PlainBillCongress, translated.Legislation. Context. Public interest.Referred to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.
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People & committees
Rep. Vindman, Eugene Simon [D-VA-7] · D–VA
Legislative record
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Referred to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Primary sources
Text links open the official source. We also preserved the text version used in the PlainBill explanation below.
No related bills are listed in this snapshot. This does not establish whether the proposal has appeared in earlier Congresses.
Source last updated: Sep 22, 2026. Consult Congress.gov for the current record.
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PlainBill explanation
Based on the full Introduced in House · 2026-08-31 text. This explanation has not received human editorial review. This overview describes the proposal’s major provisions; it does not establish what its real-world effects would be.
The bill would limit how federal agencies use nondisclosure agreements—promises to keep information confidential—with covered employees and contractors. Agencies would have to explain protected disclosure rights and obtain review of agreement templates. Workers facing threatened or actual retaliation through these agreements could sue agencies and responsible officials. These protections concern disclosures protected by law; they would not generally authorize releasing all confidential government information.
The term employee means— (A) an employee as such term is defined in section 2105 of title 5, United States Code; and (B) a contractor or contractor personnel.
the covered NDA may not be invoked or enforced by the agency to penalize, discipline, or threaten the employee for any disclosure that constitutes a protected disclosure under applicable law.
Before any agency may use or distribute a covered NDA template, including any template prepared or distributed by the Office of Personnel Management, the head of the agency shall submit the template to the Office of Special Counsel for review and certification.
An employee who is subject to, or is threatened with, retaliatory NDA enforcement may bring a civil action in a United States district court against the agency and against the agency official who directed or carried out the threatened or actual enforcement action.
The proposed law would be called the Federal Worker Protection Act.
This Act may be cited as the Federal Worker Protection Act.
The bill's findings express concern that agency nondisclosure agreements can discourage protected disclosures through unclear scope, fear of enforcement, and administrative pressure. This is Congress's stated rationale in the proposal, not an established effect demonstrated by the supplied evidence.
Congress finds the following:
Non-disclosure agreements imposed by executive agencies on Federal employees, even when nominally compliant with existing whistleblower statutes, can have a substantial chilling effect on protected disclosures through ambiguity of scope, fear of enforcement proceedings, and administrative pressure.
Coverage would include confidentiality agreements and similar requirements tied to employment, onboarding, or access to agency systems or information, where the worker's duties involve nonpublic government information. The employee definition includes contractors and contractor personnel; agency and federal employee coverage also depend on existing statutory definitions.
The term agency has the meaning given such term in section 2302(a)(2)(C) of title 5, United States Code.
The term covered NDA means any non-disclosure agreement, confidentiality agreement, or substantially similar instrument that— (A) is imposed or required by an agency as a condition of employment, continued employment, onboarding, or access to agency systems or information; and (B) applies to any employee whose duties involve access to sensitive, protected, or otherwise non-public Government information.
The term employee means— (A) an employee as such term is defined in section 2105 of title 5, United States Code; and (B) a contractor or contractor personnel.
The bill would define protected disclosures by reference to existing law and expressly include any disclosure to Congress or a Member of Congress. Its definition of retaliatory enforcement covers threatened or actual use of an agreement, or a personnel action based partly or wholly on an alleged violation, where the underlying disclosure is or would be protected.
The term protected disclosure has the meaning given the term disclosure in section 2302(a)(2)(D) of title 5, United States Code, and includes any disclosure to Congress or a Member of Congress.
The term retaliatory NDA enforcement means any actual or threatened invocation of a covered NDA by an agency, or any adverse personnel action predicated in whole or in part on an alleged violation of a covered NDA, where the underlying disclosure constituted or would constitute a protected disclosure.
Before requiring a worker to sign, an agency would have to include a prominent disclosure-rights notice on the agreement or a clearly labeled attachment. The notice must explain that the agency cannot use the agreement to punish, discipline, or threaten the worker for a legally protected disclosure.
An agency may not require an employee to sign a covered NDA unless the covered NDA bears, in conspicuous and legible type on the covered NDA or as a clearly labeled and prominently displayed attachment to the covered NDA— (1) a notice stating YOUR PROTECTED DISCLOSURE RIGHTS in boldface type no smaller than the body text of the NDA
the covered NDA may not be invoked or enforced by the agency to penalize, discipline, or threaten the employee for any disclosure that constitutes a protected disclosure under applicable law.
