PlainBillCongress, translated.Legislation. Context. Public interest.Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Congressional Research Service
No official summary is available in the imported record yet.
People & committees
Rep. Barrett, Tom [R-MI-7] · R–MI
Legislative record
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Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Primary sources
Text links open the official source. We also preserved the text version used in the PlainBill explanation below.
No related bills are listed in this snapshot. This does not establish whether the proposal has appeared in earlier Congresses.
Source last updated: Sep 19, 2026. Consult Congress.gov for the current record.
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PlainBill explanation
Based on the full Introduced in House · 2026-05-07 text. This explanation has not received human editorial review. This overview describes the proposal’s major provisions; it does not establish what its real-world effects would be.
This proposed joint resolution would authorize the President to use U.S. military forces against Iran’s nuclear weapons program, address imminent threats, blockade Iranian ports, and protect shipping. It would exclude authorization for specified ground operations in Iran while preserving rescue and intelligence activities. The President would have to report to Congress every 30 days. The military authority would end on July 30, 2026, with up to 30 additional days solely to end deployments or engagements.
The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as the President determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to— (1) successfully demolish, degrade, or defeat the nuclear weapons program and associated delivery systems of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran; (2) address imminent threats to the Armed Forces or to United States facilities posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran or Iranian-backed forces; (3) enforce a blockade of Iranian ports; and (4) ensure safe passage for United States and allied vessels throughout the Strait of Hormuz, as well as any other vessels the President determines appropriate.
The authority granted in subsection (a) does not include any authorization for the deployment of the Armed Forces for the purpose of— (1) conducting sustained ground combat operations in the territory of Iran; (2) occupying, seizing, or holding territory within Iran; or (3) engaging in nation-building, stabilization operations, or the establishment of long-term security governance within Iran.
Nothing in this section may be construed to prohibit the use of the Armed Forces for— (1) the rescue of United States citizens or members of the Armed Forces; or (2) intelligence collection or sharing activities in support of the national security of the United States, or in support of an ally or partner force.
The President shall, at least once every 30 days, submit to Congress a report on matters relevant to this joint resolution
Except as provided in subsection (b), the authority provided in section 2 shall terminate on July 30, 2026. (b) Limited wind-Down period For an additional period of not more than 30 days after the date described in subsection (a), the authority provided in section 2 may be exercised only as necessary to end the deployment or engagement of the Armed Forces.
Section 1 would name the measure the “2026 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iran.”
This Joint Resolution may be cited as the 2026 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iran.
The introductory statements describe military action on February 28, 2026, and a report to Congress on March 2, 2026. They assert that Congress had neither declared war nor specifically authorized the hostilities and that the War Powers Resolution’s 60-day period had expired. These are the proposal’s stated premises, not independently verified conclusions.
Whereas the President of the United States took military action on February 28, 2026, against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and later submitted a report to Congress on March 2, 2026, pursuant to the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93–148);
Whereas Congress has not declared war with respect to, or provided any specific statutory authorization for, hostilities involving United States Armed Forces against the Islamic Republic of Iran;
Whereas the sixty-calendar-day period specified in section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(b)) has expired; and
Section 2 would permit, rather than require, military force as the President determines necessary and appropriate to demolish, degrade, or defeat Iran’s nuclear weapons program and associated delivery systems, and to address imminent threats to U.S. forces or facilities from Iran or Iranian-backed forces.
The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as the President determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to— (1) successfully demolish, degrade, or defeat the nuclear weapons program and associated delivery systems of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran; (2) address imminent threats to the Armed Forces or to United States facilities posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran or Iranian-backed forces;
The proposed military authority would also cover enforcing a blockade of Iranian ports and ensuring safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz for U.S. and allied vessels. The President could also select other vessels for that protection.
(3) enforce a blockade of Iranian ports; and (4) ensure safe passage for United States and allied vessels throughout the Strait of Hormuz, as well as any other vessels the President determines appropriate.
The proposed authority would not authorize deployments to conduct sustained ground combat in Iran, occupy, seize, or hold Iranian territory, or undertake nation-building, stabilization operations, or long-term security governance there. This limits the authority granted by this proposal.
The authority granted in subsection (a) does not include any authorization for the deployment of the Armed Forces for the purpose of— (1) conducting sustained ground combat operations in the territory of Iran; (2) occupying, seizing, or holding territory within Iran; or (3) engaging in nation-building, stabilization operations, or the establishment of long-term security governance within Iran.
Section 2 could not be interpreted to prohibit military rescues of U.S. citizens or service members. It would also preserve intelligence collection or sharing supporting U.S. national security or an ally or partner force.
Nothing in this section may be construed to prohibit the use of the Armed Forces for— (1) the rescue of United States citizens or members of the Armed Forces; or (2) intelligence collection or sharing activities in support of the national security of the United States, or in support of an ally or partner force.
The proposal states that Section 2 would supply specific congressional approval for military force under the cited War Powers Resolution provisions. It would leave all other requirements of that law in place.
Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.
Nothing in this joint resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.
Section 3 would require presidential reports to Congress at least every 30 days. Reports would cover actions under this authorization and relevant military operations relying on other authorities, explain their legal and policy grounds, describe the expected scope and duration of hostilities, and assess civilian and military casualties. Reports must be unclassified but could include a classified attachment.
The President shall, at least once every 30 days, submit to Congress a report on matters relevant to this joint resolution, including— (1) actions taken pursuant to the exercise of authority granted in section 2; (2) a description of any military operations conducted in reliance on authorities other than the authority granted in section 2; (3) an explanation of the legal authority for each action and operation described in paragraphs (1) and (2); (4) policy justifications for each action and operation described in paragraphs (1) and (2); (5) the expected scope and duration of hostilities associated with each such action and operation; and (6) an assessment of civilian and military casualties.
The report required by this section shall be submitted in unclassified form and may contain a classified annex.
Section 4 would terminate Section 2’s authority on July 30, 2026, except for a wind-down period of no more than 30 additional days. During that period, the authority could be used only as necessary to end military deployments or engagements.
Except as provided in subsection (b), the authority provided in section 2 shall terminate on July 30, 2026. (b) Limited wind-Down period For an additional period of not more than 30 days after the date described in subsection (a), the authority provided in section 2 may be exercised only as necessary to end the deployment or engagement of the Armed Forces.
The supplied actions snapshot, updated September 19, 2026, records introduction in the House and referral to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 7, 2026. It does not establish the measure’s subsequent disposition or enactment.
Source snapshot updated 2026-09-19T23:32:57Z. 2026-05-07: Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 2026-05-07: Introduced in House
A closer look
Reviewed version: Introduced in House · 2026-05-07. These findings describe provisions and who may benefit; they are not judgments of waste, corruption, or motive.
This review covers the supplied bill text. “None identified” does not rule out provisions in later versions or accompanying reports and disclosures.
Provisions outside the bill’s main subject, or policy changes attached to appropriations.
None identified in the reviewed text
No unrelated provision or policy change attached to appropriations was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion does not extend to other versions or accompanying materials.
Spending directed to particular recipients or places outside ordinary competitive or formula-based allocation.
None identified in the reviewed text
No congressionally directed spending for particular recipients or places was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion does not establish the absence of earmarks in other versions or accompanying materials.
Narrow exceptions, exemptions, or preferential treatment that warrant a closer look.
None identified in the reviewed text
No materially narrow preferential benefit warranting a finding was identified in the complete supplied introduced text. This conclusion is limited to that version and does not extend to other versions or accompanying materials.
Full text preserved for this analysis. Legislative record snapshot: Sep 19, 2026. How PlainBill uses AI