PlainBillCongress, translated.Legislation. Context. Public interest.Referred to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, and in addition to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Congressional Research Service
No official summary is available in the imported record yet.
People & committees
Rep. Gottheimer, Josh [D-NJ-5] · D–NJ
Legislative record
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Referred to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, and in addition to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Referred to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, and in addition to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Primary sources
Text links open the official source. We also preserved the text version used in the PlainBill explanation below.
No related bills are listed in this snapshot. This does not establish whether the proposal has appeared in earlier Congresses.
Source last updated: Oct 16, 2026. Consult Congress.gov for the current record.
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PlainBill explanation
Based on the full Introduced in House · 2026-09-14 text. This explanation has not received human editorial review. This overview describes the proposal’s major provisions; it does not establish what its real-world effects would be.
The proposed Stop Rogue AI Act would require federal standards for securing AI agents—software that acts on someone’s behalf with little ongoing human involvement. The standards would address identifying agents, controlling their access and actions, and monitoring their behavior. Federal purchasing officials would have to propose rules requiring compliance by covered contractors and agencies. Contracts entered into before enactment would be exempt from those procurement requirements.
This Act may be cited as the Stop Rogue AI Act.
shall develop, publish, and maintain standards, guidelines, and best practices for the secure development, deployment, and operation of artificial intelligence agents by an organization.
the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council shall propose revisions to the Federal Acquisition Regulation to require contractors and Federal agencies procuring or deploying, as the case may be, AI agents or information systems that interact with AI agents to comply with such standards, guidelines, and best practices.
This subsection shall not apply to contracts for the procurement or deployment, as the case may be, of AI agents or information systems that interact with AI agents entered into before the date of the enactment of this Act.
The bill would cover software systems that use an AI model to perceive, plan, or make decisions, act autonomously on behalf of a person or organization, and require minimal or no human interaction after their initial direction.
(4) Artificial intelligence agent; AI agent The terms artificial intelligence agent and AI agent mean a software-based system that— (A) uses an AI model to perceive, plan, or make decisions; (B) autonomously interacts with other software systems, digital services, users, external environments, or AI agents on behalf of a person or organization; and (C) involves minimal or no human interaction beyond its initial direction.
Within one year after enactment and annually afterward, the National Institute of Standards and Technology director, coordinating with the specified Commerce official, would have to develop, publish, and maintain AI-agent security standards, guidelines, and best practices.
Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (in this section referred to as the Director), in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information (in this section referred to as the Assistant Secretary), shall develop, publish, and maintain standards, guidelines, and best practices for the secure development, deployment, and operation of artificial intelligence agents by an organization.
The standards would address continuously finding, listing, verifying, and controlling agents operating within or interacting with an organization’s digital systems. Discovery and verification controls would apply consistently to internally developed agents, third-party products, and external services.
(A) maintain the capability to continuously discover, inventory, verify, and maintain organizational control over all AI agents operating within or interacting with the information systems, networks, applications, services, or digital environments of such organizations; (B) maintain organizational control over AI agents deployed by such organization;
(D) apply discovery and verification controls consistently across AI agents regardless of whether such AI agents are developed internally, acquired from third-party vendors, or operated through external services;
Organizational control would mean being able to allow, deny, or restrict an agent’s data access, actions, and interactions with tools or systems—and change or revoke those decisions at any time.
(7) Organizational control The term organizational control means the technical and organizational ability to— (A) allow, deny, or restrict— (i) an AI agent’s access to specific data; (ii) the actions an AI agent can perform; and (iii) the tools, information systems, and AI agents which an AI agent can use or interact with; and (B) revoke or change at any time any of the allowances, denials, or restrictions described in clauses (i) through (iii) of subparagraph (A).
Agent discovery would become part of broader cybersecurity and risk management guidance. The bill calls for defense-in-depth, meaning multiple layers of security measures intended to reduce the risk of unauthorized access or attacks.
(C) integrate discovery mechanisms into broader cybersecurity and risk management processes, consistent with defense-in-depth;
shall include in the standards, guidelines, and best practices described in such paragraph AI agent discovery as a necessary component of effective cybersecurity within applicable frameworks, profiles, and reference materials.
(5) Defense-in-depth The term defense-in-depth means the protection of information systems by using multiple security measures, including policies, procedures, and physical security, such as antivirus software, firewalls, anti-spyware tools, strong password policies, intrusion detection systems, biometric verification, encryption, and multi-factor authentication, to reduce the risk of unauthorized access, data breach, or other successful attack.
The standards would call for evaluating agents before deployment and continuously afterward. They would also address monitoring agents while running and, where appropriate, detecting and intercepting interactions, including attempts to manipulate agents through prompts, extract data, misuse tools, or depart from approved behavior.