The required statement would list permitted disclosure channels, including oversight offices, Congress, the Merit Systems Protection Board, federal courts with jurisdiction, and other legally permitted recipients. The congressional language includes an appropriate-security-clearance qualification and says committee assignment does not matter.
the employee retains the right to disclose information to— (i) the Office of Special Counsel; (ii) the Inspector General of the employee’s agency or any other Inspector General; (iii) the Government Accountability Office; (iv) any committee or subcommittee of Congress, or any Member of Congress or member of congressional staff with appropriate security clearance, regardless of committee assignment; (v) the Merit Systems Protection Board; (vi) a Federal court of competent jurisdiction; and (vii) any other channel designated by law as a permissible recipient of a protected disclosure
The rights statement would have to appear before any signature block and could not be formatted to reduce its prominence. Agencies would have to provide it in the agreement's language and, on request, any language routinely used to communicate with the worker. A noncompliant agreement would make the agency liable to an affected employee for at least $5,000 per violation, plus reasonable enforcement-related attorney fees and costs.
The statement required under subsection (a) shall— (1) appear before any signature block in the covered NDA; (2) not be reduced in font size or otherwise formatted in a manner designed to minimize its prominence; and (3) be provided to the employee in both the language of the NDA and, upon request, in any language in which the agency routinely communicates with the employee.
An agency that imposes a covered NDA that does not comply with the requirements of this section shall be liable to any affected employee for— (1) a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 per violation; and (2) reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in any proceeding to enforce this section.
Agency heads would have to submit agreement templates to the Office of Special Counsel before use or distribution, including templates from the Office of Personnel Management. Certification would require a finding that no provision would restrict or discourage protected disclosures, or reasonably be read that way, across the broadest plausible covered workforce. Otherwise, the office would return written objections identifying each deficient provision.
Before any agency may use or distribute a covered NDA template, including any template prepared or distributed by the Office of Personnel Management, the head of the agency shall submit the template to the Office of Special Counsel for review and certification.
certify the template if the Office determines that no provision of the template, as applied to the broadest plausible population of covered employees, would restrict, discourage, or reasonably be interpreted to restrict or discourage a protected disclosure; or (2) return to the agency the template with written objections specifying each provision that fails to meet the standard in paragraph (1).
The Office of Special Counsel would have 60 days to review a template. Inaction would produce provisional approval, which could later be revoked upon a finding of a deficiency. An agreement imposed using a template without certification or provisional approval would be void and unenforceable.
The Office of Special Counsel shall complete its review within 60 days of receiving a submission. If the Office fails to act within 60 days, the template shall be deemed provisionally approved, but the Office may revoke provisional approval at any time upon finding a subsequent deficiency.
No agency may impose a covered NDA using a template that has not received certification or provisional approval under this section. Any covered NDA imposed in violation of this subsection shall be void and unenforceable.
The Office of Special Counsel would maintain a public online registry of submitted templates and its decisions or objections, updated within 10 business days of each determination. It would review certified templates at least once every two years and could revoke certification if a template no longer meets the standard.
The Office of Special Counsel shall maintain a publicly accessible online registry of all templates submitted for review under this section, together with the Office’s certification determination or written objections, and shall update the registry within 10 business days of each determination.
The Office of Special Counsel shall review previously certified templates not less than once every two years and may revoke certification upon a finding that the template no longer meets the standard in subsection (b)(1).
A worker facing threatened or actual retaliatory enforcement could sue the agency and the official who directed or carried it out in federal district court. The court could stop enforcement or related personnel actions, declare the challenged provision invalid for the disclosed information, award compensation and legal costs, and award punitive damages against an individual who acted maliciously or recklessly disregarded protected disclosure rights.
An employee who is subject to, or is threatened with, retaliatory NDA enforcement may bring a civil action in a United States district court against the agency and against the agency official who directed or carried out the threatened or actual enforcement action.
the court may award appropriate relief, including— (1) preliminary or permanent injunctive relief staying any enforcement action or adverse personnel action predicated on the covered NDA; (2) a declaration that the challenged NDA provision is void as applied to the disclosed information; (3) compensatory damages, including lost wages, benefits, and other economic harm; (4) punitive damages against an individual defendant who acted with malice or reckless disregard for the employee’s protected disclosure rights; and (5) reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
The right to sue would arise at the earlier of an oral or written warning about investigation or possible discipline for an agreement violation involving protected conduct, or an adverse personnel action based at least partly on an alleged agreement violation. A lawsuit would have to be filed within three years after that trigger.
A cause of action under this section accrues upon the earlier of— (1) any written or oral communication by an agency official to the employee that the employee is under investigation for, or may be subject to discipline arising from, an alleged NDA violation where the underlying conduct would constitute a protected disclosure; or (2) any adverse personnel action predicated in whole or in part on an alleged violation of a covered NDA.
An action under this section must be filed within 3 years of the date of accrual under subsection (c).
The worker would first have to make an initial showing that enforcement was based at least partly on a disclosure the worker reasonably believed was protected. The agency would then have to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, that it would have acted for reasons entirely independent of that disclosure.
the employee bears the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that the threatened or actual enforcement action was predicated, at least in part, on a disclosure that the employee reasonably believed to constitute a protected disclosure
once a prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the agency to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the enforcement action would have been taken for reasons entirely independent of the protected disclosure.
