PlainBillCongress, translated.Legislation. Context. Public interest.Referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Congressional Research Service
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People & committees
Rep. Mace, Nancy [R-SC-1] · R–SC
Legislative record
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Referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Primary sources
Text links open the official source. We also preserved the text version used in the PlainBill explanation below.
No related bills are listed in this snapshot. This does not establish whether the proposal has appeared in earlier Congresses.
Source last updated: Aug 25, 2026. Consult Congress.gov for the current record.
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Analyze H.R.10098 as objectively as possible. Explain its main provisions, who would be affected, possible benefits and harms, implementation, exceptions, and uncertainties. Present the strongest arguments for and against it, and identify evidence needed to assess its public impact.
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PlainBill explanation
Based on the full Introduced in House · 2026-08-13 text. This explanation has not received human editorial review. This overview describes the proposal’s major provisions; it does not establish what its real-world effects would be.
This bill would make specified District of Columbia offenses, including first-degree murder and first-degree child sexual abuse, eligible for a death sentence. A prosecutor who believes death is justified would have to file and serve advance notice seeking it before the separate sentencing process could proceed. That hearing would weigh reasons supporting and opposing death. A death sentence would require a unanimous jury recommendation, or a recommendation by the judge when there is no jury. The proposal would apply to offenses committed on or after enactment.
A defendant who has been found guilty of any of the following offenses shall be sentenced to death after consideration of the factors under section 23–1702 of this chapter and in the course of a hearing held pursuant to such section, if it is determined that the imposition of a such a sentence is justified:
(1) An offense described in section 798 of an Act to establish a code of law for the District of Columbia, approved March 3, 1901 (sec. 22–2101, D.C. Official Code) (murder in the first degree).
(5) An offense described in section 207 of the Anti-Sexual Abuse Act of 1994 (sec. 22–3008, D.C. Official Code) (first degree child sexual abuse).
If, in a case involving an offense described in section 23–1701 of this chapter, the attorney for the Government believes that the circumstances of the offense are such that a sentence of death is justified under this chapter, the attorney shall, at a reasonable time before the trial or before acceptance by the court of a plea of guilty, sign and file with the court, and serve on the defendant, a notice— (A) stating that the Government believes that the circumstances of the offense are such that, if the defendant is convicted, a sentence of death is justified under this chapter and that the Government will seek the sentence of death;
If the attorney for the Government has filed the required notice under subsection (a) and the defendant is found guilty of, or pleads guilty to, an offense described in section 23–1701 of this chapter, the judge who presided at the trial or before whom the guilty plea was entered, or another judge if such judge is unavailable, shall conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine the punishment to be imposed.
the finder of fact shall consider whether all the aggravating factor or factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh all the mitigating factor or factors found to exist to justify a sentence of death
Based upon this consideration, the jury by unanimous vote, or if there is no jury, the court, shall recommend whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, to life imprisonment without possibility of release, or some other lesser sentence.
The Act, and the amendment made by this Act, shall apply with respect to offenses committed on and after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Section 1 names the proposal the “Restoring the Death Penalty in the District of Columbia Act,” with “Restoring the Death Penalty in DC Act” as an alternative short title.
This Act may be cited as the Restoring the Death Penalty in the District of Columbia Act or Restoring the Death Penalty in DC Act.
The proposed death-penalty chapter would cover eight listed offenses: first-degree murder; first-degree murder involving railroad obstruction or displacement; murder of a law enforcement officer or public safety employee; solicitation of murder; first-degree child sexual abuse; acts of terrorism; use, dissemination or detonation of a weapon of mass destruction; and distribution of controlled substances to minors when it results in a minor’s death. Eligibility would not by itself require a death sentence; the prescribed hearing would have to find that sentence justified.