(E) evaluate the security, safety, correctness, and reliability of AI agents before such AI agents are deployed by such organization and continuously after such deployment; (F) enable continuous runtime monitoring and, where appropriate, inline detection and interception of AI agent interactions with tools, data sources, information systems, and other AI agents, including detection of prompt injection, data exfiltration, anomalous tool invocation, and behavioral drift from an AI agent’s approved operational baseline;
The standards would call for cryptographic proof identifying who created or operates an agent. They would also address keeping standardized records of significant agent actions that reveal tampering and can be transferred and accessed by deploying organizations and authorized parties, as appropriate and consistent with law.
(G) implement cryptographically verifiable provenance mechanisms sufficient to identify the entity responsible for creating or operating an AI agent; and (H) generate and retain tamper-evident, standardized logs of material AI agent actions, and ensure such logs are portable and accessible, as appropriate and consistent with law, to deploying organizations and authorized relying parties.
Federal officials would support open discovery standards that work across vendors and countries without depending on proprietary or platform-specific registries. They would promote existing internet infrastructure and verifiable identity systems, or functionally equivalent methods, and involve industry, civil society, and technical standards bodies.
The Director, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary, shall support the development and adoption of open, vendor-agnostic, and interoperable standards for AI agent discovery mechanisms.
(A) promote the use of existing internet infrastructure and identity-based discovery mechanisms, including domain name system-based approaches, cryptographically verifiable AI agent identity and registry frameworks, or functionally equivalent mechanisms, to enable secure and scalable AI agent discovery and AI agent identity verification; (B) ensure that such standards are globally interoperable, distributed, and not dependent on proprietary or platform-specific registries; and (C) engage with multistakeholder processes, including industry, civil society, and technical standards bodies, to support broad adoption and international coordination.
The standards would specify that organizations deploying agents keep continuously updated inventories that computers can read, using names not tied to a particular vendor. Identity and trust checks would need independent cryptographic verification at both network and application levels; organizations could not rely solely on an agent’s own claims or one provider’s assertions.
(4) Minimum organizational requirements Standards, guidelines, and best practices developed under this subsection shall provide that organizations deploying AI agents— (A) maintain a continuous, machine-readable inventory of all AI agents, using standardized, vendor-agnostic naming conventions; (B) implement AI agent identity verification and trust verification mechanisms that are independent and cryptographically verifiable at both the network and application layers; and (C) do not rely solely on self-attested or single-provider assertions for establishing AI agent identity.
The standards institute would incorporate the work into its existing frameworks and guidance and keep it consistent with, and nonduplicative of, its other AI-agent standards efforts.
(5) Guidance, coordination, and demonstration projects The Director, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary, shall— (A) incorporate the standards, guidelines, and best practices developed under this subsection into existing National Institute of Standards and Technology frameworks and guidance; (B) ensure that standards, guidelines, and best practices developed under this subsection are consistent with and not duplicative of other efforts by National Institute of Standards and Technology to establish standards related to AI agents;
The director would conduct or support demonstration projects to evaluate open agent-discovery methods, including through the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence. Coordination with the National Telecommunications and Information Administration would promote outreach and adoption, including international engagement as appropriate.
(C) conduct or support demonstration projects, including through the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence, to evaluate the effectiveness of open agent discovery mechanisms; (D) coordinate with the Administrator of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration to promote outreach and adoption through multistakeholder processes and international engagement, as appropriate;
The director would coordinate with the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency so that agent-discovery standards are reflected, as appropriate, in federal civilian agency security guidance and binding operational directives—mandatory security instructions.
(E) coordinate with the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency of the Department of Homeland Security to ensure AI agent discovery standards are reflected in applicable Federal civilian agency security guidance and binding operational directives, as appropriate.
Within 18 months after publication of the standards and annually afterward, the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council would have to propose changes to federal purchasing rules. Those proposals would require compliance by contractors and agencies purchasing or deploying agents or systems that interact with them. This deadline concerns proposing rules, rather than completing their adoption.
(1) In general Not later than 18 months after the publication of standards, guidelines, and best practices under subsection (a) and annually thereafter, the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council shall propose revisions to the Federal Acquisition Regulation to require contractors and Federal agencies procuring or deploying, as the case may be, AI agents or information systems that interact with AI agents to comply with such standards, guidelines, and best practices.
Proposed purchasing rules would require AI-agent contracts to include continuous, computer-readable inventories and cryptographically verifiable identity checks at network and application levels. Agencies would have to be able to use discovery and verification capabilities without relying on the contractor.
(2) Required contract elements Revisions proposed under paragraph (1) shall ensure contracts for the procurement or deployment of AI agents include requirements that the contractor— (A) maintain a continuous, machine-readable inventory of all AI agents deployed under such contract, using standardized, vendor-agnostic naming conventions consistent with standards, guidelines, and best practices developed under subsection (a); (B) implement AI agent identity verification mechanisms that are cryptographically verifiable at both the network and application layers; (C) ensure AI agent discovery and verification capabilities are accessible to the Federal agency that has entered into such a contract without reliance on the contractor with which such Federal agency has so entered into such a contract;
AI-agent contracts under the proposed rules would also give agencies control over agent interactions and the ability to provide cryptographically verifiable origin or operator information to authorized entities, consistent with agency policy. Contractors would generate transferable records that reveal tampering, accessible to the agency and, where appropriate and consistent with law and the contract, authorized parties.
