PlainBillCongress, translated.Legislation. Context. Public interest.Referred to the House Committee on Armed Services.
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People & committees
Rep. Jacobs, Sara [D-CA-51] · D–CA
Legislative record
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Referred to the House Committee on Armed Services.
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Primary sources
Text links open the official source. We also preserved the text version used in the PlainBill explanation below.
Source last updated: Sep 22, 2026. Consult Congress.gov for the current record.
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PlainBill explanation
Based on the full Introduced in House · 2026-08-31 text. This explanation has not received human editorial review. This overview describes the proposal’s major provisions; it does not establish what its real-world effects would be.
The proposed Defense AI Reliability and Reporting Act would require the Defense Department to create a central program for reporting, investigating, and addressing problems with artificial intelligence systems throughout their development and use. It would require prompt reporting of covered incidents and vulnerabilities, protect people who report in good faith from Department retaliation based on the report alone, and require annual reports to congressional defense committees from 2027 through 2031.
This Act may be cited as the Defense AI Reliability and Reporting Act.
The Secretary of Defense shall establish a centralized Department-wide program for the reporting, tracking, analysis, and remediation of covered AI incidents and covered AI vulnerabilities arising from the development, testing, procurement, fielding, or operation of artificial intelligence systems within the Department of Defense.
The Secretary shall require prompt reporting to the official designated under subsection (d) of— (A) any covered AI incident; and (B) any covered AI vulnerability.
The Secretary shall ensure that a person making a report in good faith under paragraph (1) is not, on the basis of that report alone, subject to adverse contract action, subject to adverse personnel action, or otherwise retaliated against by the Department.
In each of years 2027 through 2031, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees an annual report on the program.
The bill would add a new section to federal defense law. Its stated goals include finding recurring AI problems, including problems arising when people and machines work together, reducing significant risks, and informing decisions about testing, purchasing, cybersecurity, and deployment. These are intended goals, not demonstrated results.
Chapter 131 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 2224a the following new section: 2224b. Artificial intelligence incident and vulnerability reporting program
The purpose of the program established under subsection (a) shall be to— (1) identify recurring risks, failure modes, vulnerabilities, and systemic weaknesses in artificial intelligence systems, including risks or failure modes arising from human-machine teaming; (2) support mitigation of significant risks; and (3) inform testing, procurement, cybersecurity, and deployment decisions to improve the safety, security, reliability, and operational effectiveness of such systems.
Reportable AI incidents would include unintended operational, safety, or security harm; operation outside authorized limits or approved safeguards; and substantial reductions in mission performance or reliability during actual operations or realistic testing.
The term covered AI incident means an event in which an artificial intelligence system— (A) causes unintended operational, safety, or security harm; (B) operates outside authorized parameters or approved safety, legal, or mission guardrails; (C) materially degrades mission performance or reliability in a real-world or operationally representative environment;
An incident would also be reportable if an AI system failed to obey an operator's disengage command, operated in a way that could foreseeably have caused significant unintended harm, or raised concerns about control and independent operation. Actual harm would not be required for these categories.
(D) fails to respond to an operator disengage command; (E) operates in a manner that, under reasonably foreseeable circumstances, could have resulted in significant unintended operational, safety, or security harm; or (F) operates in a manner that raises concerns regarding system control and autonomy.
Reportable vulnerabilities would include exploitable weaknesses or systemic problems in an AI system or related component that could substantially affect mission performance, compromise the system, create safety risks, or produce unauthorized or unintended behavior. The bill adopts an existing statutory definition of artificial intelligence without reproducing it.
The term covered AI vulnerability means an exploitable weakness, vulnerability, or systemic issue in an artificial intelligence system or related component that could materially affect mission performance, compromise system integrity, create safety risk, or result in unauthorized or unintended behavior.
The term artificial intelligence has the meaning given such term in section 5002 of the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020 (15 U.S.C. 9401).
The program would draw on established safety reporting, vulnerability disclosure, and lessons-learned practices. It would emphasize reporting without punishment, protection of sensitive and proprietary information, and appropriate sharing of lessons. It would also provide timely access to relevant logs, system data, and model information needed to analyze and respond to problems.
The program shall— (1) be designed using practices drawn from established safety incident reporting programs, vulnerability disclosure programs, and programs to identify and develop lessons learned; (2) emphasize non-punitive reporting, protection of sensitive and proprietary information, and dissemination of lessons learned, as appropriate; and (3) include a mechanism to enable timely access to and sharing of relevant logs, system data, and model information as necessary to support analysis and response.
The Defense Secretary would designate an official to oversee reporting, tracking, analysis, and correction of covered problems. Through that official, the Secretary would standardize reports, analyze trends, identify recurring problems, and issue guidance, alerts, and recommendations as appropriate.