A defendant who has been found guilty of any of the following offenses shall be sentenced to death after consideration of the factors under section 23–1702 of this chapter and in the course of a hearing held pursuant to such section, if it is determined that the imposition of a such a sentence is justified:
(1) An offense described in section 798 of an Act to establish a code of law for the District of Columbia, approved March 3, 1901 (sec. 22–2101, D.C. Official Code) (murder in the first degree). (2) An offense described in section 799 of such Act (sec. 22–2102, D.C. Official Code) (murder in the first degree - placing obstructions upon or displacement of railroads). (3) An offense described in section 802a of such Act (sec. 22–2106, D.C. Official Code) (murder of law enforcement officer or public safety employee). (4) An offense described in section 802b of such Act (sec. 22–2107, D.C. Official Code) (solicitation of murder). (5) An offense described in section 207 of the Anti-Sexual Abuse Act of 1994 (sec. 22–3008, D.C. Official Code) (first degree child sexual abuse). (6) An offense described in section 103 of the Ant-Terrorism Act of 2002 (sec. 22–3153, D.C. Official Code) (acts of terrorism). (7) An offense described in section 105 of such Act (sec. 22–3155, D.C. Official Code) (use, dissemination, or detonation of a weapon of mass destruction). (8) An offense described in section 406 of the District of Columbia Uniform Controlled Substance Act of 1991 (sec. 48–904.06, D.C. Official Code) (distribution to minors) which results in the death of a minor.
The judge or jury would consider notified aggravating factors—circumstances supporting a death sentence. These would include a death during a violent or dangerous crime or attempt; knowingly creating a grave risk of death to another person during the offense or escape; torture or serious physical abuse; substantial planning and premeditation; a victim especially vulnerable because of age or infirmity; and committing the offense as part of gang membership or association.
the finder of fact shall consider each of the following aggravating factors for which notice has been given and determine which, if any, exist:
(1) The death, or injury resulting in death, occurred during the commission or attempted commission of a crime of violence or dangerous crime.
(3) The defendant, in the commission of the offense, or in escaping apprehension for the commission of the offense, knowingly created a grave risk of death to not less than 1 other person in addition to the victim of such offense. (4) The defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner in that it involved the use of torture or serious physical abuse to the victim.
(7) The defendant committed the offense after substantial planning and premeditation.
(9) The victim was particularly vulnerable due to old age, youth, or infirmity.
(17) The defendant committed the offense as part of their membership or association with a criminal street gang.
Paying or promising anything of financial value to arrange the offense, or committing it in return for receiving or expecting to receive anything of financial value, would also be aggravating factors.
(5) The defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment, or promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value. (6) The defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in the expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value.
Criminal-history aggravating factors would include a prior conviction for a violent or dangerous crime; prior convictions for at least two drug-distribution offenses committed on different occasions, each punishable by more than one year of imprisonment; prior convictions for at least two offenses committed on different occasions involving the infliction or attempted infliction of serious bodily injury or death, each punishable by more than one year; and a prior conviction for an offense resulting in death for which life imprisonment or death was authorized. The two-offense thresholds and the prior death-resulting offense cover federal, state, state political-subdivision or D.C. offenses. The list also includes a prior conviction for an offense against someone under 18 and a conviction for a sex offense against someone under 18; the latter provision does not expressly say “previously.”
(2) The defendant has previously been convicted of a crime of violence or a dangerous crime.
(8) The defendant has previously been convicted of not less than 2 Federal, State, including any political subdivision of a State, or District of Columbia offenses punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year and which were committed on different occasions and involved the distribution of a controlled substance.
(11) The defendant has previously been convicted of not less than 2 Federal, State, including any political subdivision of a State, or District of Columbia offenses punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year and which were committed on different occasions and involved the infliction of, or attempted infliction of, serious bodily injury or death upon another person. (12) The defendant has previously been convicted of a Federal, State, including any political subdivision of a State, or District of Columbia offense resulting in the death of a person, for which a sentence of life imprisonment or a sentence of death was authorized by statute.
(16) The defendant previously has been convicted of committing an offense against a person who has not attained 18 years of age.
(18) The defendant has been convicted of committing a sex offense against a person who has not attained 18 years of age.
Other aggravating factors would concern offenses against current or former law enforcement officers, judicial officers or prosecutors during or because of their official duties; government officials during or because of their duties or because of their official status; and witnesses or potential witnesses targeted to impede or deter prosecution.
(13) The defendant committed the offense against— (A) a Federal, State, or local law enforcement officer or any such former officer during or because of the performance of his or her official duties; (B) a judicial officer, former judicial officer, prosecutor, or former prosecutor, during or because of his or her official duties; or (C) a Federal, State, local, or District of Columbia government official— (i) while he or she is engaged in the performance of his or her official duties; (ii) because of the performance of his or her official duties; or (iii) because of his or her status as an official. (14) The offense was committed against a witness or potential witness committed at any time during the criminal process for the purpose of impeding or deterring prosecution of any crime.