Workers would not have to complete administrative complaint procedures before filing this lawsuit. The new remedy would supplement remedies available under other laws.
An employee need not exhaust administrative remedies before bringing an action under this section.
The remedy provided by this section is in addition to, and does not preempt, any remedy available under title 5, United States Code, or any other provision of law.
Agreements and other executive-branch documents could not be interpreted to restrict protected disclosures, reduce statutory whistleblower rights, or justify adverse personnel actions arising from protected disclosures. Conflicting statutory protections would control, and agreement provisions purporting to restrict protected disclosures would have no legal effect from the outset, even if signed.
No covered NDA, NDA template, Executive order, agency policy, memorandum, or other executive-branch instrument shall be construed to— (1) limit, restrict, condition, discourage, or penalize any protected disclosure; (2) waive, modify, or reduce any right or protection conferred by section 2302 of title 5, United States Code, chapter 4 of such title, section 7211 of such title, or any other Federal statute conferring whistleblower rights upon Federal employees; or (3) serve as the legal basis for any adverse personnel action against an employee arising from a protected disclosure.
In the event of any conflict between a provision of a covered NDA and any provision of the statutes listed in subsection (a)(2), the statutory provision shall control as a matter of law. Any NDA provision that purports to restrict a protected disclosure is void ab initio and shall have no legal effect, regardless of whether the employee signed the NDA or any associated acknowledgment.
When an agency uses an agreement to justify an adverse personnel action in an administrative or court proceeding, the worker could raise the disclosure's protected status as a complete defense. The agency would have to disprove that defense with clear and convincing evidence. The Office of Personnel Management would have to include the statutory-priority rule in every agreement template it issues, revises, or distributes.
In any administrative or judicial proceeding in which an agency invokes a covered NDA to justify an adverse personnel action, an employee may raise as a complete affirmative defense the fact that the underlying disclosure constituted a protected disclosure. The agency shall bear the burden of disproving this defense by clear and convincing evidence.
The Office of Personnel Management shall incorporate the rule of supremacy established in this section as a mandatory provision in every NDA template it issues, revises, or distributes to agencies.
Before an agency imposes a covered agreement, its inspector general would independently review the agreement or template and issue a written assessment of legal compliance. The assessment would go to the agency head and simultaneously to the Office of Special Counsel, congressional oversight committees, and the Government Accountability Office.
Before an agency may impose any covered NDA on its employees, the Inspector General of that agency shall— (1) independently review the proposed covered NDA or NDA template; (2) provide to the head of the agency a written certification stating whether, in the Inspector General’s judgment, the covered NDA complies with all applicable whistleblower protection statutes and this Act; and (3) transmit the certification simultaneously to the Office of Special Counsel, the appropriate congressional oversight committees, and the Government Accountability Office.
If an inspector general finds an agreement noncompliant, the inspector general would have to describe its deficiencies, publish them on the agency website within five business days, and notify Congress. The agency could not impose the agreement until the deficiencies were fixed and a new certification issued.
If the Inspector General determines that the covered NDA does not comply with applicable law, the Inspector General shall— (1) describe in writing each deficiency identified; (2) publish the written description on the agency’s public website within 5 business days; and (3) notify Congress as provided in subsection (a)(3).
An agency that receives a negative certification may not impose the covered NDA until the identified deficiencies have been remedied and a new certification issued.
Each inspector general would report to congressional committees within 90 days after enactment and every February 1 thereafter on the preceding fiscal year's agreement practices. Reports would cover agreement counts by organizational unit and position type, enforcement proceedings, personnel actions involving potentially protected disclosures, corrective actions, and template changes.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and February 1 of each year thereafter, each Inspector General shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an annual report on NDA practices at the Inspector General’s agency during the preceding fiscal year.
Each annual report shall include— (1) the total number of covered NDAs executed during the preceding fiscal year, disaggregated by bureau, office, and position type; (2) the total number of enforcement proceedings initiated, threatened, or concluded during the preceding fiscal year in which a covered NDA was cited; (3) any instance in which a covered NDA was cited in connection with a personnel action and the underlying conduct of the employee involved a disclosure that the Inspector General believes may have constituted a protected disclosure; (4) any corrective action taken or recommended; and (5) any changes to agency NDA templates made during the preceding fiscal year.
The Comptroller General would audit agency agreement practices governmentwide and report to Congress on compliance within 18 months after enactment and every three years thereafter.
Not later than 18 months after the date of enactment of this Act and every 3 years thereafter, the Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct an audit of agency NDA practices governmentwide and shall submit a report to Congress evaluating agency compliance with this Act.
