shall solicit and take into consideration comments from the public in developing the redistricting plan for the State by— (1) holding meetings in the State Capitol of the State that shall also be made available live on a publicly accessible government website of the State at which members of the public may provide input; and (2) otherwise soliciting input from the public through such methods as the commission determines appropriate.
Commission meetings would be public, except where necessary to protect information about pending litigation or other legally protected matters.
Except as necessary for the protection of information pertaining to pending litigation or other legally protected matters, the commission shall hold each of its meetings in public.
A commission would first publish a preliminary map and seek public input. After considering comments, it would develop and publish a final map only after the 30-day period following release of the preliminary map.
the independent redistricting commission of a State shall develop and make publicly available a preliminary redistricting plan and solicit public input as described in subsection (b) on the preliminary redistricting plan.
After taking into consideration comments from the public under subsection (b) and paragraph (1), at any time after the expiration of the 30-day period which begins on the date the commission makes the preliminary plans available to the public under paragraph (1), the independent redistricting commission of a State shall develop and publish a final redistricting plan for the State.
A final map would become law after a further 30-day period beginning when it receives approval from at least two-thirds of the entire commission and at least two-fifths of the commissioners in each affiliation group.
The final redistricting plan developed and published under this subsection shall be deemed to be enacted into law upon the expiration of the 30-day period which begins on the date on which— (A) such final plan is approved by at least two-thirds of the whole membership of the commission; and (B) at least two-fifths of the members of the Commission from each of the categories of the approved selection pool described in section 3(a) vote to approve such final plan.
As soon as practicable after a final map is enacted, the commission would publish its supporting data and research. Required materials include maps and drafts, an explanation of how the map meets the criteria, demographic and election data, software and methods, consultant reports, communications, public submissions, commissioner emails, and meeting recordings. The list also includes an undefined statistical item called an “algorithmic bell curve” of a fair process's average outcome.
As soon as practicable after the enactment of a final redistricting plan under paragraph (2), the commission shall make available to the public all data and research relied upon to develop such plan, including the following: (A) The final redistricting plan, including all relevant maps and draft maps. (B) A report by the commission to accompany the plan which provides the background for the plan and the commission’s reasons for selecting the plan as the final redistricting plan, including how the plan satisfies each of the considerations under subsection (a). (C) Demographic and election data used. (D) Mapping software and methodologies. (E) Consultant reports. (F) Communications with outside parties and constituents. (G) Public submissions. (H) Email correspondence between commissioners. (I) Meeting recordings. (J) An algorithmic bell curve of the average outcome of a fair redistricting process.
Commissioners could not privately discuss proposed maps with elected officials, political parties, lobbyists, or outside advocacy organizations.
Members of the commission of a State may not engage in private communications regarding any proposed maps under this section with any elected officials, political parties, lobbyists, or outside advocacy organizations.
If no commission map were enacted by 30 days before the state's candidate filing deadline, existing districts would remain for no more than eight weeks. If the commission still had not enacted a map when that period ended, the state's highest court could appoint two special masters—people assigned by the court—to develop and publish a map meeting the bill's criteria. The legislature could have no role in determining that fallback map.
If a redistricting plan developed by the independent redistricting commission of a State is not enacted into law under subsection (d) by the date that is 30 days before the deadline in the State for a candidate to file to run for office, the existing congressional districts shall remain in place in the State for a period of not more than 8 weeks and, if after such period has ended, the commission has not enacted into law a final redistricting plan under subsection (d), the highest court of the State may appoint two special masters to develop and publish a final redistricting plan for the State consistent with the criteria described in subsection (a), but in no case may the State legislature of the State have a role in determining a final redistricting plan under this subsection.
Each state's highest court would have authority to hear claims that the final map violates this Act or state law.
The highest court of each State shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine claims asserting that the final redistricting plan of the State violates the requirements of this Act or State law.
The bill describes transferring a state-court lawsuit to federal district court when it includes a claim over which federal district courts have exclusive authority under this section. Any party, including an intervenor who has joined the case, could request transfer at any time without others' consent by filing a signed notice stating the grounds. Claims outside the federal court's authority would be separated and returned to state court. The section does not clearly supply the exclusive federal jurisdiction or venue rules this procedure references.
At any time, a civil action brought in a State court which asserts a claim for which the district courts of the United States have exclusive jurisdiction under this section may be removed by any party in the case, including an intervenor, by filing, in the district court for an applicable venue under this section, a notice of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal. Consent of parties shall not be required for removal.
If a civil action removed in accordance with paragraph (1) contains claims not within the original or supplemental jurisdiction of the district court, the district court shall sever all such claims and remand them to the State court from which the action was removed.
A commission would end the day after the first regularly scheduled federal general election following the state chief executive's receipt of the apportionment notice.
The independent redistricting commission of a State shall terminate on the day after the date of the first regularly scheduled general election for Federal office which occurs after the chief executive of the State receives the State apportionment notice.
The proposal and its statutory amendment would apply to congressional redistricting occurring after the regular 2030 census.
This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall apply with respect to any Congressional redistricting which occurs after the regular decennial census conducted during 2030.
The supplied official-actions snapshot, updated September 29, 2026, records introduction in the House and referral to the House Judiciary Committee on September 15, 2026.
Source snapshot updated 2026-09-29T15:01:10Z. 2026-09-15: Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary. 2026-09-15: Introduced in House
A closer look
Reviewed version: Introduced in House · 2026-09-15. These findings describe provisions and who may benefit; they are not judgments of waste, corruption, or motive.
This review covers the supplied bill text. “None identified” does not rule out provisions in later versions or accompanying reports and disclosures.
Provisions outside the bill’s main subject, or policy changes attached to appropriations.
None identified in the reviewed text
No unrelated provision or policy change attached to appropriations was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to that version and does not establish absence in other versions or accompanying materials.
Spending directed to particular recipients or places outside ordinary competitive or formula-based allocation.
None identified in the reviewed text
No congressionally directed spending for particular recipients or places was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to that version; formal earmark disclosures and accompanying materials are not supplied.
Narrow exceptions, exemptions, or preferential treatment that warrant a closer look.
None identified in the reviewed text
No materially narrow benefit, special exemption, or preferential carve-out warranting a finding was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. Commission composition and selection rules serve the proposed redistricting structure. This conclusion is limited to that version and does not establish absence in other versions or accompanying materials.
Full text preserved for this analysis. Legislative record snapshot: Sep 29, 2026. How PlainBill uses AI