Being in lawful custody or escaping it during the offense, and committing the offense during a prison term, would be aggravating factors. The list is open-ended: another aggravating factor could be considered if notice had been given.
(10) The defendant, during the commission of the offense, was in, or escaped from, the lawful custody of a law enforcement officer or place of lawful confinement.
(15) The offense was committed during the term of imprisonment of such person.
(19) Any other aggravating factor for which notice has been given.
The judge or jury would have to consider mitigating factors—reasons against a death sentence. These include significantly impaired understanding or self-control, unusual and substantial duress, and relatively minor participation in an offense committed by another person, even when those circumstances do not provide a defense to the charge. An equally responsible defendant not receiving death would also be a mitigating factor.
the finder of fact shall consider any mitigating factor, including the following: (1) The defendant’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct or to conform conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, regardless of whether the capacity was so impaired as to constitute a defense to the charge. (2) The defendant was under unusual and substantial duress, regardless of whether the duress was of such a degree as to constitute a defense to the charge. (3) The defendant is punishable as a principal in the offense, which was committed by another, but the defendant’s participation was relatively minor, regardless of whether the participation was so minor as to constitute a defense to the charge. (4) Another defendant, or defendants, equally culpable in the crime, will not be punished by death.
Additional mitigating factors would include no significant prior criminal history, severe mental or emotional disturbance, and the victim’s consent to the conduct that caused the victim’s death. Other circumstances of the offense or aspects of the defendant’s background, record or character could also count against imposing death.
(5) The defendant did not have a significant prior history of other criminal conduct. (6) The defendant committed the offense under severe mental or emotional disturbance. (7) The victim consented to the criminal conduct that resulted in the victim’s death. (8) Other factors in the defendant’s background, record, or character or any other circumstance of the offense that mitigates against the imposition of a sentence of death.
For the sentencing factors, the proposal would use existing D.C. Code definitions of “crime of violence” and “dangerous crime.” Its definition of “law enforcement officer” would include people legally authorized to prevent, investigate, prosecute or adjudicate offenses, expressly including peace officers, corrections officers and firefighters. The incorporated definitions in section 23–1331 are not supplied.
(c) Definitions In this section: (1) Crime of violence; dangerous crime The terms crime of violence and dangerous crime have the meanings given such terms in section 23–1331. (2) Law enforcement officer The term law enforcement officer is a person authorized by law to conduct or engage in the prevention, investigation, or prosecution or adjudication of an offense, and includes peace officers, corrections officers, and firemen.
A prosecutor who believes death is justified in a case involving a listed offense would have to file and serve notice a reasonable time before trial or acceptance of a guilty plea. The notice would state that the government will seek death and identify the aggravating factors it proposes to prove. The court could permit changes to the notice for good cause.
If, in a case involving an offense described in section 23–1701 of this chapter, the attorney for the Government believes that the circumstances of the offense are such that a sentence of death is justified under this chapter, the attorney shall, at a reasonable time before the trial or before acceptance by the court of a plea of guilty, sign and file with the court, and serve on the defendant, a notice— (A) stating that the Government believes that the circumstances of the offense are such that, if the defendant is convicted, a sentence of death is justified under this chapter and that the Government will seek the sentence of death; and (B) setting forth the aggravating factor or factors describe in section 23–1702(a) of this chapter that the Government, if the defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death. (2) Good cause amendments The court may permit the attorney for the Government to amend the notice upon a showing of good cause.
After the required notice and a conviction or guilty plea, a separate sentencing hearing would ordinarily use the trial jury. A new jury would hear sentencing after a guilty plea, a trial without a jury, discharge of the original jury for good cause, or required reconsideration of the sentence. That new jury would have 12 members unless the parties agreed to fewer and the court accepted. A judge alone could conduct the hearing on the defendant’s motion with the prosecutor’s approval.
If the attorney for the Government has filed the required notice under subsection (a) and the defendant is found guilty of, or pleads guilty to, an offense described in section 23–1701 of this chapter, the judge who presided at the trial or before whom the guilty plea was entered, or another judge if such judge is unavailable, shall conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine the punishment to be imposed. Such hearing shall be conducted— (1) before the jury that determined the defendant’s guilt; (2) before a jury of 12 members (or less if the parties so stipulate and the court accepts) impaneled for the purpose of the hearing if— (A) the defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty; (B) the defendant was convicted after a trial before the court sitting without a jury; (C) the jury that determined the defendant’s guilt was discharged for good cause; or (D) after initial imposition of a sentence under this section, reconsideration of the sentence under this section is necessary; or (3) before the court alone, upon the motion of the defendant and with the approval of the attorney for the Government.