For two years after an inspector general issues a negative certification, the President could not remove the inspector general, place them on administrative leave, or reduce their duties or authority unless the bill's notice and reasons conditions are met. Those conditions require written notice to both chambers at least 30 days before removal and reasons that do not directly or indirectly include the negative certification or oversight under this bill.
The President may not remove, place on administrative leave, or otherwise diminish the duties or authority of an Inspector General within 2 years following the Inspector General’s issuance of a negative certification under section 7(b), unless— (1) the President provides, not fewer than 30 days before the effective date of the removal, written notice to both chambers of Congress specifying the reasons for removal; and (2) the reasons stated in such notice do not include, directly or indirectly, the Inspector General’s issuance of a negative certification or the Inspector General’s oversight activities under this Act.
After a removal covered by those protections, an acting inspector general could serve more than 30 days only if the President had submitted a permanent nominee to the Senate. The Senate would be directed to try to consider the nomination within 90 days; the text does not require confirmation within that period.
Following the removal of an Inspector General under circumstances described in subsection (a), no person may serve in an acting capacity in the Inspector General position for more than 30 days unless the President has submitted a nomination for a permanent Inspector General to the Senate. The Senate shall endeavor to consider such a nomination within 90 days of receipt.
An inspector general removed in violation of these protections could seek reinstatement and compensation in the federal district court for the District of Columbia. The lawsuit would have to be filed within one year after the removal took effect.
An Inspector General who is removed in violation of this section may seek reinstatement and compensatory damages in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Such action must be filed within 1 year of the effective date of removal.
If a provision or its application were held invalid, the bill would preserve the remaining provisions and their application to other people or circumstances.
If any provision of this Act, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, the remainder of this Act and the application of its provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected.
The bill would generally take effect upon enactment. For agreements signed earlier, agencies would have 180 days after enactment to bring existing templates into compliance with the notice and Special Counsel review requirements and give affected workers written notice of their rights.
Except as provided in subsection (b), this Act shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.
With respect to covered NDAs executed before the date of enactment of this Act, agencies shall have 180 days from such date of enactment to— (1) bring existing NDA templates into compliance with sections 3 and 4; and (2) provide written notice to all employees subject to existing covered NDAs of their rights under this Act.
During the transition, earlier agreements would already be interpreted as containing the required plain-language rights notice and would be subject to the rule giving whistleblower statutes priority over agreement terms.
During the transition period described in subsection (b), any covered NDA executed before the date of enactment of this Act shall be construed as if it contained the plain-language rider required by section 3 and shall be subject to the statutory supremacy rule in section 6.
The supplied actions snapshot, updated September 22, 2026, records introduction in the House and referral to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on August 31, 2026.
Source snapshot updated 2026-09-22T18:41:33Z. 2026-08-31: Referred to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. 2026-08-31: Introduced in House
A closer look
Reviewed version: Introduced in House · 2026-08-31. These findings describe provisions and who may benefit; they are not judgments of waste, corruption, or motive.
This review covers the supplied bill text. “None identified” does not rule out provisions in later versions or accompanying reports and disclosures.
Provisions outside the bill’s main subject, or policy changes attached to appropriations.
None identified in the reviewed text
No unrelated provision or policy change attached to appropriations was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to that version and does not establish absence in other versions or accompanying materials.
Spending directed to particular recipients or places outside ordinary competitive or formula-based allocation.
None identified in the reviewed text
No congressionally directed spending for particular recipients or places was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to that version; formal earmark disclosures and accompanying materials are absent.
Narrow exceptions, exemptions, or preferential treatment that warrant a closer look.
Findings to examine
The supplied text contains a narrow, conditional employment protection tied to oversight duties. Identifying it as a targeted benefit is not a judgment about its justification.
Inspectors general who issue negative agreement certifications would receive special protection against presidential removal, administrative leave, or reduced authority for two years, subject to advance congressional notice and permissible reasons. An inspector general removed unlawfully could seek reinstatement and compensation. This protection targets the officials responsible for finding agreements noncompliant and is directly related to enforcing the bill's main policy.
If the Inspector General determines that the covered NDA does not comply with applicable law, the Inspector General shall— (1) describe in writing each deficiency identified
The President may not remove, place on administrative leave, or otherwise diminish the duties or authority of an Inspector General within 2 years following the Inspector General’s issuance of a negative certification under section 7(b), unless— (1) the President provides, not fewer than 30 days before the effective date of the removal, written notice to both chambers of Congress specifying the reasons for removal; and (2) the reasons stated in such notice do not include, directly or indirectly, the Inspector General’s issuance of a negative certification or the Inspector General’s oversight activities under this Act.
An Inspector General who is removed in violation of this section may seek reinstatement and compensatory damages in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Such action must be filed within 1 year of the effective date of removal.
Full text preserved for this analysis. Legislative record snapshot: Sep 22, 2026. How PlainBill uses AI