(D) enable the Federal agency that has entered into such a contract to exercise organizational control over AI agent activity, including the ability to allow, deny, or constrain AI agent-to-AI agent and AI agent-to-information system interactions; (E) enable the Federal agency that has entered into such a contract to provide cryptographically verifiable provenance information to authorized entities interacting with the AI agent, consistent with the policies of such Federal agency; and (F) generate tamper-evident, standardized logs of material AI agent actions, and ensure such logs are portable and accessible to the Federal agency that has entered into such a contract and, where appropriate and consistent with law and such contract, authorized relying parties.
Separate proposed contract requirements would cover information systems that agents interact with. Contractors would inventory all interacting agents and provide cryptographic verification of both their identity and their origin or operator information.
(3) Required contract elements for information systems interacting with AI agents Revisions proposed under paragraph (1) shall ensure contracts for the procurement or deployment of information systems that AI agents interact with include requirements that the contractor— (A) maintain a continuous, machine-readable inventory of all AI agents that interact with such an information system, using standardized, vendor-agnostic naming conventions consistent with standards, guidelines, and best practices developed under subsection (a); (B) implement identity verification mechanisms that are cryptographically verifiable for all AI agents that interact with such an information system; (C) implement provenance verification mechanisms that are cryptographically verifiable for all AI agents that interact with such an information system;
For those information-system contracts, agencies would receive discovery and verification capabilities usable without the contractor, plus control over agents’ interactions with the system and one another within it. Contractors would keep transferable records of significant agent actions within the system that reveal tampering, with access for agencies and qualified access for authorized parties.
(D) ensure AI agent discovery and verification capabilities are accessible to the Federal agency that has entered into such a contract without reliance on the contractor with which such Federal agency has so entered into such a contract; (E) enable the Federal agency that has entered into such a contract to exercise organizational control over AI agents’ ability to interact with such an information system, including the ability to allow, deny, or constrain AI agent-to-AI agent interactions within such an information system; and (F) generate tamper-evident, standardized logs of material AI agent actions within such an information system and ensure such logs are portable and accessible to the Federal agency that has entered into such a contract and, where appropriate and consistent with law and such contract, authorized relying parties.
The federal procurement subsection would not apply to covered contracts entered into before enactment. The exception is tied to the contract date, rather than the date an agent or system is deployed.
(4) Saving provision for certain contracts This subsection shall not apply to contracts for the procurement or deployment, as the case may be, of AI agents or information systems that interact with AI agents entered into before the date of the enactment of this Act.
Within 180 days after the purchasing-rule revisions are proposed and annually afterward, the Office of Management and Budget director would issue agency guidance with the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. It would address implementation—including cloud services, platform integrations, and third-party managed environments—and effective agency use of agents consistent with the standards.
(5) Agency guidance Not later than 180 days after the proposal of revisions under paragraph (1) and annually thereafter, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in coordination with the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, shall issue guidance to Federal agencies regarding the following: (A) The implementation of procurement requirements under this subsection, including for AI agents deployed through cloud services, platform integrations, or third-party managed environments. (B) The effective usage of AI agents by such Federal agencies in accordance with the standards, guidelines, and best practices under subsection (a).
The supplied official-actions snapshot, updated October 16, 2026, records introduction in the House on September 14, 2026, and referral that day to the Science, Space, and Technology Committee and the Oversight and Government Reform Committee for provisions within their respective jurisdictions.
Source snapshot updated 2026-10-16T08:05:41Z. 2026-09-14: Referred to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, and in addition to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
2026-09-14: Introduced in House
A closer look
Reviewed version: Introduced in House · 2026-09-14. These findings describe provisions and who may benefit; they are not judgments of waste, corruption, or motive.
This review covers the supplied bill text. “None identified” does not rule out provisions in later versions or accompanying reports and disclosures.
Provisions outside the bill’s main subject, or policy changes attached to appropriations.
None identified in the reviewed text
No unrelated provision or policy change attached to appropriations was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion does not cover other versions or accompanying materials.
Spending directed to particular recipients or places outside ordinary competitive or formula-based allocation.
None identified in the reviewed text
No congressionally directed spending for particular recipients or places was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This is a text-limited finding, not a determination about absent disclosures or other materials.
Narrow exceptions, exemptions, or preferential treatment that warrant a closer look.
None identified in the reviewed text
No materially narrow preferential benefit was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. Generally applicable implementation and transition provisions were not treated as targeted benefits. This conclusion does not cover other versions or accompanying materials.
Full text preserved for this analysis. Legislative record snapshot: Oct 16, 2026. How PlainBill uses AI