The Secretary shall designate an appropriate official for the reporting, tracking, analysis, and remediation of covered AI incidents and covered AI vulnerabilities under this section. The Secretary, acting through such official, shall receive and standardize reports, conduct trend analysis, identify recurring risks and failure modes, and issue guidance, alerts, and recommendations, as appropriate.
The Secretary would require prompt reporting of every covered incident and vulnerability. Each report would be classified according to whether it required a response across the Department, within a program, or at a local level.
(1) The Secretary shall require prompt reporting to the official designated under subsection (d) of— (A) any covered AI incident; and (B) any covered AI vulnerability. (2) The Secretary, acting through the official, shall categorize each incident or vulnerability reported to the official according to whether the incident or vulnerability requires— (A) a Department-wide response; (B) a response at the program level; or (C) a response at a local level.
For problems requiring a Department-wide or program-level response, the designated official would coordinate responses the Secretary considered appropriate. Possible responses include correcting the problem, retesting, reducing risks, or restricting deployment; the text does not require every listed response in every case.
In the case of any incident or vulnerability categorized under subsection (e)(2)(A) or (B), the Secretary, acting through the official designated under subsection (d), shall coordinate any responses that the Secretary considers appropriate, such as remediation, retesting, mitigation measures, or deployment restrictions.
Problems requiring a Department-wide response would also require a written corrective action plan. Before continued operational use, implementation of any risk-reduction measures in that plan would have to be verified.
In addition, in the case of any incident or vulnerability described in subsection (e)(2)(A), the Secretary, acting through the official, shall require— (A) a documented corrective action plan; and (B) validation that the mitigation measures, if any, in such plan have been implemented before continued operational use.
Service members, civilian employees, contractors, and subcontractors at every tier would have a protected process for reporting covered problems in good faith. The Department could not take adverse contract or personnel action, or otherwise retaliate, based on that report alone.
The Secretary shall establish a protected disclosure process, informed by established vulnerability disclosure practices, through which members of the Armed Forces, civilian employees, contractors, and subcontractors at any tier may report covered AI incidents and covered AI vulnerabilities in good faith.
The Secretary shall ensure that a person making a report in good faith under paragraph (1) is not, on the basis of that report alone, subject to adverse contract action, subject to adverse personnel action, or otherwise retaliated against by the Department.
The Secretary would establish procedures to protect sensitive, proprietary, and classified information submitted through the protected reporting process.
The Secretary shall establish procedures to protect sensitive, proprietary, and classified information submitted through the protected disclosure process under subsection (g).
Annual reports to congressional defense committees would be required in 2027 through 2031. They would include report counts and classifications, significant trends and recurring problems, corrective actions, and recommendations for changes to AI testing, purchasing, cybersecurity, or deployment policies. Reports would be unclassified but could include a classified attachment.
In each of years 2027 through 2031, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees an annual report on the program. The report shall include— (A) the number of reports made of incidents and vulnerabilities and the categorizations of such reports; (B) a summary of significant trends, recurring risks, systemic issues, and corrective actions taken in response;
(D) any recommendations for changes to testing, procurement, cybersecurity, or deployment policies relating to artificial intelligence systems. (2) Each report under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.
If a covered AI incident killed or physically harmed a member of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, or Space Force, the annual report would need additional details: the systems and operational circumstances, date and time, assessed cause and operational consequence, and any corrective actions.
(C) in the case of any covered AI incident resulting in the loss of life of, or in bodily harm to, a member of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, or Space Force— (i) a description of the incident, including the system or systems involved and the operational context; (ii) the date and time the incident occurred; (iii) an assessment of the cause and operational consequence of the incident; and (iv) any corrective actions taken;
The supplied actions snapshot, updated September 22, 2026, records introduction in the House and referral to the House Committee on Armed Services on August 31, 2026. It does not establish subsequent legislative action or enactment.
Source snapshot updated 2026-09-22T18:33:03Z. 2026-08-31: Referred to the House Committee on Armed Services. 2026-08-31: Introduced in House
A closer look
Reviewed version: Introduced in House · 2026-08-31. These findings describe provisions and who may benefit; they are not judgments of waste, corruption, or motive.
This review covers the supplied bill text. “None identified” does not rule out provisions in later versions or accompanying reports and disclosures.
Provisions outside the bill’s main subject, or policy changes attached to appropriations.
None identified in the reviewed text
No unrelated provision or policy change attached to appropriations was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to that version and does not establish absence in other versions or accompanying materials.
Spending directed to particular recipients or places outside ordinary competitive or formula-based allocation.
None identified in the reviewed text
No congressionally directed spending for particular recipients or places was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to that version; formal earmark disclosures and accompanying materials are not supplied.
Narrow exceptions, exemptions, or preferential treatment that warrant a closer look.
None identified in the reviewed text
No materially narrow carve-out, special exemption, or preferential treatment was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to that version and does not establish absence in other versions or accompanying materials.
Full text preserved for this analysis. Legislative record snapshot: Sep 22, 2026. How PlainBill uses AI