The sentencing hearing could receive relevant information, including trial materials, defense information supporting mitigation and government information supporting notified aggravating factors. No presentence report would be prepared for that hearing. Information could be admitted even if ordinary criminal-trial evidence rules would exclude it, but the court could exclude information when its evidentiary value was outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion or the risk of misleading the jury.
At the sentencing hearing, information may be presented as to any matter relevant to the sentence, including any mitigating or aggravating factor permitted or required to be considered under section 23–1702. Information presented may include— (1) the trial transcript and exhibits if the hearing is held before a jury or judge not present during the trial, or at the trial judge’s discretion; (2) any information presented by the defendant relevant to a mitigating factor; or (3) any information presented by the Government relevant to an aggravating factor for which notice has been provided under subsection (a).
Notwithstanding rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, when a defendant is found guilty or pleads guilty to an offense under section 23–1701 of this chapter, no presentence report shall be prepared for the hearing under subsection (b).
Information is admissible regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials, except that information may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.
The government would argue first, the defendant could reply, and the government could respond again. Both sides would have an opportunity to rebut information and argue about the sentencing factors and whether death was appropriate.
The Government shall open the argument. The defendant shall be permitted to reply. The Government shall then be permitted to reply in rebuttal. The Government and the defendant shall be permitted to rebut any information received at the hearing, and shall be given fair opportunity to present argument as to the adequacy of the information to establish the existence of any aggravating or mitigating factor, and as to the appropriateness in the case of imposing a sentence of death.
The government would have to prove each aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant would have to establish a mitigating factor by a preponderance of the information.
The burden of establishing the existence of any aggravating factor is on the Government, and is not satisfied unless the existence of such a factor is established beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of establishing the existence of any mitigating factor is on the defendant, and is not satisfied unless the existence of such a factor is established by a preponderance of the information.
The jury, or court when there is no jury, would consider all hearing information and return special findings identifying the aggravating factors found to exist. An aggravating-factor finding would require jury unanimity. An individual juror could find and consider a mitigating factor without agreement from other jurors. If no qualifying aggravating factor were found, the court would have to impose an authorized sentence other than death.
The jury, or if there is no jury, the court, shall consider all the information received during the hearing. It shall return special findings identifying any aggravating factor or factors set forth in section 23–1702 of this chapter found to exist and any other aggravating factor for which notice has been provided under subsection (a) found to exist.
A finding with respect to a mitigating factor may be made by 1 or more members of the jury, and any member of the jury who finds the existence of a mitigating factor may consider such factor established for purposes of this section regardless of the number of jurors who concur that the factor has been established. A finding with respect to any aggravating factor must be unanimous. If no aggravating factor set forth in section 23–1702 of this section is found to exist, the court shall impose a sentence other than death authorized by law.
When an aggravating factor was found, the judge or jury would decide whether the aggravating factors sufficiently outweighed mitigating factors to justify death, or were sufficient on their own if no mitigating factors existed. A jury recommendation would require unanimity. The court would have to follow a recommendation of death or life imprisonment without any possibility of release; otherwise it would impose an authorized lesser sentence.
If, in the case of an offense described in section 23–1701 of this chapter, an aggravating factor required to be considered under section 23–1702 of this chapter is found to exist, the finder of fact shall consider whether all the aggravating factor or factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh all the mitigating factor or factors found to exist to justify a sentence of death, or, in the absence of a mitigating factor, whether the aggravating factor or factors alone are sufficient to justify a sentence of death. Based upon this consideration, the jury by unanimous vote, or if there is no jury, the court, shall recommend whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, to life imprisonment without possibility of release, or some other lesser sentence.
Upon a recommendation under section 23–1703(f) that the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without possibility of release, the court shall sentence the defendant accordingly; otherwise, the court shall impose any lesser sentence that is authorized by law.
A defendant could appeal a death sentence to the D.C. Court of Appeals within the applicable filing deadline. The appeal could be combined with an appeal of the conviction and would receive priority over all other cases. The court would review the entire record, including trial evidence, sentencing information, hearing procedures and specific findings.
In a case in which a sentence of death is imposed, the sentence shall be subject to review by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upon appeal by the defendant. Notice of appeal must be filed within the time specified for the filing of a notice of appeal. An appeal under this section may be consolidated with an appeal of the judgment of conviction and shall have priority over all other cases.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals shall review the entire record in the case, including— (1) the evidence submitted during the trial; (2) the information submitted during the sentencing hearing; (3) the procedures employed in the sentencing hearing; and (4) the special findings returned under section 23–1703 of this chapter.
The appeals court would address the issues raised and examine whether arbitrary influences affected the sentence and whether evidence supported the required aggravating finding. The text directs reconsideration for a sentence other than death when specified defects are found, including properly preserved legal errors requiring reversal. It also prohibits reversal or vacating the sentence for an error that the government proves harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court would have to explain its disposition in writing.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals shall address all substantive and procedural issues raised on the appeal of a sentence of death, and shall consider whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor and whether the evidence supports the special finding of the existence of an aggravating factor required to be considered under section 23–1702 of this chapter.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals shall remand the case for reconsideration under section 23–1703 of this chapter for imposition of a sentence other than death whenever the court of appeals finds that— (A) the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; (B) the admissible evidence and information adduced does not support the special finding of the existence of the required aggravating factor; or (C) the proceedings involved any other legal error requiring reversal of the sentence that was properly preserved for appeal under the rules of criminal procedure.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals shall not reverse or vacate a sentence of death on account of any error which can be harmless, including any erroneous special finding of an aggravating factor, where the Government establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals shall state in writing the reasons for its disposition of an appeal of a sentence of death under this section.
Subject to the execution exceptions, a person sentenced to death would be committed to the custody of the U.S. Attorney for D.C. until conviction-appeal and sentence-review procedures were exhausted. For execution, custody would transfer to the D.C. Department of Corrections director, who would supervise implementation in the District.
Except as provided under subsection (c), a person who has been sentenced to death under this chapter shall be committed to the custody of the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia until exhaustion of the procedures for appeal of the judgment of conviction and for review of the sentence. When the sentence is to be implemented, the United States Attorney shall release the person sentenced to death to the custody of the Director of the Department of Corrections of the District of Columbia, who shall supervise implementation of the sentence in the District of Columbia in accordance with subsection (b).
Electrocution would be the default execution method. A person sentenced to death could instead choose lethal injection, firing squad, lethal gas or nitrogen hypoxia by writing at least 14 days before execution. Failure to make that choice by the deadline would count as a waiver. Each person would have to receive written notice of the right to choose an alternative.
Except as provided under paragraph (2), a person sentenced to death under this chapter and released under subsection (a) to the custody of the Director of the Department of Corrections of the District of Columbia for the implementation of such sentence shall have such sentence implemented by electrocution.
A person sentenced to death under this chapter may elect to have such sentence implemented by lethal injection, firing squad, lethal gas, or nitrogen hypoxia. Such an election may be made in writing not later than 14 days before the date on which the sentence of death is to be implemented, or such election shall be considered waived.
Each person sentenced to death under this chapter shall be provided written notification of such person’s right to elect an alternate method of execution under paragraph (2).
An election of an alternative method would expire if execution were stayed or its scheduled date passed, but could be made again. A waiver of the right to choose an alternative could not be withdrawn. If the selected alternative were unavailable on execution day, electrocution would apply unless the person selected another available alternative under the choice provision. Unavailability of a selected method could not delay execution.
If, for any reason, a person so sentenced receives a stay of execution, or the execution date has passed, an election for an alternate method of execution shall be considered to have expired but may be reelected. If a person so sentenced at any point waives the right to elect an alternate method of execution, such person may not retract such waiver.
If an alternate method of execution described in paragraph (2) is not available on the date on which such method is to be implemented, the person sentenced to death under this chapter who elected such alternate method shall have such sentence implemented by electrocution, unless such person elects a different, available alternate method of execution under paragraph (2).
The implementation of a sentence of death under this chapter may not be delayed as a result of the unavailability of any selected method of execution selected under this subsection by a person sentenced to death under this chapter.
The proposal would prohibit carrying out a death sentence on a pregnant woman, a person currently under 18, or a person whose mental disability prevents understanding the death penalty and why it was imposed. These are restrictions on carrying out the sentence; the age language does not expressly address age when the offense occurred.
(c) Exceptions A sentence of death shall not be carried out upon— (1) a woman while she is pregnant; (2) a person who has not attained the age of 18; or (3) a person who, as a result of mental disability, lacks the mental capacity to understand the death penalty and why it was imposed on that person.
The bill would amend D.C. Code section 22–2104(a) to add references to death sentences: it would qualify the words “first degree” and insert death-sentence language after “intends to seek” and “shall be sentenced.” The surrounding existing statute is not reproduced, so these textual changes do not establish its complete revised operation.
Section 801(a) of an Act to establish a code of law for the District of Columbia, approved March 3, 1901 (sec. 22–2104, D.C. Official Code), is amended— (A) by striking first degree and inserting first degree, if not a sentence of death as provided for in chapter 17 of title 23,; (B) by inserting a sentence of death or after intends to seek; and (C) by inserting to death or after shall be sentenced.
The proposal would define “State” to include D.C. for chapter 228 of title 18 and chapter 154 of title 28 of the U.S. Code, and update their section lists. The supplied text does not reproduce those chapters, so the full consequences of these definitions cannot be determined from this bundle.
Chapter 228 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: 3599A. State defined For the purposes of this chapter, the term State includes the District of Columbia. . (B) Clerical amendment The table of sections for chapter 228 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: 3599A. State defined.
Chapter 154 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: 2267. State defined For the purposes of this chapter, the term State includes the District of Columbia. . (B) Clerical amendment The table of sections for chapter 154 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: 2267. State defined.
Section 3 would apply the Act and its amendment to offenses committed on or after enactment. Its application date depends on enactment rather than a specified calendar date.
The Act, and the amendment made by this Act, shall apply with respect to offenses committed on and after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Section 4 would preserve the rest of the Act and other applications of its provisions if a provision, amendment or particular application were held unconstitutional. This clause states how the proposal seeks to preserve remaining provisions; it does not establish that a court would uphold them.
If any provision of this Act or any amendment made by this Act, or the application of a provision of this Act or an amendment made by this Act to any person or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act, and the application of the provision or amendment to any person or circumstance, shall not be affected by such holding.
The official-actions snapshot updated August 25, 2026, records introduction in the House on August 13, 2026, and referral that day to the Oversight and Government Reform and Judiciary committees for consideration within their respective jurisdictions. This snapshot does not establish subsequent passage or enactment.
Source snapshot updated 2026-08-25T14:17:34Z.
2026-08-13: Referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
2026-08-13: Introduced in House
A closer look
Reviewed version: Introduced in House · 2026-08-13. These findings describe provisions and who may benefit; they are not judgments of waste, corruption, or motive.
This review covers the supplied bill text. “None identified” does not rule out provisions in later versions or accompanying reports and disclosures.
Provisions outside the bill’s main subject, or policy changes attached to appropriations.
None identified in the reviewed text
No provision unrelated to the bill’s main subject or policy change attached to appropriations was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to that version and does not establish the content or attachment history of other versions or accompanying materials.
Spending directed to particular recipients or places outside ordinary competitive or formula-based allocation.
None identified in the reviewed text
No congressionally directed spending for particular recipients or places was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to that version and does not establish the absence of earmarks in other versions or accompanying materials; member requests, disclosures and committee materials were not supplied.
Narrow exceptions, exemptions, or preferential treatment that warrant a closer look.
Findings to examine
The complete supplied introduced text contains narrow exceptions to the main policy that qualify for this category. Classification describes their scope without judging their justification or implying misconduct.
Proposed section 23–1706(c) would exempt three defined groups from execution while the stated conditions apply: women who are pregnant, people who have not attained age 18, and people whose mental disability prevents understanding the death penalty and why it was imposed. These are narrow exceptions to carrying out the bill’s death sentences. They do not expressly bar imposing a death sentence, and the age exception does not expressly address age at the time of the offense. The supplied sources do not establish whether these protections would add to protections under other law.
(c) Exceptions A sentence of death shall not be carried out upon— (1) a woman while she is pregnant; (2) a person who has not attained the age of 18; or (3) a person who, as a result of mental disability, lacks the mental capacity to understand the death penalty and why it was imposed on that person.
Full text preserved for this analysis. Legislative record snapshot: Aug 25, 2026. How PlainBill uses AI